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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the meaning of metaphors. In particular, it examines a 
contemporary dispute in the philosophy of language, primarily comprising critical 
responses to Donald Davidson's seminal work in the area, which focuses on the question 
of whether metaphorical utterances, qua metaphors, ought to receive distinctive semantic 
evaluations. I treat this debate as an instance of a more general form of philosophical 
dispute, which has been explored in some detail in recent work on the nature of realism 
and anti-realism. 
The thesis has five chapters. In the first chapter, I outline, motivate and evaluate two 
contrasting approaches to realism, proposed by Michael Devitt and Crispin Wright. I 
argue that neither is wholly satisfactory, but that a modified version of Wright's 
approach is likely to be most fruitful in the philosophy of metaphor. In the second 
chapter, I examine the character of Davidson's anti-realism, concluding that he is best 
thought of as an error-Theorist about metaphorical meaning. I go on to set out a unified 
Davidsonian argument for semantic and pragmatic anti-realism about metaphor, and 
offer a sustained discussion and partial defence of the six premises that such an 
argument proceeds from. 
My third chapter outlines a series of common objections to Davidson's views, and 
argues that error-theorists have the resources to address many of these criticisms in a 
fairly plausible manner. In the fourth chapter, I go on to investigate the realist standing 
of metaphorical meaning in more detail. I examine the open-endedness of metaphor in 
the light of Wright's response-dependent theory of intention, and argue that this 
approach offers a novel response to certain anti-realist concerns. 
The fifth chapter concerns the relationship between metaphor and non-conceptual 
content. I argue that thinking of metaphorical meanings as non-conceptual entails that 
the non-propositional and limitless character of metaphor does not pose a fatal objection 
to a pragmatic realist account, contra Davidson. I apply my suggested account to two 
test cases: metaphors that describe one's emotional state, and religious metaphors, and 
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argue that in each case, thinking of the metaphors as expressing non-conceptual contents 
is potentially suggestive and helpful. In that chapter, I also examine the possibility of an 
robustly realist approach to metaphorical meaning, modelled on the epistemicist 
approach to vagueness set out in recent work by Timothy Williamson. I demonstrate 
how the dominant objection to this account can be partially defused, and go on to 
examine the final standing of the dispute between realist and anti-realist. 
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Preface 
In this essay, I examine some of the ways in which a particular debate in the philosophy 
of metaphor -a debate which concerns, to put it crudely, the question of whether 
metaphors have meaning - can inform, and be informed by, contemporary reflections on 
realism and anti-realism. This choice of subject matter has the distinct disadvantage that 
neither topic is particularly pre-theoretically gripping. On the one hand, reflection on 
the core elements shared by, say, moral realism, scientific realism and mathematical 
Platonism is an especially abstruse variety of philosophical activity, one where obtaining 
the requisite alpine clarity of overview requires getting accustomed to thinner air than 
that which surrounds the more pressing, felt, substantive, first-order philosophical 
problems. The interest of undergraduates or non-philosophers is more easily sparked 
when considering the nature of scientific success, or the problems of reconciling the 
claims of justice and welfare,. than when identifying the best formulation of cognitivism, 
or the relationship between metaphysical and semantic accounts of realism. 
Metaphor might seem a juicier topic of discussion than realism, but the particular 
question of metaphorical meaning is rarely felt to be worthy of serious consideration. 
Blank stares from the folk are hardly unsurprising in this area. If by `meaning' we mean 
the property that ordinary speakers of English tend to attribute in their talk about 
meaning and meaningfulness, it can scarcely be denied that metaphors are meaningful. 
The debate I am concerned with, unsurprisingly, appeals to a more technical notion of 
metaphorical meaning; otherwise this would be a very short book. Once again, however, 
the price of precision and theoretical interest is a certain dislocation from first order 
issues. It is easy to feel, when reading even the best work by analytic philosophers on 
the topic of metaphor that something has been lost; that the original motivation for 
engaging in talk of metaphorical meaning involved some quite separate impulse, perhaps 
misplaced or ill-conceived, but in any case somewhat orthogonal to the debates that we 
find ourselves engaging in. 
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I do not in any way intend these remarks to signal a lack of engagement with, or 
enthusiasm for, the question of realism, or the methodology of analytic philosophy of 
language. My sympathies lie wholly with that tradition. The point is rather simply to 
signal explicitly that this book, like those of many analytic philosophers, may deliver 
results that are less well integrated with efforts in other arts and humanities subjects, and 
with the wider practical concerns of those whose work or life involves grappling with 
language, than might have been hoped. I would have liked to have written a book that 
had some consequences for the way real metaphors are actually thought about and 
interpreted. I might yet, but I rather fear this is not it. 
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1. Truth, Realism and Balance 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this book is to examine the way in which recent work on realism might help 
advance attempts to give a satisfactory answer the following question: do metaphors, 
qua metaphors, express distinctive linguistic meanings? In this chapter, I begin to set 
out what I take to be the most constructive way of characterizing the nature of the debate 
between realists and anti-realists in general, considered in abstraction from any given 
subject matter. My hope is that regarding the disagreement between those theorists who 
think that metaphors are typically associated with characteristic meanings, and those 
who do not, as a special instance of such a general form of debate about realism, will 
cast some welcome light on some difficult issues in the philosophy of metaphor. I begin 
this more challenging work in later chapters. For the present, my concern is primarily 
elucidatory. 
I introduce the topic, in Sections 1.2-1.5, by elaborating two influential contemporary 
conceptions of that debate, presented in recent work by Michael Devitt and Crispin 
Wright. ' I argue that the generality and topic-neutrality of Wright's conception offers a 
more attractive approach for our purposes, and that there are in any case some reasons to 
remain suspicious of Devitt's presentation of the issues. Since much of the interest of 
Wright's approach relates to the `cruces', or tests for the realist standing of a given type 
of fact, that he outlines, I go on to examine and discuss a selection of such criteria in 
some detail in the next four sections. 
However, I do not embrace Wright's approach uncritically. In the final section, I raise 
some worries which relate to the putatively unassuming character of a minimalist 
approach to truth, and, relatedly, to the suggestion that an anti-realist construal of a 
given area of thought ought to be the default dialectical position. I conclude by briefly 
1 See Devitt (1997) and Wright (1992) 
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outlining a conception of the realist/anti-realist debate that seems to me to respect many 
of Wright's key insights, but which seems to avoid some of the more unwelcome 
implications of his position. 
1.2 Realism, Existence and Independence 
Michael Devitt has argued that we ought to characterise realism about the external world 
in the following terms: 
Devitt's Realism Tokens of most current common-sense and scientific physical 
types objectively exist independently of the mental. 2 
The various elements of this definition require some elucidation. Devitt tells us that for 
a token of some common-sense type (chairs, tables, mountains) or scientific type 
(electrons, quarks) to exist objectively is to for the object not to be 
constituted by our knowledge, by our epistemic values, by our capacity to refer to it, by 
the synthesizing power of the mind, by our imposition of concepts, theories, or 
languages. 3 
It is not wholly clear what Devitt means by an object being `constituted by our 
knowledge', or by our epistemic values, but the thrust of the thought about objective 
existence is, I hope, clear. His common-sense realist thinks of the world as being as it is 
regardless of our epistemic and semantic access to it. 
Such a conception of objectivity might seem to make the qualification regarding 
independence from the mental redundant. Devitt, recognises this possibility, but argues 
that it is worth including it to forestall the possibility that a sophisticated anti-realist 
might posit unknowable or unconceptualized entities, that were nevertheless somehow 
dependent on minds for their existence. Perhaps certain past, non-actualised `permanent 
possibilities of sensation' might have this status, for example. Such an anti-realist might 
2 See Devitt (1997) Ch. 2, passim. 
3 Ibid, p. 15 
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argue that she too could provide an account of our common-sense intuitions regarding 
the objective existence, in the above sense, of the external world. 
In any case, Devitt is surely right to endorse the idea that realism about an external 
world commits one to this kind of modesty - to use Wright's terminology - in 
characterising the degree to which the existence and nature of the external world 
depends on human minds and cognitive abilities. It is also common ground that such 
realism involves a certain epistemic presumption, marked in the case at hand by Devitt's 
inclusion of ontological commitment to many of the entities postulated by contemporary 
scientific theory. Let us grant, finally, that anti-realism about the external world can be 
characterised in general terms as the rejection of either such modesty or presumption. 4 
I have deliberately laid stress upon the sense in which Devitt and Wright agree on a core 
general characterisation of realism, and, ipso facto, anti-realism. The key elements - 
independence and existence, modesty and presumption - comprise a shared and plausible 
background theory, even if differences of emphasis remain. Issues become more 
contentious, and more immediately pertinent to the project at hand, with the following 
questions 
1. Is it unproblematic to extend this kind of general picture of realism to debates 
between realists and anti-realists. in other areas of discourse? 
2. How might actual debates between realists and anti-realists be profitably 
prosecuted? 
3. Given the above intuitive characterisations give a satisfactory account of realism 
and anti-realism in general, which particular species of each genus are tenable, 
and which most plausible, in particular disputes? 
Much of this book will examine potential answers to the third question with reference to 
the special case of realism about metaphorical meaning. I will concentrate for the 
4 See Wright (1992) pp. 1-3 
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moment, therefore, on briefly examining the divergent answers that Devitt and Wright 
offer to the first two questions. 
1.3 Extending Devitt's Account? 
Devitt is explicitly concerned with realism about the external world, committed to the 
existence and mind-independence of both common-sense and scientific entities. He 
does, however, extend his account beyond this domain. For example, he argues for a 
certain realist attitudes towards semantics, which he call `the factual perspective'. 5 He is 
also defends a certain kind of value realism, with respect to epistemic value. 6 These 
further realisms are defended, in part, by appeal to external world realism, but it should 
be clear that they are logically independent from it. (For example, Davidsonians reject 
the factual perspective on semantics, and many philosophers would feel suspicious of 
the claim that empirical procedures can establish normative claims. ) Each of these 
further realist theories, however, fits more or less into the model Devitt has set out as 
constitutive of external world realism. In each case, instances of semantic and epistemic 
properties are thought of as existing objectively, and doing so in a manner which is not 
constitutively dependent on human cognitive responses. 7 
Moreover, each of the realist accounts that Devitt offers are in accord with a certain set 
of methodological `maxims' that he offers: 
Maxim 1 In considering realism, distinguish the constitutive and evidential issues. 
5 See e. g. Devitt (1997) p. 190: "From [the factual] perspective the semantic properties of symbols are 
explanatory in theories of mind and language. Thus, on the one hand, their existence is supported by a 
wide spectrum of evidence, and, on the other hand, their nature is not determined by that evidence". 
6 Ibid p. 78 "I see no reason to doubt that most questions of the goodness of [epistemic] procedures are 
concerned with objective matters of fact. Though this normative task is outside psychology, it is not 
outside science... It is an empirical, question which procedures are good". 
Except perhaps per accidens, as when all the instantiated semantic properties are properties of creatures 
with minds. It is not clear what Devitt should say about this kind of case. 
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Maxim 2 Distinguish the metaphysical (ontological) issues of realism from any 
semantic issue. 
Maxim 3 Settle the realism issue before any epistemic or semantic issue. 
Maxim 4 In considering the semantic issue, don't take truth for granted. 
Maxim 5 Distinguish the issue of correspondence truth from any epistemic issue. 
It is not wholly clear what the status of such maxims are. There is clearly something 
right about the idea that e. g. epistemological, metaphysical and semantic issues can often 
be profitably distinguished from one another. On the other hand, there is something 
uncomfortable - at least it feels so to me - about taking such maxims to be simply an 
expression of methodological inclination. I shall try and give more substance to this 
intuition in my discussion of the self-reflective worries for Wright's minimalism in 
Section 1.10 below. 
For the moment, I simply want to note that, even if we follow such maxims, there is 
some reason to wonder whether Devitt's model of external world realism can be 
extended straightforwardly to cover other realist/anti-realist disputes. Bernhard Weiss, 
for example, claims that if 
we thought of realism as a view about a certain range of entities then we would miss the 
potential similarities between realism about, say, other minds and realism about the past 
(where norange of entities seems to be under discussion). 8 
Weiss's latter example is, perhaps, poorly chosen. At least one realist/anti-realist debate 
about the past - that conducted between eternalists and presentists - precisely turns on 
the existence or non-existence of a range of entities, with the eternalist holding, and the 
presentists denying, that past and future objects and events exist in just the same sense as 
present ones do. I think his general point is well taken, though. There are cases where it 
is difficult to think of realism as consisting in the combination of existence and 
8 Weiss (2002) p. 51 
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independence that Devitt appeals to in the case of common-sense objects. One example 
might be the debate about the existence of qualia. Neither friends nor foes of qualia 
need think of them as existing wholly independently of human subjective responses; 
quite the opposite. Both realists about qualia and their opponents can accept that the 
existence of qualia depends on their being perceived. This seems straightforwardly 
inconsistent with Devitt's characterisation of independence. 9 Perhaps some adjustment 
could be made to that theory, to allow us to state the similarities and differences between 
external world realism and qualia realism perspicuously. Surely, however, it is 
methodologically desirable, when engaging in reflection on philosophical debates and 
positions, to be able to operate at a level of abstraction that enables us to draw analogies 
directly with similar debates in other areas. It seems that Devitt's account of external 
world realism does not generalise straightforwardly to other debates in this way. 
Another example might be the debate between genuine modal realists and actualist 
realists. 10 Both groups of theorists can hold that possible worlds exist, and that such 
possible worlds are mind-independent. There is a real sense, however, in which the 
actualist defends a less realist position than the genuine modal realist. (That is why 
actualist realism has proved to be a more attractive option in the debates about 
modality). A useful overview of the realism issue should allow us to draw finer grained 
distinctions than Devitt's account, as it stands, allows us to do. 
Again, it might be the case that Devitt's account could be extended or modified so as to 
include the kind of generality and topic-neutrality that it currently seems to lack. " The 
maxims that I outlined earlier might seem to offer a natural starting point for such a 
expanded project. For the moment, I merely-want to insist that Devitt's treatment of 
external world realism is not straightforwardly extensible to other, seemingly directly 
analogous areas of thought, and that therefore, as it stands, gives us only limited insight 
into how actual debates between realists and anti-realists in other contexts might actually 
9 See Devitt (1997) p. 16 "The realist rejects esse estpercipi for the objects he believes in. No object that 
is tied to perception for its very existence has the required independence". 
10 I follow Divers (2002) in using `actualist realism' to refer to the position that Lewis (1986) terms `ersatz 
realism', and Stalnaker (1976) terms `moderate realism'. 
11 One way would be to avoid talking of modal realism simpliciter, and instead distinguish e. g. realism 
about possible worlds, from realism about possibilia. 
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proceed. Rather than exploring possible ways in which Devitt's account might be 
developed, however, I now want to turn my attention to a different approach, set out in 
recent work by Crispin Wright, which seems to build in from the start exactly the kind of 
generality, fine-grainedness and dialectical sensitivity required for the project at hand. 
1.4 Wright on Truth 
Wright's approach to the question of realism proceeds via the notion of truth. He is a 
truth minimalist in two senses. Firstly, he is a minimalist about truth. In this context, a 
minimalist about truth is someone who holds that it is necessary and sufficient for a 
particular linguistic expression to qualify as a truth predicate that its use accord with a 
particular set of interlinked `platitudes'; putatively a priori principles that `chime with 
12 our ordinary thinking about truth'. These platitudes include, for example 
Transparency to assert, doubt, fear, that p is to assert, doubt, fear, that p is true. 
Embedding aptitude for truth is preserved under embedding - in particular, 
truth-apt propositions have negations, conjunctions, disjunctions, 
etc., that are themselves truth-apt. 
Correspondence for a proposition to be true is for it to reflect reality, accurately 
reflect how matters stand, `tell it like it is', etc. 
Contrast a proposition can be true without being justified and vice versa. 13 
The platitudes are intended to capture the `minimal' set of commitments incurred by any 
theorist who is concerned with truth in the relevant sense at all. They are `common 
I, 
12 Wright (1999) `Truth: A traditional debate reviewed', p. 226. The canonical statement of Wright's 
minimalism is given in his (1992). See also his (1998) for a useful summary of the position. 
13 Wright (1999) p. 227. Other platitudes relate to the absoluteness and timelessness of truth, as well as 
the `opacity' of truth - this latter embracing a variety of principles to the effect that a particular truth might 
be outside a particular speaker's or community's cognitive reach at a particular time, or at any actual time, 
or for any possible time. 
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ground' between different substantive conceptions of the nature of truth, and between 
proponents of substantive theories of truth and their deflationary opponents. For 
example, both correspondence and coherence theorists of truth are committed to the. 
truth of the correspondence platitude, although only the former attempts to base a theory 
of truth on a philosophically rich conception of what that relation amounts to. In effect, 
the platitudes serve to implicitly define the notion of truth, but remain silent whether it 
has an essential nature, or if so, what that essence might consist in. 
The second sense in which Wright is a minimalist concerns truth-aptitude. A utterance 
is truth-apt in the relevant sense if it can be (semantically) correct to evaluate it as true 
or false. 14 A discourse about a particular subject matter - morality, say, or colour - is 
truth apt if a suitable range of the utterances which go to make up the discourse are truth 
apt. This second aspect of minimalism itself involves two sub-components. Wright 
argues that it will be necessary and sufficient for a particular discourse to be apt for the 
application of a truth-predicate that the discourse in question involves assertoric content. 
This, I think, ought to be uncontroversial. For a sentence of a language to possess 
assertoric content is simply for it to be capable of being used, in a suitable context, to 
say something about how things are. Once we have such a notion of a sentence saying 
how things are, it ought to be a short step to characterising a sentence as true if things 
are indeed how it says they are, and false otherwise. 15 
14 One might say: if it can have the property of being true or false, were it not for the deflationist's denial 
that the truth predicate genuinely attributes a property. I should note here that, for ease of exposition, I 
blur over important differences between describing utterances, sentences, sentences in a language, etc, as 
truth apt. 
15 For reasons of space, I here will rely on appeal to this intuitive link between possession of assertoric 
content and truth aptitude. For an explicit demonstration that any sentence that meets the constraints of 
syntax and warrant will be apt for the application of a predicate that accords with the set of platitudes 
referred to above, see the first two chapters of Wright (1992). The basic idea is that if, as outlined below, 
it suffices for a sentence to possess assertoric content that it a) has a certain syntactic form and b) is 
associated with a suitable set of conditions under which we count it as epistemically warranted, then it 
ought to make sense of it being capable of meeting those conditions, and of it continuing to do so under 
arbitrarily close scrutiny of the warrant with which we hold it, and arbitrarily large improvements of our 
`informational state'. Wright calls sentences that meet such conditions superassertible, and argues that 
superassertibility counts as a truth predicate, in that it satisfies all the relevant platitudes. I discuss 
superassertibility further in Section 1.6. 
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The second, more controversial and distinctive claim of the minimalist about truth- 
aptitude, is that it suffices for a discourse to possess assertoric content that it meet 
certain constraints regarding firstly, syntax and secondly, discipline. 16 The syntactic 
criteria - roughly, that the relevant sentences should embed appropriately within the right 
logical and propositional attitude contexts - suffice to ensure that an utterance is 
assertoric in character, syntactically suitable to act as a conventional vehicle for a saying 
that p. Sayings should allow for the expression of belief, for the drawing of inferences 
on the basis of the information that they carry, and for disagreement about their 
accuracy, and the relevant syntactic embeddings ensure that these demands can be met in 
ways that are syntactically well-formed. 
The second constraint insists that there should be public norms which determine the 
conditions under which particular claims within the discourse in question ought to be 
asserted or denied. '7 Wright thinks of these as being cashed out in epistemic terms, 
claiming that the use of the sentences in question must be governed by `agreed standards 
of warrant'. The demand that a discourse display this kind of discipline is intended to 
ensure that we are dealing with something genuinely worth regarding as content- 
involving, serving to carry information about how the speaker takes the world to be. 
Meeting the constraint establishes the type of minimal normative standard which is 
often taken to be necessary for linguistic meaning, since it allows a distinction to be 
drawn between cases in which a sentence or term is correctly used, and those in which it 
is misapplied. It is an important component of Wright's claim that such standards must 
include prescriptive and descriptive norms; there must be something like rules 
governing particular assertoric moves within the discourse, and participants in the 
discourse must to some degree also actually respect such rules. 
41 
In summary, then Wright's key claims are as follows; 
16 So again, we have two sub-components. The structure is as follows: Wright's truth minimalism consists 
of two claims, about truth and truth-aptitude. The latter comprises two sub-claims a) that possession of 
truth aptitude is co-extensional with possession of assertoric content and b) that it suffices for an utterance 
or discourse to be truth apt that it meet two constraints regarding i) syntax and ii) discipline. 
"See Wright (1998) p. 185, and, for a fuller account of the nature and motivation of the background 
conception of warranted assertibility, Wright (1993) pp. 35-40,403-433. 
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1. it suffices for a sentence (which comprises part of a linguistic practice) to possess 
assertoric content that it meet minimal constraints relating to syntactic form and 
public standards of epistemic warrant18 
2. any such sentence which possesses assertoric content will be suitable for the 
application of a certain predicate T that accords with a certain set of platitudes 
3. any predicate that accords with such platitudes will be a truth predicate. 
1.5 Pluralism, Truth and Realism 
As well as subscribing to minimalism about truth and truth-aptitude, Wright endorses a 
pluralism about truth. This should not be thought of as involving an ambiguity in the 
meaning of the predicate `_ is true'. That term can be thought of as being wholly 
(implicitly) defined by the set of platitudes that serve to identify the characteristic 
`marks' of truth. Rather, truth-pluralism comprises the claim that what constitutes truth 
might vary from discourse to discourse: 
The kind of plurality that's envisaged may be brought out by a comparison with identity. 
Minimally, identity can be characterised as that relation which is universally reflexive 
and a congruence for an arbitrary property. To that extent, the concept of identity is 
uniform across varying kinds of object. But that uniformity had better be consistent with 
our recognising that what constitutes identity is subject to considerable variation 
depending on the kinds of objects concerned. The identity of material objects is 
constituted by spatial and temporal continuity; for cardinal numbers, according to 
Frege's famous proposal, identity is constituted by the one to one correspondence of an 
associated pair of concepts; for the directions'of a pair of straight lines, identity is 
constituted by those lines being parallel; and for persons, identity is constituted by - 
well, it's notoriously difficult to say, but the case is different from each of the preceding. 
Identity, one might thus say, is formally uniform, but may vary in constitution as we 
IS I prescind here from the interesting a pressing question of how we can genuinely talk in terms of 
epistemology and warrant in a way that doesn't presuppose the notion of truth, contrary to the direction of 
Wright's derivation. 
18 
consider different potential identicals. Clearly there is space for a similar contention 
about truth ... 
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Wright's central idea in Truth and Objectivity is that we can profitably approach the 
question of realism by consideration of the different ways in which truth might be 
constituted in different areas of thought and language. We have already seen that 
Wright and Devitt converge fairly sharply on an intuitive construal of realism about the 
external world. Whereas Devitt tackles the issue in rigorously anti-semantic terms, 
however - witness his second and third methodological maxims - Wright attempts to 
approach it via an inquiry into the nature of truth as we apply it to talk about observable, 
everyday objects (and their scientific cousins). 
The inquiry takes the form of the examination of a number of `cruces'; distinctive 
properties which it is possible for truth-predicates in given areas of discourse to display, 
and which can serve to focus the debate between the realist and anti-realist, in a 
satisfyingly wide number of philosophical contests. Wright discusses four such key 
properties in Truth and Objectivity: Evidence Transcendence, the Order-of- 
Determination Test, Cognitive Command and Width of Cosmological Role. Since I 
agree that each of these marks an important area of focus for disputes about realism, and 
they shall play an important role in later chapters, it is worth examining each constraint 
in some detail here. 
1.6 Evidence Transcendence 
Michael Dummett has famously, or infamously, argued that realism about a given area 
of fact consists in the view that the language in which we describe such facts includes 
sentences with `evidence-transcendent' truth conditions, grasp of which constitutes 
mastery of such sentences. 20 For example, realism about the external world is the view 
that understanding certain sentences (about e. g. inaccessible planets) involves grasping 
truth-conditions that in a certain sense `outrun' our current evidence; realism about 
19 Wright (1998) p. 186 
20 Classic statements can be found in Dummett (1978) and Dummett (1991). 
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mathematics is the view that understanding certain sentences (about e. g. Goldbach's 
conjecture) involves grasping truth-conditions that similarly transcend our current 
evidence; etc. More precisely, Dummett's Realism consists of the following claim 
(DR) The literal content of realism about a given area of fact A consists in 
semantic realism about the sentences that concern A 
where semantic realism is characterised as follows 
(SR) Our understanding of undecidable sentences about an area of fact A 
consists in grasp of their truth conditions, where an undecidable sentence 
is one that meets the following two conditions 
a) we currently have no evidence that bears on its truth or its falsity 
b) we do not know a procedure which, if correctly implemented, is 
guaranteed after finitely many steps to put us in a position where we have 
evidence that it is either true or false. 21 
There are some important issues which arise with respect to this formulation regarding, 
for example, the question of whether the relevant notion of evidence is one which 
essentially involves a certain transparency, so that one who had such evidence would 
know that she did so; the extent to which we are permitted to idealize away from some 
of our contingent human limitations, etc. It is more important for our immediate 
purposes, however, to get clearer on the motivation for Dummett's view, and the sense 
in which elements of such a Dummettian approach are carried over into Wright's 
Evidence Transcendence test. 
Few contemporary philosophers are convinced that debates between realists and anti- 
realists can only be literally construed in terms of semantic realism, as (DR) claims. 
Certainly, the claim requires much more support than Dummett, or any other 
21 Here and elsewhere in this section I have benefited from Alexander Miller's discussion of theses issues 
in Miller (forthcoming, a) and Miller (forthcoming, b). My formulation of semantic realism draws directly 
on Miller (forthcoming, a), Sections 3 and 4. 
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philosopher, has given it to date, if it is to deserve acceptance. A more modest claim, 
however, while hardly uncontroversial, has more widespread support: 
(DR*) (At least) one important element of an intuitive realism about a given area 
of fact A, in the presence of certain fairly plausible background 
assumptions, entails semantic realism about A-sentences. 
Why ought we to believe (DR*)? Firstly, let's get clearer on the nature of some 
`background assumptions' that might be relied upon in establishing it. These include the 
following: 
P1) If a subject S understands a statement T, then he knows what it states. 
P2) If a statement T states that P, and a subject S knows what T states, then he knows 
that T states that P. 
P3) If S knows that T states that P, then, by virtue of that very fact, S knows that 
(things are as T states they are if and only if P) 
P4) If, in virtue of the fact that S knows that T states that P, S knows that (things are 
as T states they are if and only if P), then S knows that the truth condition of T is 
P. 
These seemingly platitudinous assumptions can be employed in an argument to the 
effect that understanding a given statement entails grasping its truth conditions. 
1) S understands statement T. Assumption. 
2) T states that P. Assumption 
3) S knows what T states. By 1, P1), MPP 
4) S knows that T states that P By 2,3, P2), MPP 
5) In virtue of the fact that S knows that T states that P, S knows that (things 
are as T states they are if and only if P). By 4, P3, MPP 
6) S knows that the truth condition of T is P By 5, P4, MPP 
7) If S understands statement T, that states that P, then he knows that the 
truth condition of T is P. By 1,2,6, 
Conditional Proof 
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I think that the premises of the above argument are true, for one important sense of 
linguistic `understanding', and that the argument is valid. 22 Be that as it may, it must be 
granted that the premises are at least prima facie plausible and the line of thought prima 
facie coherent. 23 Moreover, the argument seems to provide initial support, perhaps via 
an inference to the best explanation, for the following thesis 
(TC) Understanding an assertoric utterance of a declarative sentence consists in 
grasp of its truth conditions. 
Now, recall that one element of an intuitive realism about e. g. the external world 
identified by both Devitt and Wright comprised a certain modesty about humanity's 
relationship to the universe; that the world's existence and nature does not depend in any 
way on our 
knowledge... our epistemic values.. . our capacity to refer to it... the synthesizing power 
of the mind.. . our 
imposition of concepts, theories, or languages. 24 
Given the absence of such dependence, it ought to be possible, by the realist's lights, for 
the world to be a given way - say, for conditions C to obtain in the heart of a black hole 
- even though we have no evidence that bears on the matter, and have no idea how we 
might even begin to instigate a search for such evidence. The case is similar for the 
mathematical Platonist, the realist about the past, the genuine modal realist, etc. Thus, it 
22 In this I diverge from both Devitt and Miller, who are sympathetic to the thought that P2 involves an 
illegitimate substitution into an opaque `knows-what' context. I think this is simply an error. Some 
`knows-what' contexts do not allow certain inferential transitions. For example, if I know what gold is, 
and gold is John's favourite element, it does not follow that I know what John's favourite element is, or 
that it is gold, at least on one disambiguation of those claims. However, some other such contexts clearly 
do allow such transitions: if I know what your favourite colour is, and your favourite colour is red, then it 
follows that I know that your favourite colour is red. The above inference is, I believe, of the latter, 
harmless kind. See Devitt (1991) pp. 270-271, and Miller (forthcoming, b), Section 7 for discussion. 
23 There is no doubt a perfectly good sense of understanding in which one can understand a declarative 
sentence without knowing what it states - for example, if you don't know the semantic value of indexical 
or demonstrative expressions it contains. Nevertheless, there's also a perfectly good sense in which if you 
don't know such facts, you don't really understand the statement. 
24 Devitt (1997) p. 15 
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seems that a central element of realism about certain areas entails a commitment to the 
possibility of there being undecidable sentences in that area, in the sense that I outlined 
above. Now, given a truth-conditional conception of meaning, as characterised in (TC), 
we can argue to (SR) as follows 
1) A central element of an intuitive realism about an area of fact A is the 
commitment to a modest conception of the relationship between human beings 
and the existence and nature of A-facts. 
2) In many areas where realism is at issue, a modest conception of the relationship 
between human beings and the existence and nature of A-facts entails the 
possibility of there being an undecidable A-sentence such that 
a) we currently have no evidence that bears on its truth or its falsity and 
b) we do not know a procedure which, if correctly implemented, is guaranteed 
after finitely many steps to put us in a position where we have evidence that it is 
either true or false. 
3) Given the above two premises, it follows that, in many areas where realism is at 
issue, a central element of an intuitive realist view of an area of fact A commits 
one to the possible existence of undecidable A-sentences. 
4) By (TC), understanding an assertoric utterance of a declarative sentence consists 
in grasp of its truth conditions. 
5) By 3) and 4), it follows that, in many areas where realism is at issue, a central 
element of an intuitive realist view of an area of fact A commits one to the 
possible existence of undecidable A-sentences, where our understanding of 
assertoric utterances of such sentences would consist in grasp of their truth 
conditions. 
6) By (SR), semantic realism is the thesis that our understanding of undecidable 
sentences about an area of fact A consists in grasp of their truth conditions 
Conclusion: In many areas where realism is at issue, a central element of an intuitive 
realism about an area of fact A commits one to the possibility of semantic 
realism about A-sentences. 
The above argument, then, seems to give us grounds to subscribe to (DR*) 
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(DR*) (At least) one important element of an intuitive realism about a given area 
of fact A, in the presence of certain fairly plausible background 
assumptions, entails semantic realism about A-sentences. 
Such grounds are, of course, defeasible, and the line of argument is no doubt vulnerable 
to attack at many points. Nevertheless, given (DR*), we can begin to see why Wright 
identifies the question of whether we can make sense ofA-facts obtaining in an 
evidence-transcendent manner as an important crux for realism disputes. 
The connection runs in two directions. Firstly, evidence that semantic realism is 
somehow incoherent, or in any case implausible in some strong sense, will, given (TC), 
be evidence that an important element of realism is implausible. Dummett and Wright's 
reflections on e. g. how semantic competence is acquired and manifested, the rule- 
following considerations, etc., are of course intended to provide exactly such evidence 
against semantic realism. 25 
Secondly, a defence of the claim that there can be undecidable sentences of a given 
discourse counts against the claim that truth in that area can be constituted by 
superassertibility. A sentence is superassertible, remember, if we are capable of gaining 
evidence that would epistemically justify its assertion, given our current state of 
information, and we would remain so justified given any way that that state of 
information might be `enlarged or improved'. 26 An undecidable sentence is one whose 
assertion cannot be so justified, and thus one whose truth cannot consist merely in being 
superassertible. Thus, given that a construal of truth as superassertibility seems to 
favour an anti-realist construal of the nature of the contested discourse, with truth being 
`built out of' uman epistemic concerns and standards, a demonstration of the possibility 
of undecidable sentences in a given discourse blocks one important anti-realist version 
25 See e. g. Wright (1993) pp. 13-29, Hale (1997) passim, Miller (forthcoming aand b), Miller (2002) for a 
detailed overview and appraisal of the strategy. 
26 See Wright (1992) pp. 47-48. The formal definition he gives there runs as follows: a sentence is 
superassertible if and only if it is, or can be, warranted, and some warrant for it would survive arbitrarily 
close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive increments to or other forms of improvement of our 
information. The notion is introduced and elaborated in Ch. 13 of Wright (1993). 
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of the truth-constituting property. Providing a defence of the possibility of undecidable 
A-sentences, therefore allows the realist to foreclose on an anti-realist account of A-facts 
which presents them as constructed from human assertoric practices and values. 
Much more could and should be said here, but my purpose is to provide an outline of 
why evidence transcendence matters to realism disputes, not to extend or evaluate those 
disputes. Suffice it for the moment to say that the following test 
Evidence Transcendence Does the discourse at issue include sentences with regard 
to which a) we27 have no evidence that bears on their truth 
value, and b) we lack a conception of any way in which 
we might come to get such evidence? 
seems prima facie to provides one genuine and important focus for critical attention 
when determining whether a realist construal of that discourse is appropriate. 
1.7 The Order-of-Determination Test 
The second focus for debates about realism that Wright identifies concerns the 
Euthyphro dileninia, or Order-of-Determination test. Wright is interested in different 
ways of interpreting what he calls `Provisional Equations', which take the following 
general form 
(PE) For a set of optimal conditions C, a state of affairs P, and a subject S: 
If C holds, then (It would be the case that P iff S would judge that P). 
There are two different ways, Wright thinks, that we could understand the case where 
(PE) holds true for a particular C, P and S. We could understand the C-conditions as 
being such as to allow S to successfully track an independently obtaining fact that P. 
That is, we could understand the biconditional as indicating that S judges that P because 
27 Or, perhaps, some suitably idealised counterparts of us. 
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P is the case. For example, we might understand the instance of (PE) that told us that, 
under relevant C-conditions, S judged that x was square when and only when it was 
square, as holding because (i) x was in fact square, and (ii) under conditions C, S is a 
competent judge of squareness. Call this the extension-reflecting reading. 
On the other hand, we could understand the biconditional as indicating that it is S's best 
opinion that constitutes the fact that P. In this case, we understand it as telling us that P 
is the case because S judges that P. For example, we might take the instance of (PE) 
that told us that, under relevant C-conditions, S judged that x was funny when and only 
when it was funny, as holding because the facts about funniness depend on our best 
judgements about what's funny. Call this the extension-determining reading. 28 It is 
clear that the extension-determining reading of the biconditional is far more conducive 
to an anti-realist view of the state of affairs P, and that the extension-reflecting reading is 
similarly conducive to realist intuitions about the mind-independence of the relevant 
species of fact. 
How are we to tell which way we should read the Provisional Equation in any given 
case? Wright's idea is that it should be read as extension determining just in case it 
meets a set of further constraints. First, the C-conditions must be specified in 
philosophically substantial terms, not by means of a `whatever it takes' ceteris paribus 
clause. Secondly, they must be a priori true. Third, whether the C-conditions are 
satisfied must be logically independent of facts about P. And finally, our case for 
reading it as extension determining must be extremal: there must be no better 
explanation of why the first three conditions are satisfied than the claim that S's best 
judgements constitute the fact that P. 
What is the motivation behind these constraints? Wright wants to test whether or not a 
particular biconditional is extension determining or extension reflecting by examining 
whether or not there is a merely accidental, a posteriori, contingent link between our 
best judgements and whether or not the fact that P holds. That kind of link is what we 
28 Since the PE only tells us about what is happening in optimal conditions, Wright normally describes our 
optimal judgement of whether Pas at best partially determining the facts about P. I have often blurred 
this distinction here. 
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would expect if the realm of fact in question had the sort of constitutive independence 
from human responses that realism attributes to it. It is clear, however, that if we specify 
the C-conditions by means of a `whatever it takes' clause, the biconditional will hold 
trivially true, and thus prevent us from examining whether the link between judgement 
and fact holds merely contingently. 29 So we must specify the C-conditions in more 
detail, without appeal to ceteris paribus clauses. If we do so, and the biconditional holds 
a priori, then that will be a sign that the facts of the matter cannot come apart from our 
best judgements of the matter, and thus that we should construe the Equation in the 
extension-determining sense. But such a sign will only be an accurate guide if the 
further two conditions hold. 
The independence condition is required in order that we can allow echoing, making use 
of the very concepts that we are concerned with in specifying the optimality conditions, 
without running the risk that we might be jeopardising the idea that the a prioricity of 
the PE can be a test of whether the relevant concepts are extension-reflecting or - 
determining. By making sure that the concepts only occur, if at all, in contexts governed 
by intensional operators, we ensure that there is no 'hidden reference' to the extension 
built into the optimality conditions. We avoid the charge that in specifying the 
conditions under which, for example, we can best judge whether something is red, we 
have implicitly appealed to an response-independent property of redness, thereby 
rendering our proposed test valueless. 
The extremal condition, that there must be no better explanation of why the first three 
conditions are satisfied than that S's best opinions constitute the fact that P, is intended 
to leave room for the idea that the a priori co-extensiveness of judgement and fact might 
be a result of our infallibility about a particular type of fact, for example, and not an 
indication that our judgements constitute the relevant facts. In effect, the condition 
ensures that if we are to be justified in claiming such infallibility we must be able to give 
a pretty detailed story of why and how we can be infallible about this particular type of 
29 I blur here the important distinction between necessity and a prioricity. In the case of extension 
determining judgements, Wright seems to see the facts about our judgements as being the truth makers for 
e. g. the facts about what we meant. The a prioricity of the biconditional is interpreted as a sign that 
judgement and fact are non-contingently linked. 
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fact. In the absence of such a story, we are entitled to assume that our best judgements 
determine what the facts are. 
Given the fit between the extension-determining reading and anti-realism, it again seems 
that we have grounds to hold, prima facie at least, that Wright has identified another 
important question for disputants to focus on 
Order-of-Determination Given that we can identify a true Provisional Equation 
involving the discourse at issue, do the best judgements of 
ideally placed subjects constitute the relevant facts, or 
merely track independently constituted facts? 
1.8 Cognitive Command 
The third test suggested by Wright attempts to establish whether thought and talk about 
the area in question is richly representational, in the sense that we might expect if a 
realist construal of the relevant discourse was appropriate. If the states of affairs in 
question really do have the kind of independence and autonomy that the realist attributes 
to them, then when we come to successfully represent them in thought and talk, we 
interact with the world in a way which is cognitive in a rich sense. On the contrary, if 
the states of affairs are essentially best thought of as shadowy projections of human 
thought or normative practice, as the anti-realist maintains, then talk of substantive 
cognitive achievement is misplaced, and such `representation' is a thin relation, secured 
merely by a certain sensitivity to the internal norms of the language game in question. 
Wright's discussion of this crux for realism is rather confusing. He appeals to the 
following `incontestable' principle: 
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Convergence/Representation If two devices each function to produce 
Platitude representations, then if conditions are suitable, 
and they function properly, they will produce 
divergent output if and only if presented with 
divergent input. 30 
Given such a platitude about representation, Wright thinks, we can generalise to a third 
test for realism 
Cognitive Command Does the discourse display Cognitive Command? 
when that notion is defined as follows 
(CC) A discourse displays Cognitive Command if and only if it is a 
priori that differences of opinion arising within a given discourse 
can be satisfactorily explained only in terms of `divergent input' 
(that is, the disputants working on the basis of different 
information, and hence guilty of ignorance or error, depending on 
the status of that information), or `unsuitable conditions' 
(resulting in inattention or distraction, and so in inferential error, 
or oversight of data, etc. ), or `malfunction' (for example, 
prejudicial assessment of data, upwards or downwards, or dogma, 
or failings in other categories already listed). 31 
As Edwards has pointed out, however, it is rather difficult to see the route that Wright 
discerns here. 32 If the Convergence/Representation Platitude is really a platitude, 
then it seems difficult to see how it can serve to differentiate genuine, thick 
30 Wright (1992) p. 91 
31 Wright (1992) pp 92-93. See also Ch. 4, passim, where he defines the notion as follows (p. 144): a 
discourse meets Cognitive Command if and only if it is a priori that differences of opinion formulated 
within the discourse, unless excusable as a result of vagueness in a disputed statement, or in the standards 
of acceptability, or variation in personal evidence thresholds, so to speak, will involve something that may 
properly be regarded as a cognitive shortcoming. 
32 See Edwards (1994) pp. 66-69 
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representation from its minimalist simulacrum. This reflection, of course, doesn't 
invalidate the proposed test, merely the considerations that Wright appeals to in order to 
motivate it. It can still mark a discourse as apt for a realist understanding that it stand in 
relations of representation that are cognitive in a thick sense, and Cognitive Command, 
correctly understood, may provide a useful first step towards a characterisation of just 
such a sense. 
What if somebody insists that mere ignorance of the fact in question - whether a 
particular shade is red, for example, or whether a particular metaphor means that P- 
inevitably does involve something properly thought of as a cognitive shortcoming? That 
is, what if somebody insists that the real effect of the Convergence/Representation 
Platitude is to ensure that the mere truth-aptness of a discourse, even those for which 
only a minimalist treatment is appropriate, entails that any disagreement about a given 
statement signals a lack of grasp - on the side of at least one of the participants - of the 
way things genuinely are, although perhaps only resulting from ignorance of that very 
fact? For this type of objector, the price of the notion of representational content that the 
minimalist employs is the surrender of the possibility of cognitively faultless 
disagreement about whether the world fits a given representation or not. 
Wright has replied in various ways to this worry, the effect of which is to trivialise the 
(Cognitive Command) constraint by ensuring that any disagreement, whether 
apparently relating to genuine objective fact, or reflecting mere differences of 
inclination, is going to involve one of the disputants getting something wrong, namely, 
the truth value of the very proposition that they are disagreeing about. His response in 
Truth and Objectivity is to claim that the burden of proof is always on the side of the 
party who wants to argue that, in a particular discourse, there can be culpable cognitive 
dysfunction which consists solely of our ignorance of the very proposition whose realist 
standing is at issue. 33 
Consider a case where have a disagreement about say, whether a certain speaker had a 
given communicative intention. In order for such discussion to display Cognitive 
Command, we must assume that the parties agree on all questions of a non-intentional 
33 And e. g. disjunctions involving such propositions, etc. 
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character, (since otherwise the parties would be working on the basis of different 
information, contra the first clause of the constraint). The issue at hand is whether or 
not divergent opinions regarding, say, a particular intention, must betray ignorance on 
one side or the other, given that none of the other explanations noted in (CC) are 
available. 
Wright's claim in Truth and Objectivity is that the burden of proof always lies on the 
part of the theorist who holds that, in any disagreement about the truth value of an 
assertion - even one in which all other relevant facts are agreed upon - there is always a 
cognitive shortcoming. His idea is that talk of a cognitive shortcoming betrays a 
commitment to an object, fact or state of affairs with which we cognitively interact in 
some sense, even if merely by representing it as obtaining. Now, either the existence of 
such an entity will be in principle detectable or it will not. If not, then we need an 
account of how we can acquire and manifest grasp of the relevant concept. For example, 
in the case of intention, we need to be shown how to make sense of the notion of action- 
directing psychological states that can outrun all possibility of human cognitive contact. 
Such a demonstration may perhaps be given, but if so, it will surely be unsurprising that 
the discourse deserves a realist construal, since the relevant facts will clearly have the 
kind of autonomy from human cognitive affairs that realism maintains. The interesting 
case, therefore, is when the theorist holds that we can come to have warranted beliefs 
about such facts. 
In that case, Wright thinks, it is incumbent on the theorist who holds that e. g. talk about 
intentions meets Cognitive Command to identify an epistemological route to externally 
constituted facts about intentions. The theorist must, that is, provide details of when and 
how we might be justified in holding that such a fact obtains, bearing in mind that all 
other relevant facts are agreed upon, and that vagueness, varying standards of evidence, 
etc., have been excluded by hypothesis. Only if this type of route is provided has the 
intended sense of `cognitive' been respected. Otherwise, in the absence of a substantive 
epistemology, we are entitled to conclude that the sense of cognition in question is 
merely a minimal one, that consists in no more than adherence to the relevant practice- 
internal standards of the discourse. 
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Such an epistemological route will presumably be either inferential, as in e. g. our 
knowledge of mathematical theorems or direct, as in perception and memory. If direct, 
then the case for acceptance of a perceptual or otherwise intuitional epistemology needs 
to be made. If indirect, it seems that the parties who disagree about whether P must 
disagree about the inferential transitions that `link' that fact to others, since, by 
hypothesis, there is agreement on matters that don't make mention of the particular fact 
that P, and on norms and degrees of justification, etc. In the example at hand, there must 
be disagreement about the `principles' linking the possession of a given intention with 
e. g. uncontested behavioural and dispositional facts. For example, I might assert, and 
you reject, the claim that a particular pattern of behaviour is constitutively tied to 
possession of the intention in question, so that if the subject behaves in such a way, she 
possesses the intention. 
Now, the status of these (conditional) principles has to be investigated. Since Cognitive 
Command is claimed to be being met trivially, these conditionals should also display it. 
Otherwise, the standards of acceptability that govern the discourse would permit 
differing opinions, since they would count both adherence and non-adherence to such 
principles to be acceptable. In that case, the discourse would not meet Cognitive 
Command. 34 So now we either need an intuitional epistemology for these, or help in 
understanding how their truth can outrun our cognitive powers, or another conditional, 
containing the original as consequent, for which the same problems will arise. 
Eventually, the thought is, the `trivialising' theorist is going to have to provide some 
substantive intuitional epistemology for the facts in question, or accept that the relevant, 
`robust' sense of cognitive achievement is simply not in play here. 
In effect, Wright's insistence on the provision of an epistemological route equates to the 
claim that `cognitive shortcoming', in the intended sense, entails some failure of 
substantive epistemological process, rather than being signalled merely by disagreement 
about whether a given representational content `fits the world'. Cognitive Command is 
passed when it makes sense to think of us coming to grasp a given fact by means of 
some substantive epistemological procedure, tracing back ultimately to the fact in 
34 See note 31, above for the formulation that includes `standards of acceptability'. 
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question, rather than merely being sensitive to the assertoric norms of a given linguistic 
practice. 
In more recent work, Wright has clarified how he thinks the Cognitive Command 
constraint should be defended in the light of a more telling formulation of the problem. 
The overall aim, remember, is to defend the constraint from the trivialising response, 
that is, the claim that mere ignorance of the purported fact in question can count as a 
cognitive failing, and thus that all discourses in which talk of assertoric content is 
appropriate will trivially meet Cognitive Command. We can take the response as 
crystallised in what Wright calls the Simple Deduction. Thus, where P is any claim that 
is at most minimally true, held true by a thinker A and held false by a thinker B: 
1,1) A accepts P- A 
2 2) B accepts ,P-A 
3 3) A's and B's disagreement involve no cognitive shortcoming. -A 
4 4) P -A 
2,4 5) B is guilty of a mistake, hence of cognitive shortcoming. -2,4 
2,3 6) ,P-4,5,3, RAA 
1,2,3 7) A is guilty of a mistake, hence of a cognitive shortcoming. -1,6 
1,2 8) Not-(3) -3,3,7 
RAA 
I canvassed above Wright's idea that enforcing a distinction between the sense of 
cognitive shortcoming as failure of process, and as failure of agreement, might help in 
avoiding the trivialising objection. The distinction was there left intentionally vague, but 
is fleshed out by Wright in his analogy between genuinely representational discourses 
and taking a photograph 
two cameras that produce different - conflicting - representations of the same scene 
must, one or both, have functioned less than perfectly, not merely in the sense that one 
(or both) gives out an inaccurate snapshot but in the sense that there must be some 
independently noticeable defect, or limitation, in the process whereby the snapshot was 
produced. So too, it might be suggested, with Cognitive Command: the motivated 
requirement is that differences of opinion should involve imperfections of pedigree: 
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shortcomings in the manner in which, one or both, they were arrived at, of a kind that 
might be appreciated independently of any imperfection in the result. 35 
Unfortunately for that plausible thought, it looks like an amended version of the Simple 
Deduction can be run for the `process' sense of cognitive shortcoming. 36 Consider a case 
where we are dealing with a subject matter, where if a particular fact holds, we must be 
able to come to know that it does by implementing a humanly feasible process. Thus, 
the following Evidential Constraint (EC) holds for the subject matter in question: 
(EC) P -> it is feasible to know that P. 
We can run an argument structurally parallel to the Simple Deduction, with A, B, P as 
defined there, as follows: 
1 (1) A believes P, B believes -'P, and neither has a cognitive shortcoming. - A 
2 (2) P -A 
2 (3) It is feasible to know that P - 2, EC 
1,2 (4) B believes the negation of something feasibly knowable - 1,3 
1,2 (5) B has a cognitive shortcoming -4 
1 (6) -, P - 2,1,5 RAA 
1 (7) It is feasible to know that ,P - 6, EC 
1 (8) A believes the negation of something feasibly knowable - 1,7 
1 (9) A has a cognitive shortcoming -8 
(10) Not-(1) - 1,1,9 RAA. 
Since the cognitive shortcoming in this case involves error about something which is 
within human cognitive grasp, there must be an error in the application of procedure and 
not just concerning the particular fact at issue. Thus, the line of defence proposed by 
Wright in Truth and Objectivity, where he suggests that the burden of proof should be 
placed on the side of the `realist' about the fact at issue to make good on an explanation 
of the relevant epistemology, looks beside the point. For here we have case where the 
's Wright (2001) p. 57-5 8 
36 See Shapiro and Taschek (1996), and Wright (2001) 59-62 
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epistemology of the matter is, by hypothesis, not in question, since EC holds. But if the 
discourse is one in which we want to hold that a substantive realism is not an option - 
say, talk about the twee, or smug - then it seems difficult to see how we can defend such 
a position. For if EC holds, then it seems that there can be no room for intelligible, 
blameless, differences of opinion about whether e. g. Clive James is smug. One party is 
always in the wrong. Given that cognitive blamelessness seems to be an essential 
feature of such disputes of inclination, and one that in part motivates an intuitive anti- 
realism, it seems that Cognitive Command fails to adequately capture the key 
distinction in the area. 
Since Cognitive Command plays an important role in Alison Denham's defence of a 
non-reductive cognitivism about metaphor, which I discuss in Section 3.5, I have 
included a fairly substantive introduction to it here. I ought to briefly note, however, 
that Wright's current position is that his previous conception of what a dispute of 
inclination fundamentally consists in takes us down the wrong path. For he thinks that 
leads us to think of cognitively blameless situations as a kind of third option, so that we 
know that either (i) A knows that P (ii) B knows that Not-P, or (iii) we know that neither 
P nor -P is knowable. In cases where EC holds, this picture clearly cannot work, at 
least as long as LEM is assertible. For then it looks like we are holding the following 
inconsistent set true: 
(LEM) P or -P 
(EC) P -> OK(P) 
(X) OK (-, OK(P) & -'OK(-'P)) 
In conjunction with LEM, EC lets us derive [OK(P) or OK(-'P)]. Another application of 
EC tells us that this itself is feasibly knowable. But then, with (*), we effectively have 
the claim that propositions of the form ('R & 'S) and (R or S) can be simultaneously 
feasible to know. On the plausible assumption that the relevant sense of feasible 
knowability involves knowledge of actual fact, this is contradictory. 
Wright's suggestion is that instead of construing disputes of inclination as cases where 
we can come to know that neither side is at fault, we should instead think of them as 
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cases where we cannot, in some suitably epistemic sense, identify which side the fault is 
on, and, moreover, that we have no idea whether it even is metaphysically possible to 
come to identify such fault. In this case, Wright describes us as being in a Quandary 
with respect to the truth value of the disputed proposition; we do not know whether or 
not P, or any means or method of coming to know whether or not P; we cannot produce 
a reason for thinking there is any way of knowing whether or not P and do not even 
know whether it can be known that P, (in some strongly modal sense of `can'). 
In cases where we find ourselves in a quandary, Wright holds, we should reject LEM, 
while holding onto its double negation. 37 Since 
(LEM) P or 'P 
(EC) P -> OK(P) 
(Q) -K (OK (P or 'P))38 
is an inconsistent set, 39 while 
(--LEM) -(P or -, P) 
(EC) P -> OK(P) 
(Q) -'K (OK (P or -'P)) 
is consistent, the way is open for Wright to claim that an acceptable anti-realist 
resolution of the aporia is to reject LEM in cases where EC and Quandary hold. This 
provides him with the resources to finesse the Simple Deduction and its EC counterpart. 
Since the claim that neither A nor B has a cognitive shortcoming has the form of a 
37 The background logic is assumed to be neutral as to the question of whether LEM holds, and thus to be 
shared ground between classical and intuitionist logicians. This is required if the realist's preferred 
resolution of the inconsistency, the rejection of EC for the discourse, is to avoid the charge of question 
begging against Wright's suggestion that in disputes of inclination we should adopt only the 
intuitionistically acceptable correlates of LEM. 
38 Wright gives the conditions for being in a quandary as a conjunction. Since the first three conjuncts 
follow from the last, I have only considered it as my (Q). 
39 Assuming LEM as a substitution instance in EC, we could come to know that it was possible to know P 
or 'P, contra Q. 
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negative existential statement, the attempted reductio only takes us to a doubly negated 
existential conclusion. Since this is not intuitionistically equivalent to the existential 
claim that a cognitive shortcoming exists, Wright thinks the bullet can be safely bitten 
without incurring unwanted realist commitment to the existence of an apparently 
unknowable state of affairs settling the dispute `beyond our ken'. (Of course, he is also 
committed to denying that such a state of affairs fails to exist, but given intuitionistic 
logic, these claims are compatible). 
We may seem to have come a long way from metaphorical meaning. But the relevance 
of our current discussion actually isn't hard to see. We will want to know whether we 
can safeguard the intuition that there can be genuine disputes of inclination about 
metaphorical content. This involves giving an account of how such a dispute can 
genuinely be a dispute (contra e. g. the Indexical Relativist, and the Expressivist) and 
genuinely one of inclination (contra the Realist and Error theorist, both of whom are 
committed to holding that the facts are holding us to account in some sense, and thus 
that inclination can only spring from ignorance of one kind or another). The promise of 
Wright's account was that minimalism about truth could guarantee the first, and failure 
of Cognitive Command account for the second. The Simple Deduction forced a 
clarification of the sense in which inclination holds sway in the kind of cases we're 
interested in. The key result turned out to be the claim that, in cases where EC holds, 
ignorance is involved in disputes of inclination, but not in the way that either the Realist 
or the Error Theorist claimed. Rather, Wright claimed that while the assumption that 
there was no cognitive shortcoming led to a contradiction, this did not automatically 
supply us with a warrant to assert that such a cognitive shortcoming must exist in every 
case. While the Simple Deduction threatened to trivialise the Cognitive Command 
constraint by reducing to absurdity the idea that the world could be somehow neutral on 
the issue of whether P or not P, Wright's argument trades on the fact that our state of 
information warranting assertions can be so neutral, even when we have a warrant to 
assert that not-(P or Not-P) does not hold. 
If Wright's suggestion can be made good, then we have the promise of a stable, if 
revisionary, account of how a genuine dispute about metaphorical meaning can involve 
no attribution of fault to either side, even in principle. Of course, this only evens the 
score with e. g. a determined realist, who already claims to have such an account, at least 
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if `attribution of fault' is heard as implying something like `in principle being able to tell 
which side is at fault'. Unlike the realist, however, Wright is not committed to claiming 
that such a fault exists. He may be a hair's breadth away, given his acceptance of the 
claim that it isn't the case that no such fault exists, but perhaps we should accustom 
ourselves to hair-splitting in philosophy. 
Nevertheless, I shall tend to confine my later discussion to Wright's original treatment of 
the Cognitive Command test. There are a number of reasons for this. First, I want to 
avoid prejudging the question of whether EC holds for meaning, as much as possible. 
Though I offer an extended discussion of Davidson in the next chapter, I explicitly aim 
not to appeal to doctrines, such as the `transparency' of meaning, that might not be 
common ground between rival philosophical treatments of semantics. Second, most of 
what I say elsewhere about Cognitive Command can be translated fairly 
straightforwardly into the new approach, and it would grate a little to do so explicitly on 
every occasion. Third, no sensible realist worth his salt is likely to accept the kind of 
revision of logic that Wright recommends. Given the reservations about the default 
status of anti-realism I raise in Section 1.10, and the holistic methodology I recommend 
in its place, it seems less likely that such revision will turn out to be acceptable. Fourth, 
my concern is often with e. g. Denham's and Hopkins' treatment of the cognitive status 
of metaphor, which predated Wright's recent discussion. 0 Finally, the difficulties raised 
by Wright's admirable efforts to clarify the relevant sense of genuinely cognitive should 
not lead us too quickly to reject this notion as unclear or misguided. It may well prove 
more useful to take the notion as primitive, with Cognitive Command having the status 
of an intuitive introduction, rather than an explicit definition. In any case, it is of 
independent interest to grant such an intuitive sense, and explore whether ascriptions of 
metaphorical meaning might meet it. 
1.9 Width of Cosmological Role 
The last of the cruces that Wright thinks realism debates should focus on is Width of 
Cosmological Role. This has received least attention in the literature; perhaps 
40 1 discuss Denham in Chapter 2 and 3, and Hopkins in Chapter 4 
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surprisingly, given that Wright sees it as developing and generalising a widely discussed 
view of Gilbert Harman's, which contrasts the explanatory efficacy of physical facts and 
moral facts. 41 Wright holds that the most interesting element of the contrast concerns not 
the nature of the explanation involved, but rather the nature and diversity of the 
explananda. Any discourse which fulfils the minimal conditions requisite for talk of 
assertoric content to be appropriate, will, according to Wright, allow certain types of 
explanation. Appeal to the property of being funny, to take a stock example of a merely 
minimally truth apt discourse, will allow us perfectly respectable explanations of e. g. 
people's television viewing behaviour, or the contrasting sales of certain novels. 
Harman's insight, according to Wright, is not best captured by the thought that cases 
where anti-realism is the appropriate stance are cases where talk of explanation is wholly 
inappropriate, but rather that there are certain extra `explanatory liaisons' that come into 
play in realist discourses. 
One of the most interesting things about Wright's account of realism is his insight that 
there are a range of quite distinct and separable ways in which the realist might attempt 
to give substance to his intuition that the facts in question are somehow constitutively 
independent from human interests and responses. Investigation of the variety of ways 
that such facts can enter into quite different species of explanation provides another such 
focus for investigation. One of the notable things about the type of explanatory role 
played by the comic properties of television programmes and novels, for example, is that 
it involves a route that goes `through' a certain kind of human response. The comic 
properties of things, when they explain the features of a certain situation, explain it in 
virtue of their having certain effects on certain human beings, suitably equipped with 
senses of humour. In contrast, explanations that appeal to facts which we tend to think 
of in realist terms- the fact that a certain table has a certain shape, for example - while 
they may well involve certain human responses in certain cases, need not do so in all. 
That the table has a certain shape can enter into explanations of why I choose it as an 
example in a physics tutorial, but also why it remains stable under the Earth's 
gravitational pull, why the dog likes to lie under it, why it won't fit through the door. 
These latter explanations are not mediated by human responses, judgements or values, 
41 See Harman (1997) Chapter 1 
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and their existence thus helps to give substance to realist claims about the independence 
of facts about the shape of the table from human subjectivity. 
Another key test for establishing the realist standing of a discourse, then is 
Width of Cosmological Role Can the putative realm of fact enter into explanations in a 
way that isn't secured merely by discourse about it being 
apt for minimal truth? 
It isn't wholly clear what explanatory role is secured merely by possession of the 
relevant kind of assertoric content. As noted above, Wright's discussion suggests that 
one key element is the capacity to enter into explanations that aren't mediated by the 
fully conceptualised attitudes of participants in the discourse. Something clearly seems 
right about this; if citing the existence of the relevant fact to explain why a subject holds 
a given attitude is, in a sense, merely a long winded way of noting that the subject is 
confident that the epistemic standards for a syntactically assertoric discourse have been 
met, then one would not expect that `fact' to be able to explain the behaviour of entities 
that are completely insensitive to such standards. On the other hand, there are 
complicating factors. Imagine that the world is Cartesian, and that concept users have 
non-material Cartesian egos associated with their bodies. Wouldn't it be possible that 
such egos played an explanatory role only in ways that were mediated by e. g. goals and 
beliefs? What about those who endorse David Lewis's view of possible worlds; surely 
realists, if anybody is? Does citing other possible worlds help explain what happens in 
this one, in a way that isn't mediated by our modal sense? 
It is of course wholly possible for talk of e. g. Cartesian egos, or other possible worlds to 
meet other of the tests, and yet fail this one, while still deserving to be thought of as 
realist. But it's not clear that the suggested cases genuinely pose a problem for Width of 
Cosmological Role properly understood. For one thing, it ought to be enough, perhaps, 
that the facts in question can potentially enter into a wider range of explanations than 
that secured by minimalism. For example, even if only certain kinds of causal relations 
actually do hold between minds and bodies in the Cartesian world, it ought to have been 
possible that a broader set of causal relations held between the material and immaterial 
elements of the world. If a Cartesian ego can raise my arm, then it ought to be possible 
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for a vase to be caused to break just by having such an ego think a certain thought, for 
example. Secondly, although the Cartesian case essentially involves the presence of 
conceptualised attitudes, it's not clear that it involves them in the right way. In the case 
where talk of explanation by a given fact is really just a matter of harmless paraphrase, it 
is essential that conceptualised attitudes mediate because these are required for 
sensitivity to the relevant communal epistemic standards. The Cartesian case makes 
conceptualised attitudes essential, but only as an accompanying, dependent feature of a 
metaphysical substratum, not as the genuine source of the facts in question. 
The case of possible worlds might invite a more direct reply. Perhaps the existence and 
nature of close possible worlds can partly explain e. g. why an animal's perceptual 
capacities deliver information about its environment, or why non-actually-dissolved salt 
is soluble. In any case, the primary purpose of this chapter is, as noted, to outline 
Wright's tests for realism, and not to pursue specific debates further. Since the case of 
metaphorical meaning seems unlikely to enter into the explanatory relationships in 
question, we needn't concern ourselves over much with the best formulation of the 
constraint. 
1.10 Costs and benefits of Wright's account 
At the end of section 1.2, when discussing Devitt's account of realism about the external 
world, I asked the following questions: 
1. Is it unproblematic to extend this kind of general picture of realism to debates 
between realists and anti-realists in other areas of discourse? 
2. How might actual debates between realists and anti-realists be profitably 
prosecuted? 
I suggested that Devitt's theory did not invite an unproblematic extension to wide range 
of disputes, and did not suggest a framework in which such disputes could proceed 
fruitfully. Wright's account, in contrast, offers a welcome topic-neutrality, and the 
various tests, schematic as they are, have seemed to many philosophers to provide a 
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focussed dialectical structure in which longstanding debates might advance. Moreover, 
the general tactic, of establishing key constraints or tests, which serve to signal the 
appropriate metaphysical attitude one ought to take to a given discourse, is one that 
obviously can be profitably extended beyond the set of cruces that Wright himself 
identifies. For example, in recent work Christopher Peacocke has suggested the 
following `indicators', each of which is relevant for the case of metaphorical meaning: 
a) Do true statements in the area have an a priori source? 
b) Is some role in causal explanation essential either to the truth of statements in the 
area in question, or to our having concepts of that area? 
c) Are statements in the problematic area predications of a property which also 
features in predications outside the problematic area? If so, does grasp of this 
identity of properties play some role in understanding statements in the 
problematic area? 42 
This generalised, pluralist, fine-grained, diagnostic approach to disputes about the realist 
standing of a wide variety of discourses is one I find conducive, and will comprise the 
background methodology to my project here. I do, however, want to distance myself 
from certain other elements of Wright's recommended framework for the execution of 
disputes in particular areas. 
There is of course room for local disagreement about e. g. the exact formulation of the 
relevant cruces. I have some sympathy, for example, with a complaint that Williamson 
and Blackburn make about the inclusion of a prioricity in the formulation of e. g. 
Cognitive Command, and the Order-of-Determination test. 3 It might well seem that this 
inclusion counts against the generality and topic-neutrality of the approach, and that, 
given that there are philosophers who reject the claim that we can know anything a 
priori, a more neutral formulation should be given rather in terms of e. g. `best overall 
explanation', with the putative a prioricity being a special case of the generic 
requirement, to be made out on its own terms by those sympathetic to that species of 
42 See Peacocke (1999) Section 2.4 
43 See Williamson (1996b) p 905-907, Blackburn (1998) p. 172 
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knowledge. My divergence from Wright's framework concerns a more fundamental 
structural element, however. He writes 
A truth predicate, I have argued is one which satisfies a small set of basic principles - 
most centrally, certain platitudes linking truth with assertion and negation. The 
characteristics possessed by any satisfier of these principles are the only characteristics 
essential to truth. Moreover, they are insufficient to motivate an intuitive realism about 
a discourse in which such a predicate applies. But a particular satisfier may, of course, 
have other characteristics as well. A basic anti-realism - minimalism - about a 
discourse contends that nothing further is true of the local truth predicate which can 
serve somehow to fill out and substantiate an intuitively realist view of its subject 
matter. Because of its unassuming character, this minimalism, I suggested, should 
always be viewed as the "default stance", from which we have to be shown that we 
ought to move ... It 
is realism which must try to make good its case, by showing that 
minimalism about the relevant discourse is wrong - showing that the minimal platitudes 
leave out features of the local truth predicate which substantially justify the rhetoric of 
independence, autonomy and full-fledged cognitive interaction by which realism 
pretheoretically defines itself. 44 
Wright thus takes it that the unassuming character of minimalism shifts the burden of 
proof onto the realist in any given debate. I have several worries about this move. 
Firstly, it is not clear that this way of presenting the ground rules of the debate actually 
corresponds to the way in which Wright actually proceeds. For example, in the case of 
the Order-of-Determination test, the burden of proof seems to be on the anti-realist. It is 
she who has to demonstrate that the coextension of fact and best opinion holds a priori, 
can be specified in philosophically substantive terms, etc. Presumably, by Wright's 
lights, until this demonstration is carried out successfully, we have no warrant to shift 
from an extension-reflecting reading of the relevant biconditional. But that seems to 
signal that an intuitive realism, rather than anti-realism, comprises the default position in 
considering whether this test is met. 45 
44 Wright (1992) p. 174 
45 1 owe this point to John Divers. 
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A second worry is that it is simply not clear why considerations of modesty alone should 
determine something as dialectically important as burden of proof. Why shouldn't other 
theoretical virtues - parsimony, simplicity, coherence with other established theories, 
prior plausibility, elegance - also be taken into account? Take the question of realism 
about the external world. Very few philosophers would want to insist that scepticism of 
a particular kind is the default position, even if, in a particular case, the sceptic's claims 
assume much less than our own. A standing worry is that an overly modest starting 
position can itself serve to rob a realist of the resources that she requires to secure his 
case. 
Wright might, with some justification, complain that such a line of argument misplaces 
the sense in which minimalism is unassuming. It is not merely that the minimalist 
makes claims that are more ontologically parsimonious, or epistemically cautious, as the 
sceptic claims to do, but that she can explain features of our thought and practice in a 
given area in terms that respect - but don't exceed - our pre theoretic intuitions. 
(Contrast the revisionary implications of scepticism). In a sense, the minimalist's 
demand is only that the realist justify his rhetoric, and what could be intrinsically. 
objectionable about that? Nevertheless, even if Wright is correct to hold that many of 
the platitudes we associate with the notion of objectivity are in themselves inadequate to 
motivate a realist construal, I think it is still fair to ask why this consideration should 
always be considered forceful enough to land the realist with the burden of proof. In 
cases where we pre-theoretically don't associate a robust sense of objectivity with mere 
philosophical hyperbole - say, in the case of the past, or the existence of other minds - 
why should the failure of the realist to identify the precise features of the discourse that 
justify such a stance automatically entail that we ought to concede that the anti-realist is, 
so far, vindicated? The revisionary implications of such a position seems to me rather to 
demand, at the minimum, that the anti-realist give us good grounds for abandoning our 
intuitive realism, rather than merely taking the travails of the realist as motivation 
enough for persisting with a minimalist view. 
In my discussion so far I have been conceding, for the sake of argument, that the 
minimalist position is unassuming. Actually, however, this is far less clear than Wright 
makes it sound. I have already noted that several of the dialectical cruces that Wright 
identifies are formulated in terms of a notion of a prioricity that simply isn't common 
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ground among participants in the debate. Similarly, Timothy Williamson has pointed 
out that Wright's characterisation of warranted assertibility assumes that warrant for 
assertion demands something less than knowledge. 6 Wright defends this claim as 
uncontroversial given its prevalence in a certain tradition in epistemology, 
47 but this 
seems to me to be less than is required if minimalism is genuinely to appeal only to 
platitudinous common sense. (Actually, even if Wright's reply were sufficient in this 
context, an unsympathetic reader might point to the reliance on the deliverances of 
common sense as itself manifesting a philosophically substantive commitment). 
Another group of critics have worried over the issue of whether Wright's position makes 
non-platitudinous demands in the philosophy of mind. 8 Given the extent of this kind of 
disagreement, we might wonder whether staking a claim to a philosophically neutral 
default position is really worth the candle. To determined realists about, say, the past, 
Wright's characterisation of the burden of proof is bound to appear simply as special 
pleading on behalf of the anti-realist. 
In any case, I shall not appeal to this element of Wright's framework in my discussion of 
realism about metaphorical meaning. Rather, I hold that the debate ought to proceed in a 
more even handed and holistic manner - as it inevitably actually will, even for 
philosophers who are sympathetic to Wright's claims about burden of proof. The 
challenge to each participant is to reconcile the data, in the form of the results of the 
suggested tests, with their own preferred epistemology, semantics and metaphysics for 
the area in question. 9 Of course, as in many cases, the proposed data may end up being 
reinterpreted, reformulated or even rejected, and there may well be more than one 
defensible overall position at any given stage of the process. I thus preserve the 
admirable generality, topic-neutrality and dialectical focus of Wright's account, but 
46 Williamson (1996b) p. 907-908. Williamson provides a sustained defence of the opposing claim in his 
(1996a) 
47 Wright (1996) p. 934-935 
48 See Smith (1994a), Jackson, Oppy and Smith (1994) and Blackburn (1998) for the prosecution; Divers 
and Miller (1994) and (1995), Wright (1999) for the defence. . I- 
49 I do not mean to exclude e. g. their philosophy of mind, science, logic, ethics, religion, etc., but rather to 
assimilate these under the broader headings outlined above. 
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substitute a general rush for coherence for Wright's advance from a default 
minimalism. 5° 
It might be difficult to see how to reconcile such a methodology with Wright's idea that 
degree of realism is a matter of the relevant features of the local truth predicate. After 
all, doesn't that commit us to a `semantics first' approach which is inconsistent with the 
kind of dialectical free-for-all endorsed above? I'm not wholly clear on whether there is 
any genuine difficulty here, but to the extent that there is, I would sacrifice the relevant 
semanticism. None of the tests that I have outlined seem to me resistant to rephrasing in 
terms that omit the notion of truth. The question of whether the proposed objects, facts 
or states of affairs might obtain without our having any evidence for them so doing, for 
example, seems to be one that only appeals to metaphysical and epistemological notions. 
If each such test can be rephrased in terms that alethiphobes can endorse, then no 
objectionable semanticism seems to be being presupposed. 
A more substantive worry concerns a kind of self-reflective worry that arises for the 
philosophical treatment of realism. What happens if the philosophical facts, the facts 
that philosophers interested in realism about a given area attempt to establish, themselves 
are only apt for a minimalist treatment? After all, such facts seem to admit of 
permissible disagreement, at least in the sense that there can be long-lasting, entrenched 
disputes between sincere and willing participants, that we don't know how to resolve. 
Evidence that we can be in a quandary with regard to e. g. moral facts will surely carry 
over to the philosophical case. Philosophical facts do not seem to display Wide 
Cosmological Role, and it seems to me to be an open question whether we can make 
sense of their outrunning the potential evidence that we might have for them, or whether 
a `tracking' epistemology is appropriate for them. If such facts deserve a less than 
maximally realist treatment, however, how can any discourse deserve a more robust 
one? The claim that e. g. talk about the external world deserves a maximally realist 
construal will itself only be less than maximally realist. If it is e. g. cognitively 
permissible to reject such a claim, then how seriously can we take the supposed realist 
50 This methodological position is hardly novel, and bears a fairly close resemblance to those outlined in 
Peacocke (1999) and Miller (forthcoming a and b). Blackburn (1984) pp. 3-7 is an early advocate of a 
broadly coherentist methodology. 
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result which claimed to have established it? Doesn't the reflection that an intuitive anti- 
realism was equally cognitively respectable itself serve to undercut the idea that the 
world is really out there, wholly independently of any decision we might have made on 
the matter? It seems that the degree to which one is anti-realist about the claims of 
philosophy to establish degrees of realism sets a limit to the degree to which one can be 
a realist in any other area, threatening a much wider anti-realist victory. 
It is a familiar phenomenon in epistemology that a dialectical draw favours the sceptic; 
here we seem to have the beginnings of a line of thought that would establish a similar 
outcome for anti-realism more generally. To use a phrase of Wright's drawn from a 
different but related context - that of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations - the 
worry has to be that any form of restricted realism about the outcome of philosophical 
theorising sets `an upper bound on the robustness of the realism which is available 
anywhere'. sl 
I think this is a serious worry, and it is not one I have an answer to. For the purposes of 
this project, I intend to ignore it. It is, of course, fairly common methodological practice 
to ignore deep and dangerous problems while pursuing more limited concerns. In the 
case of metaphorical meaning, however, where many of the most plausible positions 
involve a substantially anti-realist component, the move is perhaps slightly more 
principled than normal. Even if the upper bound to realism does turn out to be 
determined by the status of philosophy itself, there is still room to examine the 
interesting range of local debates which fall short of that limit. The case of discourse 
about metaphorical meaning is an example of this latter class, in which one of the best 
argued positions - that presented by Donald Davidson - maintains that such talk falls 
short even of the modest standards that are requisite for minimal truth. It is to 
elaboration of this position that I now turn. 
51 Wright (1992) p. 212 
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2. Davidson, Meaning and Metaphor 
2.1 Introduction 
Davidson is an anti-realist about metaphorical meaning. That thesis is true, but the sense 
- or rather senses - in which it is true have not always been easy to grasp. The 
motivation for his position has not always been clearly brought out, for all the wealth of 
commentary that his first, seminal, paper on the topic attracted. 52 Nor, relatedly, has the 
connection between Davidson's anti-realism and broader philosophical concerns with 
the nature of meaning been satisfactorily elucidated. There are, of course, honourable 
exceptions. 53 But the insights and blindspots, costs and benefits of Davidson's position 
have yet to receive a fully satisfactory treatment. My aim here is to make a pass at it 
from within the framework of a broadly Wrightian conception of the realism debate, in 
the hope that a new angle of illumination might reveal its contours more clearly. My 
aim, however, is more substantive than exegetical. While I will aim to characterize and 
interpret Davidson's position in a manner that is broadly consistent with his compressed 
remarks on metaphor, my primary concern will be to present his arguments in what I 
take to be their strongest and most interesting form. 
I will begin by examining the sense in which we should think of Davidson as an anti- 
realist about 
metaphorical meaning, and then go on to set out an argument for his 
position. The argument as presented is not wholly explicit in Davidson's work, but 
draws upon recognisably Davidsonian themes and principles. I will then go on to 
clarify, motivate and evaluate the status of the premises of that argument. 
52 Davidson (1984a) 
s' The best discussions of the position that I know are those included in Stern (2000), White (1996) and 
especially White (unpublished). I am very grateful to Roger White for allowing me access to this latter 
work, from which I have benefited immensely. 
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2.2 The Character of Davidson's Anti-Realism 
Davidson describes the central thrust of his paper in the following terms: 
This paper is concerned with that metaphors mean, and its thesis is that metaphors mean 
what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more. Since this 
thesis flies in the face of contemporary views with which I am familiar, much of what I 
have to say is critical. But I think the picture of metaphor that emerges when error and 
confusion are cleared away makes metaphor a more, not less interesting phenomenon. 
The central mistake against which I will be inveighing is the idea that metaphor has, in 
addition to its literal sense or meaning, another sense or meaning... if I am right, a 
metaphor doesn't say anything, beyond its literal meaning (nor does its maker say 
anything, in using the metaphor, beyond the literal). This is not, of course, to deny that 
14 metaphor has a point, nor that that point can be brought out using further words. 
He summarizes his contrasting view of how `metaphor works its wonders' as follows 
I depend on the distinction between what words mean and what they are used to do. I 
think metaphor belongs exclusively to the domain of use. It is something brought off by 
the imaginative employment of words and sentences and depends entirely on the 
ordinary meaning of those words and hence on the ordinary meanings of the sentences 
they comprise. 55 
And later he writes 
The central error about metaphor is most easily attacked when it takes the form of a 
theory of metaphorical meaning, but behind that theory, and statable independently, is 
the thesis that associated with a metaphor is a definite cognitive content that its author 
wishes to convey and that the interpreter must grasp if he is to get the message. This 
theory is false as a full theory of metaphor, whether or not we call the purported 
cognitive content a meaning. 56 
54 Davidson (1984a) p. 245-246 
55 ibid p. 247 
56 Ibid p. 262 
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Three theses seem to be clearly endorsed in these passages: 
(Dl) The words that are employed in metaphorical utterances do not thereby acquire 
new, distinctive, `metaphorical' senses, but rather play the same semantic role as 
they do in straightforwardly literal utterances. 
(D2) The sentences that are employed in metaphorical utterances do not thereby 
become associated with new, distinctive `metaphorical' contents, but rather 
continue to have their ordinary literal meanings, which are determined by the 
literal meanings of the words that make them up (together with the mode of 
composition of such words). 
(D3) Metaphorical utterances are not only, or typically, or characteristically, vehicles 
for the communication of a distinctive cognitive content. 
Theses (D1-D3) are clearly expressions of an anti-realist view regarding the existence of 
distinctive `metaphorical meanings', whether these are thought of as associated with 
words, sentences or communicative acts. But what is the character of this anti-realism? 
In evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of a given realist or anti-realist stance with 
regard to a particular set of issues, it is often useful to begin by identifying the position 
as an instance of a generic kind. This allows us to clarify key aspects of the position; to 
identify promising analogies between the case at issue and other, structurally related, 
debates; and to look for 'shortcuts' when developing a given dialectic. How, then, 
should we classify Davidson's anti-realism? Three broad interpretative paradigms 
suggest themselves 
Reductionism Davidson is a reductionist about metaphorical meaning. He 
rejects the idea that there are sui generis metaphorical meanings 
by simply identifying metaphorical meanings of words or 
sentences with the corresponding literal meanings. ("This paper is 
concerned with that metaphors mean, and its thesis is that 
metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal 
interpretation, mean, and nothing more"). Davidson's position is 
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analogous to e. g. a primary quality view of colour, or a type- 
identity view of the mind. 
Expressivism Davidson is a kind of expressivist, emotivist, non-cognitivist or 
non-factualist about metaphor. 57 He rejects the idea that there are 
sui generis metaphorical meanings, replacing the idea that 
metaphors typically work by communicating propositional . 
contents with the idea that metaphor is a distinctive type of speech 
act. ("I depend on the distinction between what words mean and 
what they are used to do"). Davidson's position is analogous to 
Blackburn's moral expressivism, or Wittgenstein's view of self- 
ascriptions of intentions. 
Error theorist Davidson is an error theorist about metaphorical meaning. He 
holds that talk of sui generis metaphorical meaning makes sense, 
but attributions of it to utterances or their parts are globally false. 
("The picture of metaphor that emerges when error and confusion 
are cleared away makes metaphor a more, not less interesting 
phenomenon"). His position is analogous to Mackie's view of 
moral facts, or Field's view of mathematics. 
Each of these suggestions has something going for it, and I will endeavour to say 
something about each in turn. However, I think it is important, both in getting to grips 
with Davidson's arguments for his anti-realism, and for the more general project of 
understanding how the debate about metaphorical meaning relates to other realism 
debates, that we see that the third interpretation is the correct one. 
2.3 Reductionism and Expressivism 
There is clearly a sense in which the Reductionist reading of Davidson is right to insist 
that he holds that metaphorical meaning is simply literal meaning. After all, 
57 For my purposes in the chapter, I will treat these terms as merely stylistic variations of one another. 
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`metaphorical meaning', in one sense at least, can surely be equated with `meaning 
possessed or expressed by the metaphor', and Davidson openly claims that the only 
meaning expressed by the metaphor is the literal meaning. 
This is rather misleading, however. Firstly, the sense in which Davidson is using 
`metaphorical meaning', when e. g. he talks about attacking a `theory of metaphorical 
meaning' in the third quotation above, is not the sense which is appealed to by the 
Reductionist. The phrase doesn't simply equate to `meaning expressed by the metaphor' 
when understood in its intended sense. Rather, it is equivalent to something like `result 
of a meaning-shift undergone by sub-sentential parts in virtue of being included in a 
metaphorical utterance'. Understood as it ought to be, it is clear that Davidson is not 
identifying the metaphorical meaning of the utterance or its parts with the corresponding 
literal meaning, and that any suggestion to that effect at the beginning of `What 
metaphors mean' can only be the result of an ill-timed rhetorical flourish. 
Secondly, the Reductionist construal simply mischaracterizes the nature of the error 
Davidson takes his opponents to have committed. Consider the supposedly analogous 
positions in the philosophy of mind or colour. Someone who endorses the primary 
quality view of colour, or a type-identity view of mental states and properties, will 
typically hold that these physicalistically respectable properties have always been the 
intentional objects of our thought and talk. Pain was always C-fibre stimulation, or 
whatever; it is simply that we didn't recognise it as so, as a result of a subjective mode 
of presentation, or a misleading philosophical mythology. That thesis, in part, is what 
distinguishes the Reductionist position from its Error theoretic rival, which maintains 
that our pre-theoretic thought and talk about the area in question simply has nothing 
answering to it. 
Davidson isn't claiming, however, that we, and his opponents, have always been 
referring to the literal meaning of the words and sentences in question, when we invoke 
the notion of metaphorical meaning. On the contrary, his claim is that we have been 
conflating `what the metaphor makes us notice', or `calls to our attention', or what is 
`brought to mind' when interpreting the metaphor, with something correctly thought of 
as a meaning. Construing Davidson as a Reductionist, therefore, obscures, rather than 
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illuminates, the nature of his position, and also the analogies that hold between it and 
related standpoints in other philosophical debates. 
What then of the reading that thinks of Davidson as an Expressivist? This interpretation 
agrees with the Reductionist one insofar as they both have Davidson rejecting sui 
generis metaphorical meanings, but rather than seeing him as arguing that metaphorical 
meaning just is literal meaning, the Expressivist account has him denying that making 
metaphors is usefully assimilated to assertions of any type of content. Rather, some 
other linguistic act, some distinctive use of language is involved. 
An early sketch of a naive Expressivist position is provided by Beardsley 
according to the Emotive theory, a word has meaning only if there is some way of 
confirming its applicability to a given situation - roughly, only if it has a clear 
designation. For example, the sharpness of a knife can be tested by various means, so 
that the phrase `sharp knife' is meaningful. We may also suppose that `sharp' has some 
negative emotive import, deriving from our experience with sharp things. Now, when 
we speak of a `sharp razor' or a `sharp drill', the emotive import is not active, because 
these phrases are meaningful. But when we speak of a `sharp wind', 'a sharp dealer', or 
`a sharp tongue', the tests for sharpness cannot be applied, and therefore, though the 
individual words are meaningful, the combinations of them are not. In this way the 
58 emotive import of the adjective is released and intensified. 
For this type of Expressivist, then, the metaphor maker is not dealing with any genuine 
content when she utters the metaphorical sentence, since there is just none there for her 
to be asserting. Rather, she must be doing something else with the sentence, such as 
trying to affect her interlocutor's attitudes or emotions in a particular way. 
Numerous well known problems lurk here. Firstly, the notion of `emotive import' is 
unclear, and does not account for how the same word or phrase can be used with 
58 Beardsley (1958) pp. 134-5, quoted in Soskice (1985) p. 26. Beardsley characterises the possession of 
content along verificationist lines, but this is strictly inessential to Expressivism, naive or sophisticated. 
Some criterion for the possession of genuine content is presumably required, however. That the fact that 
the naive Expressivist cannot take successful embedding in logical and propositional attitude contexts as 
such a criterion may well constitute her greatest problem. 
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`opposing emotive import', as, for example when we use the commendatory phrases `a 
sharp mind' or `a sharp wit' along with the denigratory ones mentioned in the passage 
above. 59 Secondly, we lack an explanation of the analogies between the inferential 
behaviour of genuinely contentful statements and that of merely emotive ones. Thirdly, 
it just seems plain phenomenologically wrong to claim that `getting' a metaphor is 
merely a matter of being prompted into a certain affective state. 
The naive Expressivist admittedly has some room to manoeuvre, especially with respect 
to this last problem. She may hold, for example, that what metaphor brings about need 
not be-purely affective, but can include items which bear content. In this case, making a 
metaphor is similar to, say, uttering nonsense syllables in an attempt to make the spy 
tapping your phone believe that you have a secret code. Your utterance possesses no 
literal meaning in itself, but is intentionally produced to cause another to have thoughts 
which do have a content. 
Nevertheless, deep problems remain with the naive Expressivist account of the 
inferential behaviour of metaphors, given the thesis that they lack literal content. Even 
relatively extreme poetic metaphors seem to be able to embed in conditionals (if 
philosophy is just showing the fly the ivay out of the fly-bottle, then it does not reveal 
deep metaphysical truths about the structure of reality) and under negation (Dan Quayle 
was no Kennedy). Expressivists such as Blackburn and Gibbard have aimed to discharge 
the explanatory burden of accounting for such behaviour in the moral case, and it cannot 
be ruled out a priori that an account could be given in the metaphorical one. However, 
it is fair to say that we currently lack such an account and have little idea of how to get 
hold of one. 60 
A simple minded Expressivism, then, will hold that truth conditional contents are not 
involved at all in metaphor, and thus incur the difficult burden of explaining why such 
`expressions' can embed in e. g. logical and propositional attitude contexts. A more 
plausible line for the Expressivist is available, however. Typically, this will involve 
59 Beardsley makes this point in his discussion of the position. 
60 For an introduction to the debate see Blackburn (1984) Ch. 6, Blackburn (1988), Gibbard (1990). For 
criticism of Blackburn's project see Hale (1986) and (1990). A useful discussion and overview is 
provided in Miller (2003). 1 sketch a pseudo-fictionalist solution to the embedding problem in Chapter 3. 
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granting that the propositions in question possess a truth conditional content, which is 
apt for assertion, but denying that the characteristic purpose of making a metaphor is to 
assert something. 
A sophisticated Expressivist might draw an analogies between metaphor and linguistic 
phenomena such as performatives. In using a performative such as "I hereby promise to 
pay you £10" ,I arguably 
do not assert anything, that is, represent myself as believing 
that I am making a particular promise. Rather, I typically make the promise by uttering 
the words. This is not because I could not use the sentence to make an assertion: the 
sentence has a content, determined by the conventional rules of English, which I could 
sincerely present as true. It is this propositional content which enables the sentence to be 
embedded in logical and propositional attitude contexts, and which explains the relation 
between the promising and temporally related descriptions ('I will promise her the 
money', `If I promise her the money, then I will give her the money'). In a similar way, 
according to the sophisticated Expressivist, the literal vehicle of a metaphor may well 
have a truth conditional content available for assertion, but our typical practice of 
making such claims is not best represented as assertoric. 
The sophisticated Expressivist position thus begins to address the problem of accounting 
for the inferential behaviour of metaphor by allowing that metaphors usually have a truth 
conditional content associated with them, which allows them to embed in conditionals, 
etc. However, in making metaphors, we do not assert this content, but use the sentence 
in question in some other way. This might be to perform a sari generis speech act (often 
referred to as nzetaphorizing), to perform some other distinctive illocutionary act (such 
as inviting or encouraging the interpretation of the metaphor), or simply to achieve some 
aim of the speaker's (to draw attention to certain features of a situation, or to make us 
think of somebody in a certain way, for example). 
The story, applied to the case of metaphor, typically looks something like this. The 
maker of a metaphor utters a sentence, which typically possesses literal content, and is 
thus apt for assertion. However, the speaker does not assert the sentence, which in the 
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normal case will be obviously literally false. 61 Rather, the metaphor maker implicitly 
invites, via contextual clues, shared adherence to Gricean conversational maxims, etc, 
the interpreter of the metaphor to look for a certain set of similarities between two or 
more objects, events, situations etc. The metaphor maker will typically intend that the 
interpreter get hold of some central similarities or analogies, but need not, and can in any 
case intend that the interpreter have an element of free play in coming up with ways in 
which the metaphor is apt. It is this aspect of metaphor making, the implicit invitation to 
`make the most of it', which accounts for the oft cited open-endedness of metaphor. Of 
course, the metaphor may also prompt various affective states, and be intended by its 
maker so to do. 
This position has proved attractive to a number of careful philosophers, both as an 
interpretation of Davidson, and as a plausible account of metaphor in its own right. 
Simon Blackburn, for example, writes 
[Metaphors] are typically couched in indicative sentences, certainly governed by norms 
of appropriateness, found in complex embeddings, yet certainly not intended as 
straightforward cases of truths or falsehoods. This is how the expressivist says it is in 
more controversial examples, such as commitment to conditional, moral or modal 
claims. 62 
Of course, supporters of such a position accept that much still has to be filled in; the 
nature of the contextual clues, the nature of the actual mechanism by which we get hold 
of the various relevant similarities, the scope for invention, etc. As far as the semantics 
and pragmatics of metaphor go they argue, however, the broad picture is tolerably clear. 
Metaphor is a way of using a pre-existing, truth apt content to prompt, encourage or 
invite contemplation of or active investigation into some open-ended set of similarities. 
I am in agreement with much of what this type of position has to say, both exegetically 
and substantively. It is certainly true, for example that Davidson argues against the idea 
that the typical job of metaphorical speech is to convey a `coded message', and 
61 Or perhaps nonsensical: see White (1996) pp. 204-226. I argue against the `nonsensical' view of 
metaphor in Chapter 3. 
62 Blackburn (1998) p. 159. 
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compares it instead with distinctive uses of language such as joking, promising, hinting, 
criticizing and, in an extended passage, lying 
Now, let me raise a somewhat Platonic issue by comparing the making of a metaphor 
with telling a lie. The comparison is apt because lying, like making a metaphor, 
concerns not the meaning of words but their use... The parallel between making a 
metaphor and telling a lie is emphasized by the fact that the same sentence can be used, 
with meaning unchanged, for either purpose. So a woman who believed in witches but 
did not think her neighbour a witch might say `She's a witch', meaning it 
metaphorically; the same woman still believing the same of witches and her neighbour 
but intending to deceive, might use the same words to very different effect... What 
makes the difference between a lie and a metaphor is not a difference in the words used 
or what they mean (in any strict sense of meaning) but in how the words are used. Using 
a sentence to tell a lie and using it to make a metaphor are, of course, totally different 
uses, so different that they do not interfere with one another, as say, acting and lying do. 
In lying, one must make an assertion so as to represent oneself as believing what one 
does not; in acting, assertion is excluded. Metaphor is careless of the difference. 3 
The Expressivist reading of Davidson, then is correct to attribute something like the 
following thesis to him 
(E) A metaphorical utterance involves a distinctive use of a segment of literal 
language, which does not alter in meaning by being so used, typically in order 
that a speaker might intentionally `provoke or invite' a certain view of the 
subject matter of the metaphor, (although it is also possible e. g. that the purpose 
of such an utterance might be to make us `appreciate some fact', and that the 
metaphor itself may `prompt or inspire' us in ways that the speaker does not 
actively intend. )64 
I believe we will go astray, however, if we conflate (i) Davidson's position with respect 
to the question of realism about metaphorical meaning with (ii) his positive account of 
how metaphor `works its wonders'. The latter, but not the former, is broadly analogous 
63 Davidson (1984a) pp. 258-259 
6' For support for the idea that Davidson subscribes to (E) see his (1984a) p 261-264. (The quoted phrases 
in my formulation of that thesis can also be found there. ) 
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to a typical non-cognitivist account of the function of e. g. moral or modal language. The 
purpose of metaphor, like the purpose of moral language on an Expressivist account, is 
often to do something, not to say something. But that should not mislead us into 
characterizing Davidson as an Expressivist about metaphorical meaning. His position 
with respect to metaphorical meaning is structurally significantly different from 
Expressivism about moral or aesthetic facts, whether naive or sophisticated in form. 
Alison Denham is one contemporary writer who falls into the trap of mistaking surface 
similarity in the treatment of linguistic role for depth of correspondence of metaphysical 
stance. 65 In her Metaphor and Moral Experience, a work whose partial aim, like my 
own, is to approach metaphor from within the compass of a Wrightian approach to 
realism, she writes 
Some claim that it is not possible to state the truth-conditions of moral discourse in non- 
6 
evaluative terms; the parallel thought [in the case of metaphor] is that it is not possible to 
state the truth conditions of some metaphorical discourse in non-figurative terms. 66 
Again, in her introduction to that volume, she writes 
The parallels [between moral judgements and metaphors] run deep, as can be seen by 
reflecting for a moment on the kinds of questions which often arise with respect to each. 
For instance: 1) Are moral judgements candidates for the assignment of truth values, or 
are they actually covert expressions of sentiment, not in themselves either true or false? 
Compare: Are metaphorical expressions genuine, truth-apt judgements, or do they serve 
merely to evince emotion and the play of imagery? 2) Can moral concepts be analysed 
in wholly non-evaluative terms? Compare: can metaphorical expressions be reduced to 
literal paraphrase? 67 
65 Other theorists of metaphor who sail close to the wind include Blackburn (1998), who I quoted above; 
Soskice (1985) pp. 26-27, who calls Davidson's position non-cognitivist, and notes its similarities to 
Emotivism; and Moran (1997) p. 260, who draws comparisons between Davidson and moral non- 
cognitivists. Unlike Denham, however, most of these theorists manage to refrain from sailing too close. 
66 Denham (2000) p. 283. n. 5. 
67 Denham (2000) p. 2. She goes on there to note two further `deep parallels' concerning, firstly, the 
epistemological immediacy of facts about morals and metaphorical meanings, and secondly, the 
phenomenon of persistent, conflicting responses in each case. 
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I want to argue that, in fact, no relevant parallel of the kind that Denham appeals to 
actually holds between morals and metaphors. A bad analogy has led her astray, and led 
her to ignore the genuine differences between dominant forms of anti-realism about 
metaphorical discourse on the one hand, and moral discourse on the other. 
To see where and why the putative parallel fails, let's think more closely at what a 
discourse is, in the sense in which it has come to be used in debates about realism. For 
Denham, as for Wright, a discourse is an essentially intentional entity; discourse is 
always discourse-about. Denham writes 
... a 
discourse is loosely defined as a linguistic practice governed by community norms. 
A particular discourse within a linguistic community will be circumscribed by some 
distinctive, or more or less distinctive, set of concepts: aesthetic discourse, for instance, 
is circumscribed by the exercise of concepts such as 'beauty', 'elegance', 'grace', 
'lyricism', 'ugliness', while moral discourse features concepts such as 'right, 'evil', 
'malice', 'kindness', 'deceit', 'duty' and so on 68 
Since to have a concept is to have a "way of conceiving of some object (including object 
kinds) or property, whereby one is able to form true and rationally warranted beliefs 
concerning it", 69 discourses are fundamentally world-directed, with discourses 
individuated by the particular 'realm of fact' that they concern. 
It should have made Denham question the degree to which significant parallels hold 
between moral discourse and 'metaphorical discourse', conceived of as the production of 
metaphorical utterances or assertions, that the latter, in absolute contrast with the former, 
is not concerned with any particular feature or cluster of features of the world. 
Metaphors can be about phenomenal experiences, the external world, aesthetic 
properties, moral properties, persons, numbers, actions, God, the weather - anything, in 
fact, that any other discourse can talk about literally (and, according to some theorists, a 
bit more besides). 
68 Denham (2000) p. 44. For Wright's view, see his (1992) pp. 2-18 
69 Denham (2000) p. 44. 
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It seems that Denham has been misled by an ambiguity in the phrase 'metaphorical 
discourse'. On one reading, indubitably the more natural and everyday, the phrase refers 
to discourse which is metaphorical in character. On this resolution of the ambiguity, it 
is easy to see why metaphorical discourse, as opposed to, say, moral discourse, has no 
distinct subject matter; the relation to metaphor consists in the way a given state of 
affairs is being talked about, not the nature of the state of affairs itself. 
On the second reading, however, the one Denham requires if her supposed parallel is to 
go through, metaphorical discourse is discourse about the nature and meaning of 
metaphorical utterances; discourse whose individuating concepts include 'metaphorical 
meaning', 'simile', 'literal', 'dead metaphor', etc. This kind of discourse, though clearly 
concerned with a feature of the world, is a metadiscourse, since the feature of the world 
it concerns is a particular subset of what we might call first-order discourses, which in 
turn directly concern non-linguistic features of the world. 70 
Denham's confusion is made clear in her discussion of what she terms the Reductionist 
position, which holds that the meaning expressed by metaphors can be fully spelled out 
in literal terms. She writes that for the Reductionist 
Metaphorical discourse, if it is meaningful at all, is not conceptually autonomous, but 
parasitic or conceptually supervenient: all intelligible disagreements about the truth of 
judgements expressed metaphorically will thus depend on disagreements about the truth 
of judgements expressed in non-figurative terms. (The Reductionist's position with 
respect to metaphor is in this respect analogous to that of some moral cognitivists who 
win cognitive standing for evaluative discourse by proposing to provide definitions of 
the concepts distinctive of it in naturalistic terms). '' 
Denham here simply overlooks the fact that the sense of `discourse' in which concepts 
are distinctive of particular discourses is not the one we usually intend when we talk 
70 This account actually needs to be complicated slightly, given that we can e. g. use metaphor to describe 
metaphor, or literal language to describe linguistic practice, so that not all metadiscourses need concern 
first order discourses. 
71 Denham (1998) pp. 230-231. I will go on to discuss Denham's positive views on reduction and 
metaphor further in Chapter 3 below. 
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about metaphorical discourse; the latter usage most often refers to a mode of expression, 
not a particular subject matter. 
How does getting clear on this ambiguity help us elucidate the character of Davidson's 
anti-realism? For a start, it helps us to see that Davidson is no Expressivist, although 
there are surface similarities. The moral expressivist holds that (a) moral discourse is 
not typically used to state facts and (b) there are no moral facts. Davidson holds that (a) 
metaphors are not typically used to state facts and (b) there are no facts about 
metaphorical meaning. Convergence in doctrine is more real than apparent, however. 
Expressivists hold that moral discourse is not typically used to state e. g. the moral facts 
because there simply aren't any such facts around to be stated. In the case of metaphor, 
however, there are plenty of facts around that metaphor could be used to state - in a 
pragmatic sense, rather than a semantic one - since metaphor can be used in the 
characterization of any subject matter. Davidson isn't disputing that metaphor could be 
used in such a way, only that it typically is. 
Generically, Expressivism combines an anti-realism about a particular kind of fact with 
the view that the discourse that we (or folk semantics, or philosophical prejudice) might 
mistakenly classify as representative of such facts actually has some quite different 
linguistic function. Davidson is an anti-realist about metaphorical meaning all right, but 
he does not hold that talk about metaphorical meaning actually has some non-, 
representational linguistic function. The aim of his paper isn't to reveal that Richards, 
Empson, Black, Goodman, and the rest were really expressing some non-cognitive 
attitude when they told us that sub-sentential parts of metaphors acquired new meanings 
in metaphorical contexts. On the contrary, the attitudes were cognitive enough, and 
aimed at delimiting certain linguistic facts; Davidson's complaint is simply that they got 
the relevant facts wrong. When Davidson characterizes Henle's theory as saying that `in 
its metaphorical role the word applies to everything that it applies to in its literal role, 
and then some', 72 he is attributing a theory to Henle, not some non-representational 
attitude. The analogies between Expressivism and Davidson on metaphor, then, flatter 
to deceive; they are real enough to mislead, but represent only surface similarities rather 
than continuities of metaphysical and semantic doctrine. 
72 Davidson (1984a) p. 250 
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2.4 The Nature of Davidson's Error-theoretic Approach 
Davidson is an error theorist about metaphorical meaning. He holds that talk of sui 
generis metaphorical meaning makes sense, and is to be construed in straightforwardly 
representational terms, but attributions of it to utterances or their parts are globally false. 
Error theorists in other areas, such as John Mackie in the case of morality and aesthetics, 
or Hartry Field in philosophy of mathematics, likewise claim that the relevant class of 
statements are genuinely assertoric in character, as a face-value construal would suggest 
(thus diverging from an Expressivist account) but that we are systematically mistaken 
about their truth values (thus diverging from e. g. non-reductive realists, reductivists, 
quasi-realists, indexical relativists and minimalists, each of whom hold that the 
statements in question are often true). It is to the fairly detailed and advanced critical 
discussion of such positions that we should look when seeking outside aid in evaluating 
structural features of Davidson's position. 
It is important here to recall that we are here concerned with facts about metaphorical 
content, in the sense of commitment to the truth or falsity of claims like 
(M) `Philosophy's proper aim is to show the fly the way out of the fly bottle' means 
that philosophy's proper aim is to dissolve persistent and frustratingly complex 
conceptual problems that impede our progress through life, and prevent our 
living in a fulfilling manner. 
rather than facts about metaphor production, as when we quarrel about the type of 
linguistic function metaphors characteristically or typically perform. An Error-theorist 
can endorse the idea that metaphor's role is typically not to state facts or make 
assertions; his point is that positive ascriptions of meaning to metaphors are uniformly 
false. 
We can distinguish two degrees of Error theory about metaphorical meanings. Firstly, 
one might hold that there are no strictly semantic facts which make claims about 
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metaphorical meaning true. 73 Of course, this has to go along with the claim that we 
thought that there were, in order to count as an Error theory. But perhaps this isn't 
totally implausible; lots of philosophers, literary critics, theologians and linguists did 
(and do) write as if metaphorical meanings were semantic in this sense, and we might be 
able to tell some story about epistemological deference to experts that convicted our 
linguistic community more generally. Let's call somebody who holds this kind of view 
a semantic error theorist. It will be useful to distinguish two varieties of semantic error 
theory; a folk version that held that the mistake was ingrained in the practices of the 
linguistic community at large, and an expert version that locates the mistake rather in the 
application of a semi-technical term. The phenomenon of epistemological deference 
mentioned above no doubt renders this a slightly artificial distinction, but I hope it will 
serve to mark out a difference in emphasis nevertheless. (For example, Mackie's 
discussion suggests that he endorses the folk version of semantic error theory about 
morals; we are all error theorists in the expert sense about phlogiston. ) 
A more charitable view holds that semantics offers a bad model of what talk about 
metaphorical meanings really involves, which is fundamentally pragmatic in nature - 
perhaps involving something like Gricean speaker-meanings, although this is clearly not 
mandatory. The pragmatic error theorist holds that even this more charitable account is 
mistaken; there are just no facts about metaphorical meaning, whether this is construed 
in the narrow semantic sense or in a broader pragmatic sense, which could make 
sentences like (M) true. 74 The reason that we assert or deny such sentences is that we 
are mistaken about what kind of facts there are, for whatever reason. The explanatory 
burden the Error theorist of either pragmatic or semantic stripe must discharge is, 
therefore, threefold. Their aim ought to be to (1) give us a plausible account of how the 
facts actually stand; (2) explain how we could have been led into such massive error 
concerning them and (3) elucidate what the upshot of our mistake finally amounts to. 
" My aim is to remain relatively neutral on what counts as e. g. `strictly semantic'; it should be heard here 
in a broad and intuitive sense. 
74 There is logical space for an error theory that holds that, while the semantics of ascriptions of 
metaphorical meaning involve e. g. speaker meaning, these are all in fact false, and some other, strictly 
semantic theory of metaphorical meaning is in fact correct. I don't know of any theorist who defends this 
rather unattractive position, and shall in any case ignore it here; my pragmatic error theorist holds that 
metaphors don't have meanings in either a semantic or a pragmatic sense of `meaning'. 
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Typically, an Error theoretic account will go most smoothly if the effect of our mistake 
is fairly minimal. Field, for example, does not counsel us to immediately abandon all 
scientific theory that relies on our metaphysically suspect beliefs about the existence of 
numbers, but rather tries to provide nominalistically respectable translations of such 
science. We might want to make some further distinctions in this area about how such 
translations are construed. Let an eliminativist be an Error theorist who holds that our 
talk in a particular area is mistaken because, taken literally, it is straightforwardly false. 
A hard eliminativist counsels us to abandon the discourse altogether; a soft eliminativist 
provides us with a functionally equivalent replacement discourse. 
I take Davidson's position, in a nutshell, to be the following: he is a pragmatic error 
theorist, of the `expert' variety, and a soft eliminativist. 75 As noted above, I take him to 
subscribe to the following theses: 
(D1) The words that are employed in metaphorical utterances do not thereby acquire 
new, distinctive, `metaphorical' senses, but rather play the same semantic role as 
they do in straightforwardly literal utterances. 
(D2) The sentences that are employed in metaphorical utterances do not thereby 
become associated with new, distinctive `metaphorical' semantic contents, but 
rather continue to have their ordinary literal meanings, which are determined by 
the literal meanings of the words that make them up (together with the mode of 
composition of such words). 
75 I thus disagree with a recent commentator, Garry Hagberg, (2001) p 289 who says that Davidson's 
position is `by no means an eliminative one... he allows that there is such a thing as metaphorical truth". 
Hagberg justifies this interpretation with reference to the following remark of Davidson's: "metaphor 
does lead us to notice what might not otherwise be noticed, and there is no reason, I suppose, not to say 
that these thoughts and feelings inspired by the metaphor are true or false. " I suspect Hagberg is here 
confusing the functional replacement that Davidson proposes with the kind of distinctively metaphorical 
truth that he explicitly rejects. For Davidson, the metaphor isn't true in anything like the way that 
ordinary senses are true. In the sense he allows, we could equally well say that e. g. hints, jokes or thought 
experiments were true or false. 
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(D3) Metaphorical utterances are not only, or typically, or characteristically, vehicles 
for the communication of a distinctive cognitive content, even when such 
communication is pragmatically construed. 
(D4) Previous influential theories of metaphor falsely subscribed to doctrines that 
were inconsistent with (D1-D3) above. However, much of what such theorists 
wanted to capture about metaphor can be best upheld by dropping the idea that a 
given metaphor is a vehicle for the communication of a distinctive cognitive 
content, and instead thinking in terms of what it `intimates', `brings to our 
attention', or `leads us to see'. 
That Davidson subscribes to such doctrines is perhaps relatively uncontroversial. I hope 
that in the preceding I have made the case that we should see his adherence to such 
theses as revelatory of an Error-theoretic position, with certain distinctive features. In 
the following sections, I will go on to examine the nature of his arguments for (D1-D3). 
This will clear the way for a discussion of Davidson's suggested functional replacement 
of talk of metaphorical meaning in the next chapter. 
2.5 Davidson's Master Argument Against Metaphorical Meanings 
Davidson's "What Metaphors Mean" contains several direct and indirect arguments for 
(D1)-(D3). However, these arguments need not be thought of bringing wholly 
independent considerations to bear on the matter, although that is how they are 
sometimes presented. 76 In this section, I will outline how I think the arguments are 
intended to work together in a unified way to establish the desired conclusions. I will 
then go on to evaluate these arguments in the following four sections. 
Early discussions of metaphor which appealed to the existence of the `metaphorical 
meanings' of words or sentences often left the nature of these supposed senses inexplicit, 
to put it mildly. Nevertheless, we might hope that they would agree with the following 
principle: 
76 E. g. in Nogales (1999) pp. 75-121 
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(Al) The parts of metaphorical utterances only acquire distinctive metaphorical senses 
if they thereby become associated with something that deserves to be called their 
`metaphorical meaning'. Nothing deserves to be called a metaphorical meaning 
unless (a) there is something genuinely meaning-like about it and (b) there is 
something about it that distinctively relates to the metaphorical nature of the 
utterances it is putatively associated with. 
Such a principle is, I hope, unexceptionable. Realism about metaphorical meanings is 
not secured by demonstrating the existence of elephants, eggplants or electrons, since 
those entities don't count as metaphorical meanings. The principle would perhaps seem 
dubious if it was read as reaming meanings, perhaps implicitly subscribing to the idea 
that meanings must be objects of some special kind, that words serve to name or denote. 
This is not its intended import however. (Al) merely demands that whatever the 
supposed metaphorical meaning of words consists in - whether associated patterns of 
use, ways of thinking about the world, intentional properties, inferential roles, 
satisfaction conditions or whatever - that `entity', however pleonastically construed, 
must be the kind of thing that invites us to think of it as a metaphorical meaning. 
I also take it that the two conditions outlined in (Al), regarding meaning and relevance 
to metaphor, ought to be uncontroversial. Imagine that we had adopted the convention 
of printing (all and only) written metaphors in red ink, perhaps to alert the unwary reader 
to their metaphorical character. The ink colour thus associated with metaphors would 
clearly not thereby be correctly describable as the metaphorical meaning (henceforth, in- 
meaning) of the words, even though it was distinctively related to their occurrence in 
metaphors. The colour of tokens of the words would simply not be sufficiently closely 
related to the words' `semantic role' to count as a metaphorical meaning. The fact that 
we feel no temptation at all to think of the ink colour as metaphorical meaning in this 
case, even though condition (b) is met, seems to indicate our implicit acceptance of 
something like condition (a). 
Similarly, imagine that we spoke a language in which the extension of every predicate 
systematically shifted in certain linguistic contexts. Perhaps certain forms of words 
were taken to indicate that the extension of the predicate was to be restricted to entities 
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that normally fall under this predicate and are owned by the speaker, for example. It 
would clearly not be correct to call this `restricted' extension the m-meaning of a given 
predicate, since there is simply nothing about it that relates in any distinctive way to 
metaphor. Such a systematic shift could occur in a linguistic community where nobody 
ever spoke metaphorically. Again, our reluctance to describe of this kind of case in 
terms of metaphorical meaning appears to indicate that some condition similar to (b) 
accurately captures a minimal constraint on what metaphorical meanings must be like. 
I will also appeal to two auxiliary principles that are required for Davidson's master 
argument to go through, which again, seems like it ought to be common ground between 
himself and his opponents 
(A2) If a proposed assignment of a metaphorical content to a utterance results solely 
from an unacceptable theory of metaphor, then the utterance does not express 
that content. 
(A3) If a sentence is associated with a metaphorical content solely in virtue 
of being a compositional product of its component semantic parts, then some of 
those parts must themselves have (or determine) metaphorical meanings. 
So much, I hope, ought to be common ground between Davidson and his opponents. 77 
The body of Davidson's article, however, comprises arguments for three premises that 
have proved to be more controversial: 
(A4) The words employed in a metaphorical utterance do not come to be associated 
with anything that is both (a) genuinely meaning-like and (b) distinctively related 
to the metaphorical nature of the utterances in question. 
(A5) The m-meaning conveyed by a sentence used metaphorically would be identical 
with either (a) what is said by the utterance, which results solely from the 
" (A3) may well seem less obviously neutral territory than (A2). For exegetical reasons, I delay my 
argument for (A3)'s independent plausibility until Section 2.7. Basically, I argue that rejecting (A3) 
entails rejecting compositional principles governing genuine word and sentence meaning that simply 
aren't up for grabs, given (Al). 
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meanings of its component parts, together with their mode of composition, or (b) 
the extra propositional content communicated by the author of the metaphor, 
over and above what it says, as determined by a linguistic theory of pragmatics. 
(A6) An account of m-meaning which identifies it with the extra propositional content 
communicated by the author of the metaphor, over and above what it says, as 
determined by a linguistic theory of pragmatics, provides an unacceptably 
incomplete and misleading account of our practices of producing, using and 
reflecting on metaphors. 
In what follows, I will assume that (Al)-(A3) are either uncontroversial, (or at least, that 
they can be made so by more careful reformulation, in a way that does not substantively 
affect the rest of the argument). In a moment, we will look more closely at Davidson's 
arguments for (A4)-(A6). First, though, let us briefly assure ourselves that, if true, they 
would serve to establish Davidson's negative theses regarding metaphorical meaning. 
Let s be a sentence uttered metaphorically, iv be a semantically significant part of s, and 
the following abbreviations hold 
W= iv has a metaphorical meaning Mi 
A= M1 is meaning-like 
B= M1 is distinctively related to the metaphorical nature of the relevant utterance 
S=s has a metaphorical meaning Si 
C=S1 is an m-meaning that results solely from composing the meanings of the component parts of s. 
D= SI is an m-meaning that is determined pragmatically. 
U= Attribution of S1 to s results from appeal to an unacceptable theory of metaphor 
Then the above assumptions correspond to the following schemas 
(Al) W->A&B 
(A2) U -> -S 
(A3) C -> W 
(A4) -, (W &A& B) 
(A5) S->CvD 
(A6) D -> U 
Davidson's argument can then be taken to run roughly as follows: 
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Al 1)W->A&B (Al) 
2 2) W Assumption, for reductio 
Al, 2 3) A&B 1,2 MPP 
Al, 2 4)W&A&B 2,3, &I 
A4 5) , (W &A& B) A4 
Al, A4 6) -W 2,4,5, RAA 
A5 7)S->CvD AS 
8 8) S Assumption, for reductio 
8, A5 9) CvD 7,8, MPP 
10 10) C Assumption, for v-E 
A3 11) C -> W A3 
10, A3 12) W 10,11, MPP 
Al, A3, A4,10 13) W &, W 6,12, &I 
A6, A2 14) (D -> U) & (U -> , S) A6, A2 
15 15) D Assumption, for v-E 
15, A6, A2 16)-S 14,15, &E, MPPx2 
8,15, A 6, A2 17) S& ,S 8,16, &I 
8, Al-A 6 18) , (C v D) 9,10,13,15,17, v-E 
Al-A6 19)-S 9,18, RAA 
The outline of Davidson's master-argument is thus, I hope, clear. By (A4), nothing 
meets the conditions outlined in (Al), so by (Al), anti-realism about m-meanings is the 
correct position. Thus, if we begin to understand a metaphor by coming to understand 
what its parts mean, and how they are structured, as we clearly do, the meaning in 
question can only be literal. That establishes (D1). By (A5), a sentence could only 
express a distinctive metaphorical content if it was either determined by the meanings 
and arrangement of its parts, or by the relevant pragmatic features involved in its 
utterance. If the former, then given (A3), and that (D1) has been established, the 
meaning in question would have to be the literal meaning of the sentence, violating (Al). 
If the latter, then, by (A6), we would be left with an unacceptable theory of metaphor, so 
by (A2), no such content is thus associated with the sentence. So sentences used 
metaphorically are not associated with distinctive cognitive contents, which is (D2). If 
metaphors were typically, or characteristically, vehicles for the communication of 
distinctive, pragmatically determined contents, then a pragmatic theory of metaphor 
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would be acceptable, so if (A6) is true, then no such contents are characteristically 
expressed, which is (D3). 
I therefore take myself to have established that Davidson's argument, as presented is 
valid, and relies on at least three assumptions which seem relatively uncontroversial. 
Our task in the next few sections, then, is to examine the prima facie plausibility of the 
three remaining assumptions: 
(A4) The words employed in a metaphorical utterance do not come to be associated 
with anything that is both a) genuinely meaning-like and b) distinctively related 
to the metaphorical nature of the utterances in question. 
(A5) The m-meaning conveyed by a sentence used metaphorically would be identical 
with either a) what is said by the utterance, which results solely from the 
meanings of its component words, together with their mode of composition, or b) 
the extra propositional content communicated by the author of the metaphor, 
over and above what it says, as determined by a linguistic theory of pragmatics. 
(A6) An account of m-meaning which identifies it with the extra propositional content 
communicated by the author of the metaphor, over and above what it says, as 
determined by a linguistic theory of pragmatics, provides an unacceptably 
incomplete and misleading account of our practices of producing, using and 
reflecting on metaphors. 
I shall take these one at a time. 
2.6 Word-meaning and Metaphor 
What would it be for the words in a metaphorical utterance to be associated with 
something `meaning like'? In a recent paper, discussing his support for Quine's thesis 
of the inscrutability of reference, Davidson tells us: 
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individual words don't have meanings. They have a role in determining the truth 
conditions of sentences. 78 
In Chapter 1, Section 6, I gave an argument to the effect that understanding the meaning 
of an declarative sentence (in one important sense of that phrase) consists in grasping its 
truth conditions. However, for the moment, I wish to stay as neutral as possible about 
whether this is true. It would be disappointing if Davidson's arguments relied heavily 
on a background theory of meaning that his opponents rejected. That would entail that 
the dispute between them didn't really turn on the nature of metaphor per se, but rather 
on another dispute in the philosophy of language. The interest of Davidson's arguments 
would be increased if it turned out that this was not the case; that they turned out to be 
compatible with quite different conceptions of the nature of semantics. I will, therefore, 
try not to trade on features of Davidson's account that his opponents might reasonably 
reject - e. g. the identification of meaning with truth conditions, 
79 the inscrutability of 
reference, etc. 
Nevertheless, the notion that the meaning of an individual word is exhausted by its 
semantic role, and that the semantic role of a word is the way it makes a systematic 
contribution to the meaning of sentences in which it occurs, is not, I think, up for 
grabs. 8° That would lead to tension with the following plausible principles: 
(Compositionality) The meaning of complex linguistic expressions is wholly 
determined by their syntax, together with the meanings of their 
parts (in context). For example, the meaning of `dogs bark' 
'$ Davidson (2001) p. 79 
79 Or elimination of meaning in favour of something related to truth conditions, which is probably a more 
accurate way of stating Davidson's views. 
80 I say `involves making a systematic contribution' rather than `is the systematic contribution', since on 
some theories, the meaning of a word relates not only to the sentences it can compose, but also to other, 
related words. For example, full grasp of the meaning of `healthy, ', as predicated of an diet, may involve 
understanding a family of closely related predicates (e. g. the homonyms `healthy2' `healthy3' as predicted 
of a man, and his complexion). This goes beyond the minimal capacity to grasp the compositional role of 
the predicate. 
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depends on the meaning of `dogs and `barks', and the manner in 
which they are syntactically composed. 
(Systematicity) Languages that can express a given propositional content 
composed via compositional route F out of sub-sentential parts 
W1-Wn can also express any other content which can be 
constructed from W1-Wn using F. For example, a language that 
can express `dogs bark and cows moo' can also express `dogs 
moo and cows bark'. 
(Reverse The meaning of constituent expressions (in context) supervene 
Compositionality) on the complexes of which they are parts. For example, the 
meaning of `dogs' and `bark' couldn't change without the 
meaning of `dogs bark' changing. 
Such principles, however, are widely subscribed to, 81 and play a familiar and currently 
indispensable role in explaining the productive and systematic character of human 
mastery of language. They are not peculiar to truth-conditional theories of meaning, and 
it is often held to be a minimal condition on any satisfactory theory of meaning that it 
entail them. I will assume therefore, that Davidson is entitled, pro tens, to rely on the 
notion that the meaning of an individual word is its semantic role, and that the semantic 
role of a word involves making a systematic contribution to the meaning of sentences in 
which it occurs. 82 
What significance does thinking of the meaning of a word in such a way have for 
Davidson's argument against metaphorical meaning? It provides the relevant way of 
explicating the similarity condition (a) that (Al) places upon any prospective such 
meaning: 
81 See Szabo (2004) for a note of caution, however. The three principles above could be weakened further 
by reading them as generic statement, rather than universal claims, without the force of the point being 
seriously weakened. 
82 For further defence of the importance and nature of compositionality et al, see Fodor and Lepore (2002). 
I will return to discuss the issues briefly when I discuss the radical pragmatist objection to Davidson's 
position. 
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Al) The parts of metaphorical utterances only acquire distinctive metaphorical senses 
if they thereby become associated with something that deserves to be called their 
`metaphorical meaning'. Nothing deserves to be called a metaphorical meaning 
unless (a) there is something genuinely meaning-like about it and (b) there is 
something about it that distinctively relates to the metaphorical nature of the 
utterances it is putatively associated with. 
Nothing is genuinely worth calling the metaphorical meaning of a word that isn't 
similar to the literal meaning of a word in this respect: it makes a systematic contribution 
to the meaning of sentences to which it occurs. For it is precisely this feature of words 
that theorists of language posit word-meanings for: if it wasn't for this feature, it is far 
from clear what theoretical profit there would be in talking about word meanings at all. 
Word meanings are like phlogiston, the humours, and the ether; if they can't do the 
theoretical job that they were designed to do, then there's absolutely no point in having 
them around. So if theorists like Richards, Empson, Black and Ricoeur are to defend the 
claim that words acquire distinctive new senses when used metaphorically, then they 
ought to ensure that those senses are playing the right kind of theoretical role. 
Otherwise, it's a bit like categorising afterimages as a distinctive new variety of pains 
(one that doesn't feel bad) or cabbages as distinctive instances of kings (ones that don't 
have a lot of power, or move about much). 
The problem for such theorists is that they precisely introduced such distinctive senses in 
a way that seems to prohibit the kind of systematic semantic role that (Al) rightfully 
proscribes. For example, Richards writes: 
In the simplest formulation, when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different 
things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a 
result of their interaction. 83 
83 Richards (1965) p. 93? check page ref. The idea that metaphors involved two distinct word or phrasal 
`meanings was widely shared before Davidson's article was first published in 1979. Beardsley (1976) p. 
219 describes the `conventional wisdom about metaphor' as maintaining that "in the usual case, to 
recognize a controlled sentence as metaphorical involves discerning two senses of the predicate term, in 
one of which the sentence is false". 
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This conception of the process which determines the metaphorical meaning of a word, 
however, completely rules out the possibility of the kind of systematic role mandated by 
(Al). Given that the m-meaning of the relevant phrase is wholly resultant from the local 
linguistic context, any shift to a new context leaves it open that a completely different 
sense might arise. And in fact, unsurprisingly, that is what seems to happen. Consider 
the role the word `bronze' plays in the following two metaphors: 
1) In cities you build a language of circumspection and tact, a thousand little intimations, 
the nuance that has a shimmer of rubbed bronze. (DeLillo)8; 
2) Pythagoras planned it. Why did the people stare? 
His numbers, though they moved, or seemed to move 
In marble or in bronze, lacked character. 5 (Yeats) 
How do we understand the role the word `bronze' is playing in these two utterances? In 
the first, the `two thoughts of different things active together' involve the metal and the 
dark, warm, elegant and unyielding mores of the city. In the second, the comparison is 
between the stark, unchanging abstract world of Pythagorean numbers, and the chilled, 
balanced perfection of the art that they made possible. 86 Two things seem clear. Firstly, 
we clearly do not approach either utterance with a prior grasp of a preordained 
`metaphorical class' of entities which are picked out by the metaphorical sense of the 
word, wholly independently of the immediately local linguistic context in which it 
appears. When asked for things that are metaphorically bronze, I am confident that very 
few people would include a certain restricted class of nuances, and Pythagorean 
numbers. Secondly, we only come to grasp the supposed. metaphorical sense by first 
coming to understand the utterance in which it plays a role. One simply cannot 
84 DeLillo (1997) p. 446 
85 Yeats (1962) p. 173 
86 I am assuming that the richness of Yeats' image results in part from our being encouraged by the 
grammatical structure of the lines to think firstly of the numbers as things which metaphorically move in 
bronze, and then to reverse direction, conceiving of the statues as `containing' the numbers that measure 
their form. Nothing hangs on whether this is the right way to read the lines. Yeats says in On the Boiler 
p. 37 "There are moments when I am certain that art must once again accept those Greek proportions 
which carry into plastic art the Pythagorean numbers, those faces which are divine because all there is 
empty and measured". 
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determine what the relevant sense is supposed to be, without first coming to understand 
the utterance as a whole; for it is only by so coming to understand it that we can identify 
what precisely the `two thoughts of different things' are, and how precisely they 
`interact' so as to determine the meaning of the relevant phrase. Compare and contrast 
the following literal examples: 
3) John bought a bronze statue yesterday, which was very reasonably priced. 
4) My favourite plate is bronze. 
5) Nobody much visited the bronze factory in Africa any more, where the workers were 
reputedly ill paid and married very early. 
In the first two examples, the linguistic meaning we attribute to the word bronze can 
potentially do some genuine explanatory work. We can explain how we come to 
understand the utterances by adverting (a) to the fact that we approach them with a grasp 
of which kind of objects counts as the bronze ones, and (b) that we know enough about 
semantic roles of the other constituent words in the sentences, together with the way in 
which they are syntactically related, to be able to determine the content of the whole 
sentence as a function of the meaning and arrangement of its parts. By appealing to our 
systematic mastery of a finite lexicon and set of compositional rules, we can explain 
how we are able to instantly recognize the meaning of two sentences that we have never 
come across before. Moreover, such an explanation admits of extension to cases where 
the meaning varies systematically. A bronze factory is not related to bronze in the sense 
that a bronze statue is, but nevertheless, mastery of what it is for an object to be bronze 
can interact with systematic linguistic processes to explain how we can understand a 
cluster of related uses of the word. 87 But no such explanation is possible in the case of 
the two metaphors. In that case, we do not compute the semantic value of the sentence 
based on our knowledge of the semantics and structure of its parts. It is only by first 
determining what the metaphor is supposed to get across that we can then begin to 
determine what the supposed metaphorical sense of one of its component words might 
be. 
87 Perhaps via grasping the various thematic roles of the subjects qualified by the term `bronze' -a bronze 
factory being a source of bronze, a bronze sheen being the characteristic effect of it, etc. 
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Similarly, Max Black claims that in the famous opening sentence of Davidson's article, 
Metaphor is the dreamwork of language, "dreamwork" is used metaphorically, via 
Davidson's `attaching an altered sense to the words he is using in context', allowing him 
thereby to say something distinctively different from the meaning of the words taken 
literally88. But it is not through mastery of this altered sense that we come to understand 
the utterance, as in the case of sub-sentential parts with genuine meanings. How would 
the nature of such a sense become evident? Rather, all that can happen in this case is 
that we understand - or endeavour to begin to understand - what Davidson is trying to 
get across by his remark, and then assign a corresponding `meaning' to the relevant parts 
of it. But this last step seems wholly redundant. Since we only want word meanings to 
explain how we compute utterance-meanings, etc, then it is perfectly useless to assign 
distinctive word-meanings that depend wholly on our first understanding the meanings 
of the metaphors that they occur in. 
Of course, it is fair enough to engage in such a practice as part of the process of learning 
unfamiliar words. If, lacking a dictionary or knowledgeable companion, I read Manley 
Hopkins' lines 
Glory be to God for dappled things 
For skies of couple-colour as a brinded cow 
and wonder what `brinded' means, then I only have the evidence of the surrounding 
linguistic context, together with my extra-linguistic knowledge (e. g. of skies, cows and 
the stylistic habits of Hopkins) to go on. But this is quite different from the case of the 
type of metaphorical meaning that Black adverts to. Having got as far as working out 
that brinded means something like streaked or patched with colour, I have a chance of 
using my new found knowledge to help work out the meaning of e. g. 
(6) The brinded cat wound its way through the streets. 
(7) The outside of the house was ill-kempt and brinded, not recently painted and polished as 
she'd expected. 
88 Black (1978) pp. 185-187 
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But the type of metaphorical meaning assigned to words by Richards and Black is 
intended to be far more radically dependent on immediate linguistic context than the 
above type of case. To borrow a nice example of Roger White's, try using `pheasant' in 
the same metaphorical sense in (9) as is most naturally `assigned' to it in (8) 
(8) A poem is a pheasant. 
(9) Shakespeare's Juliet is a pheasant, not a dove or a hawk. 
or `metaphysician' the same metaphorical sense in the following two metaphors 
(10) The actor is 
A metaphysician in the dark, twanging 
An instrument, twanging a wiry string that gives 
Sounds passing through sudden rightnesses, wholly 
Containing the mind, below which it cannot descend, 
Beyond which it has no will to rise. (Stevens) 
(11) [Dylan] was re-incarnated as a travelling musical salesman in the spirit 
of James Brown or B. B. King: one hundred and twenty shows a year, the hardest 
working metaphysician in showbiz. (Mick Gold) 
In the case where we use linguistic and contextual clues to master a genuine word-sense, 
we can go on to explain how that sense can contribute to an indefinite number of quite 
different and novel sentences. But in the case of the putatively metaphorical sense, we 
find this difficult to do, especially in the most interesting and effective metaphors. 
Typically, understanding the role that a word plays in a metaphor is quite unlike learning 
the meaning of an unknown word by examining its use in partially understood sentences. 
No doubt this isn't always the case. Perhaps when we come to grasp what it would be 
for Juliet to be a pheasant in the relevant sense, we can apply that term in just the same 
sense to other fictional characters, acquaintances of ours, or film stars, for example. But 
thus securing condition a) of (Al) - that anything worth calling a metaphorical meaning 
should be genuinely meaning like - comes at the cost of surrendering condition b), 
which insists that it should also be distinctively related to the metaphorical nature of the 
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utterances in question. For it now seems clear that this new sense of `pheasant' - which 
we can stipulate is to serve as the meaning of a new coinage, `m-pheasant' - admits of 
mastery by careful observers of our practice who don't know what pheasants are. Once 
they cotton onto the type of properties of people that we apply `m-pheasant' to, they 
seem to know all they need to accord with our application of the term. They don't have 
to think of the people as pheasants, through a prior literal sense of `pheasant'; they 
simply need to master the sense of `m-pheasant'. And that they can presumably do in 
the same way that they can learn other words of our language, by observation, imitation, 
guesswork, empathy, simulation and theory building. But that means that there's 
nothing distinctively metaphorical about the new meaning that has been introduced, 
except for its origin. Since many words that we now take to be associated with 
uncontroversially literal meanings similarly have etymologies involving metaphor, it 
seems that origin simply isn't enough to establish the distinctive relation that condition 
b) demands. 
It seems then, that Davidson can offer a fairly convincing defence of (A4) by offering a 
dilemma to his opponents. Is the supposed metaphorical meaning of the relevant sub- 
sentential part straightforwardly extensible to a wide range of novel linguistic contexts 
or not? If not, then it doesn't bear a close enough relation to the standard theoretical role 
of word-meanings to deserve the name. If so, then we have so far been given no reason 
to think of such a sense as distinctively metaphorical, depending for its existence and 
efficacy on our taking one thing as another, rather than as a new literal sense; possibly 
introduced, as many such senses have been, by the use of metaphor, but now bearing no 
essential or distinctive relationship to metaphor at all. 
There is no doubt much more to be said. For example, it is often claimed that apparently 
stone-dead metaphors, that don't demand our thinking of one thing as another, can 
`come to life' again given the right context. Such contexts often include cases where we 
mix dead metaphors to jarring effect: 
(12) She was hot, but cold. 
Moreover, a case might be made that it may not in fact be straightforward for observers 
who do not determine the new sense of `pheasant' via a metaphorical process to know 
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how it is to be extended to new cases. It is a familiar theme of a certain type of 
Wittgensteinian approach to the application of concepts that one might need to be 
inducted into a communal practice in order to extend them reliably to new cases, and 
there seems to be no obvious reason a priori why that might not include going at the 
thing via the metaphorical process. In any case, I have left the nature of the `distinctive 
relation' that (Al) demands at such an intuitive level that it might seem unfair to rule out 
certain kinds of etymological relations as potential satisfiers. So there is definitely much 
more that needs to be said to secure Davidson's defence of (A4). Nevertheless, I intend 
to rest content with the claim that there are at least prima facie good grounds for 
thinking that something suitably similar to (A4) might be a safe principle for Davidson 
to rely on. 
2.7 Sentence-meaning and Metaphor 
As we have seen, my reconstruction of Davidson's master argument attributes to him the 
following thesis 
(A5) The m-meaning conveyed by a sentence used metaphorically would be identical 
with either (a) what is said by the utterance, which results solely from the 
meanings of its component words, together with their mode of composition, or 
(b) the extra propositional content communicated by the author of the metaphor, 
over and above what it says, as determined by a linguistic theory of pragmatics. 
Call the putative distinctive metaphorical content expressed by the utterance the 
semantic sentential m-meaning, and that communicated by the author the pragmatic 
sentential m-meaning. 89 What reason is there to think that the m-meaning of sentences 
used metaphorically must be either semantic or pragmatic in the relevant sense? 
We have already met independently plausible principles that seem to support the idea 
that defending semantic sentential m-meaning entails defending the claim that the parts 
of sentences have metaphorical meanings. Firstly, we can note that (A1)'s demand that 
89 Henceforth, the semantic m-meaning and the pragmatic m-meaning. 
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m-meanings are both meaning like, and suitably related to the metaphorical *character of 
the utterance, applies equally to the sentential case. Secondly, we can note that e. g. the 
following principles tell us a lot about the character of genuine sentential meanings 
(Compositionality) The meaning of complex linguistic expressions is wholly 
determined by their syntax, together with the meanings of their 
parts (in context). For example, the meaning of `dogs bark' 
depends on the meaning of `dogs and `barks', and the manner in 
which they are syntactically composed. 
(Reverse The meaning of constituent expressions (in context) supervene 
Compositionality) on the complexes of which they are parts. For example, the 
meaning of `dogs' and `bark' couldn't change without the 
meaning of `dogs bark' changing. 
It seems reasonable to demand that putative semantic m-meanings accord with these 
central principles governing genuine sentential meanings. But that seems sufficient for 
us to conclude that any such metaphorical sentence meanings would have to be 
determined by the metaphorical meanings of words. Otherwise, (Compositionality) and 
its sister principle would seem to fail. We can argue as follows. 
1. Assume that a metaphorical utterance U expresses a distinct propositional 
content M that is distinct from its literal content L. 
2. Assume further, for reductio, that M does not result from a compositional process 
on sub-sentential parts that themselves have distinctive m-meanings. 
3. Since the sub-sentential parts of U have only their literal meanings, their 
compositional product will be L. 
4. By hypothesis, L and M are distinct, so the semantic m-meaning of isn't 
determined by U's syntax, together with the meanings of its parts (in context). So 
(Compositionality) fails. 
5. Since M is distinct from L, and not determined by the compositional process that 
fixed the meaning of L, and since the component words of U have only their 
literal meaning, there seems to be no obvious reason why M might not remain 
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the content of U while the meaning of U's parts changed. So (Reverse 
Compositionality) seems tb be under pressure too. 
6. Since giving up those two principles robs m-meanings of the right to be thought 
of as meanings, the assumption in line 2 must be rejected. So sentential m- 
meanings require sub-sentential m-meanings. 90 
Given that the good standing of (A3) is secured by the above line of thought, however, 
anybody who (i) wants to defend the existence of metaphorical sentence-meanings, and 
(ii) has some sympathy with the arguments of the previous section against metaphorical 
word-meanings, will no doubt want to take a different. approach. (After all, (A3) simply 
tells us the sentence m-meanings require word m-meanings, so if it's secure, and you 
don't want the latter, you'd better not take the former). The metaphorical content is not 
expressed by the utterance, such theorists might hold, but arises in some other way. 
However, given (Al), room for manoeuvre is limited somewhat. It's no good finding 
some apt propositional content, and simply proclaiming it the meaning of the 
metaphorical utterance. To be a meaning is to play a role which is similar enough to 
things deservedly regarded as meanings. It's no good just recalling some thought that 
the metaphor inspires, and proclaiming it the meaning of the metaphor. Such a content 
needs to link tip in the right way to the linguistic knowledge that governs the 
communication of representational contents by means of natural language or other 
relevant representations. For metaphorical meanings to be of distinctive interest to 
linguistics and the philosophy of language, as their proponents typically take them to be, 
they need to resemble in relevant ways linguistic meanings. Since linguistic meaning is 
fundamentally what is communicated in successful instances of linguistic 
communication, metaphorical meaning had better be what is communicated by the 
making and taking of metaphors. If that communication does not take place in virtue of 
shared mastery of the m-meanings of words, then it had better be explicable in terms of 
some other distinctively linguistic capacity. Call any theory which aims to explicate the 
nature of such non-semantic but still linguistic communication a pragmatic theory. It 
90 This is the proof of the independent good standing of (A3) promised in Section 5 above. I take it that . 
(Al) and the two principles governing compositionality ought to be common ground between any serious 
participants in the debate about metaphorical meanings. 
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seems then, that if metaphors genuinely have meanings, and those meanings aren't 
explicable in semantic terms, then they will have to be explicable in pragmatic ones, if 
we can explain them at all. Bracketing appeal to mystery, it seems that semantics and 
pragmatics offer the exclusive options for a genuine theory of metaphorical meaning.. 
But that's just what (A5) asserts. 
If the above line of thought is correct, then it seems that (A5) can in a sense be seen as 
an elucidation of (Al); metaphorical contents had better be meaning-like, so if they are 
not explicable in terms of word-meanings and compositional rules, they had better be 
suitably related to some more general theory of communication. However, it is worth 
keeping the two principles separate. Since (A5) claims more about what being meaning- 
like demands, it is correspondingly more open to challenge than the seemingly 
platitudinous (Al). 
It's notable how little we have needed to say in the above discussion about the shape of a 
linguistic pragmatics. We have not committed Davidson to the eventual success of a 
broadly Gricean model, for example, over a Relevance-Theoretic rival. 91 Nevertheless, I 
hope that I have offered some prima facie reason to think that (A5) defensible, and 
Davidson is entitled to rely on it, or a close counterpart, in his master argument against 
metaphorical meanings. 
2.8 Metaphor, System and Error 
We are left, then with the task of examining and evaluating (A6) 
(A6) An account of m-meaning which identifies it with the extra propositional content 
communicated by the author of the metaphor, over and above what it says, as 
determined by a linguistic theory of pragmatics, provides an unacceptably 
incomplete and misleading account of our practices of producing, using and 
reflecting on metaphors. 
91 See Sperber and Wilson (1986) 
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Davidson's remarks in defence of this thesis are compressed in the extreme, and it is fair 
to say that it seems at first face to be the most controversial of the principles that his 
argument relies on. Many philosophers have been attracted by the idea that metaphor 
makers use the literally false content of one sentence to get across some quite distinct 
content. Although this model of metaphor has been widely criticised in contemporary 
work on the topic, it remains a widespread and popular view among philosophers, and 
probably deserves to be thought of as the default position. An early and influential 
statement of the essence of the view comes from John Searle 
The problem of explaining how metaphors work is a special case of the general problem 
of explaining how speaker meaning and sentence or word meaning come apart. It is a 
special case, that is, of the problem of how it is possible to say one thing and mean 
something else, where one succeeds in communicating what one means even though 
both the speaker and the hearer know that the meanings of the words uttered by the 
speaker do not exactly and literally express what the speaker meant. Some other 
instances of the break between speaker's utterance meaning and literal sentence meaning 
are irony and indirect speech acts. In each of these cases, what the speaker means is not 
identical with what the sentence means, and yet what he means is in various ways 
dependent on what the sentence means. 92 
We have seen in Section 2.3 above that Davidson agrees with theorists like Searle that 
metaphor is a matter of how words are used, rather than what they mean. Why then, 
does he think that holding that they are typically used by the speaker to communicate 
some other proposition leads to an unacceptable account of metaphor? 
Some philosophers have thought that a certain kind of systematicity, or rather the lack of 
it, is the issue. 93 Thus Joseph Stem says that the view that no speaker's meaning is 
conveyed is 
92 Searle (1993) p. 84 
93 Systematicity in this sense is clearly different from the type of systematic linguistic creativity adverted 
to above. It concerns, rather, the idea that the interpretation of metaphors does not depend on a codifiable 
set of strictly linguistic rules and abilities. 
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... not peculiar to Davidson's discussion of metaphor. For in general he expresses doubt 
about the possibility of codifying the abilities and skills involved in so-called 
"speaker's" or "utterance meaning" in the form of "principles" (ä la Searle) or "maxims" 
(ä la Grice), pre-established or conventional rules which would be either specific to 
language or linguistic activities like conversation. Instead the kinds of inferences and 
reasoning these activities involve require only, he says, the "cleverness", "intuition, luck 
and skill" which are necessary for any rational activity or for "devising a new theory in 
any field". 94 
Similarly, William Lycan treats Davidson's claim that 
There are no instructions for devising metaphors; there is no manual for determining 
what a metaphor `means' or `says'; there is no test for metaphor that does not call for 
taste. 95 
as an argument against the `Pragmatic View', commenting 
As if directly inspired by that passage, Searle produced quite a number of such rules, and 
so far as they go they are plausible. 96 
Although the aim of this chapter is not textual exegesis of Davidson, I think that this 
interpretation is neither very plausible as account of what actually drives Davidson to 
endorse something like (A6), nor the most charitable way of defending that principle. 
The suggested motivation runs roughly as follows: 
(1) Anything worth regarding as a meaning relates constitutively to distinctively 
linguistic knowledge, abilities, rules or conventions. 
(2) The type of interchange of propositional content - with the interpreter coming to 
recognise what the speaker is trying to get across - which is involved in 
metaphor, though genuine enough, is not constitutively related to distinctively 
9; Stern (1991) p. 16 
9s Davidson (1984a) p. 245 
96 Lycan (2000) p. 221 
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linguistic knowledge, abilities, rules or conventions. Rather, it draws on quite 
general epistemic and practical knowledge and abilities. 
(3) Therefore, the type of interchange of propositional content which is involved in 
metaphor, though genuine enough, is not worth regarding as the meaning of the 
metaphor, whether construed in semantic or pragmatic terms. 
Firstly, there is little textual evidence in `What Metaphors Mean' that this line of thought 
is what is motivating Davidson there. Stern quotes from a different essay, 
"Communication and Convention", 97 which does not discuss the case of metaphor, and 
which is primarily concerned with the question of whether appeal to public conventions 
is explanatorily essential in constructing a theory of communication. 98 The Davidsonian 
quotation that Lycan appeals to is immediately preceded by a remark that makes it clear 
that Davidson means it to speak to semantic accounts of metaphor, rather than the kind 
of pragmatic account adverted to here. 99 His point seems to be that there are no 
additional compositional rules that serve to determine metaphorical meanings on the 
basis of literal ones. 
I am not claiming that Davidson would wholly reject the spirit of the premises of the 
above argument. The idea that a theory of meaning, properly so-called, deals with only 
a very limited pattern of predictable behaviour, teased out painstakingly from the unruly 
97 Davidson (1984b) 
98 Stern also cites remarks made by Davidson in an introductory summary to that essay. Davidson writes: 
"It is always an open question how well the theory an interpreter brings to a linguistic encounter will cope. 
In practice an interpreter keeps the conversation going by adjusting his theory on the spot. The principles 
of such inventive accommodation are not themselves reducible to theory, involving as they do nothing less 
than all our skills at theory construction. " Since the kind of pragmatic account discussed by Searle 
explicitly does not involve revision of the semantic theory which assigns satisfaction conditions to the 
parts of the language, this remark does not seem to speak to it. See Stern (1991) p. 46 and Davidson 
(1984) p. xix. Davidson explicitly distinguishes between metaphor and malapropism, where such theory 
adjustment does occur, in Davidson (1986). 
99" 
. all communication 
by speech assumes the interplay of inventive construction and inventive 
construal. What metaphor adds to the ordinary is an achievement that uses no semantic resources beyond 
the resources on which the ordinary depend. There are no instructions for devising metaphors... ". 
Davidson (1984a) p 246. The remark comes at the very beginning of Davidson's essay, whereas the 
discussion of pragmatic communication comes at the very end. 
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flux of linguistic interaction, is definitely a recurrent theme in his work. On the other 
hand, the idea that he hangs anything very much on the distinction adverted to in the 
second premise is simply not faithful to his stated view 
[Grice] has shown why it is essential to distinguish between the literal meaning... of 
words and what is often implied (or implicated) by someone who uses those words. He 
has explored the general principles behind our ability to figure out such implicatures, 
and these principles must, of course, be known by speakers who expect to be taken up 
on them. Whether knowledge of these principles ought to be included in the description 
of linguistic competence may not have to be settled: on the one hand they are things a 
clever person could often figure out without previous training or exposure, and they are 
things we could get along without. On the other hand they represent a kind of skill we 
expect of an interpreter and without which communication would be greatly 
impoverished. '00 
Davidson is wise to profess neutrality on the question of whether we should accept the 
two premises of the above argument. Linguists and philosophers of language have long 
found it plausible and profitable to suppose that some theory of implicature can play an 
explanatory role in understanding communication. Such work is no doubt provisional 
and in need of development. Furthermore, it is surely too much to hope that the type of 
theory that emerges, even in the most favourable case, is likely to allow for the type of 
productive and predictive formalization available in syntax and semantics. Nevertheless, 
it's not clear why we are to accept the claim of the first premise that anything worth 
regarding as a meaning must be constitutively related to distinctively linguistic 
knowledge and abilities. Why shouldn't it be sufficient that a pragmatics show how 
speaker meanings characteristically relate to a fairly typical, delimited set of skills and 
assumptions? It's all too easy to get slightly hysterical about such demarcatory issues. 
Given that working linguists typically find speaker meaning a useful explanatory posit, 
philosophers ought not to get too excited about what is in effect a terminological 
decision, made on the basis of a fluid and shifting pattern of use. 
Neither textual exegesis, nor a spirit of interpretative charity, then, lead us to conclude 
that Davidson's pragmatic error theory is motivated by a general scepticism about the 
100 Davidson (1986) p. 437 
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place of pragmatics in linguistic explanation. Rather, I will suggest, the intended 
supporting argument for (A6) runs somewhat as follows: 
a) Anything worth regarding as a tolerably complete and informative account of 
our practices of producing, using and reflecting on metaphors must account 
for all of the distinctive marks of metaphor. 
b) An account of metaphor that, like Searle's, characterizes such practices as 
being in essence a special case of saying one thing and meaning another, 
cannot account for all of the distinctive marks of metaphor. 
c) Therefore, such pragmatic accounts of metaphor provide at best an 
incomplete and misleading account of our practices of producing, using and 
reflecting on metaphors. 
Several comments on this argument are immediately required. Firstly, by `marks of 
metaphor', I mean the distinctive features of our practice of composing, employing and 
engaging with metaphor, that give it the role in our thought and practice that it 
possesses. Secondly, it ought to be clear that the above argument does not aim to 
demonstrate that metaphor-as-implication never takes place, nor that a theory like 
Searle's might comprise apart of a more general theory of metaphorical talk. Davidson 
has often been attacked for holding that such communication never takes place, but this 
may be to attack a straw man. He writes of the thesis that metaphors are associated with 
a distinctive cognitive content that the speaker intends to convey to an interpreter 
This theory is false as a full account of metaphor, whether or not we call the purported 
cognitive content a meaning. '0' 
Similarly, Davidson treats Donnellan's case of Smith's murderer as a case where Jones 
has "said something true by using a sentence that is false", adding 
This is done intentionally all the time, for example in irony or metaphor. '°2 
101 Davidson (1984a) p 262, my italics. The italicised section did not appear in the original version of the 
article, which might either suggest a change of heart, or, more likely, the correction of a rhetorical 
flourish. 
102 Davidson (1986) p. 440 
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Admittedly, Davidson does include the previously quoted remark 
if I am right, a metaphor doesn't say anything, beyond its literal meaning (nor does its 
maker say anything, in using the metaphor, beyond the literal). '03 
There are, however, a number of ways to interpret this charitably. We might see it as an 
ill-timed rhetorical flourish, a deliberately eye-catching overstatement of the actual 
thesis defended. We might take it as a sign that Davidson is here speaking of metaphor 
in generic terms, rather than making a universally quantified claim. We might take its 
inclusion as an oversight, a hangover from an early, less plausible version of the 
position. 
Later work suggests that the latter interpretation is probably the most likely. In 
`Locating Literary Language', Davidson distinguishes three species of intention that he 
holds must be present in any speech act. 104 Firstly, there are `ulterior' intentions which 
aim at the achievement of some extra-linguistic end; a goal or purpose that could, at least 
in principle, be achieved in other ways. For example, one might want to call 
somebody's attention to similarities between philosophers and flies trapped in fly- 
bottles, or get them to think of the former as the latter. Secondly, there are pragmatic 
intentions to utter a sentence with a given illocutionary force. A given remark is 
intended to be taken as a command, a request, an invitation, etc. 105 It is unclear whether 
Davidson thinks that the intention to speak metaphorically fits in at this level, partly 
because metaphor seems to relate more closely to the manner of what is said, than the 
force with which it is put forward. Finally, there are the `strictly semantic' intentions, 
where one intends one's words to have certain meanings that will be taken as such by 
one's interpreter. For example, Wittgenstein intended the words "Mendelssohn is not a 
peak, but a plateau" 106 to mean that Mendelssohn is not a peak, but a plateau. (Had he 
103 Davidson (1984a) p. 246, my italics. The remark is included both the original version of the article, 
and the revised version which I have relied on in this thesis. 
1°' Davidson (1993) p. 298-299 
105 Davidson accepts the possibilities of borderline cases - as when "see you in July" is half promise and 
half prediction - but only when such a mixed force is intended by the speaker. 
106 Wittgenstein (1998) p. 4e 
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mistaken the meaning of `plateau' for that of `platypus', his intention would not have 
been fulfilled. ) 
Davidson uses the label `first meaning' for the meanings of words picked out by the 
latter type of intentions. He writes 
The usefulness of the concept of first meaning emerges when we consider cases where 
what is stated or implied differs from what the words mean. "Sometimes too hot the eye 
of heaven shines" means that the sun sometimes shines too brightly. But the first 
meaning of "the eye of heaven" purports to refer to the one and only eye of heaven. We 
can tell this because Shakespeare (we assume) intended to use words that would be 
recognised by a reader to refer to the one and only eye of heaven (if such a thing existed) 
in order to prompt the reader to understand that he meant the sun. We may wish to use 
the word "meaning" for both the first meaning and what the metaphor carries us to, but 
only the first meaning has a systematic place in the language of the author. 107 
As if to eliminate any doubt, in a footnote to the above he adds 
In my essay "What Metaphors Mean" I was foolishly stubborn about the word 
"meaning" when all I cared about was the primacy of "first meaning". 
In any case, I will assume that the best defence of the type of pragmatic error theory 
canvassed by Davidson in his original article involves granting that a speaker-meaning 
account might be applicable on occasion, but deny that it provides a satisfactory theory 
of metaphor. 108 
Such a concession, while seemingly inevitable given the widely acknowledged datum 
that we sometimes do, or at the very least could, convey a cognitive content when 
speaking metaphorically, entails an immediate weakening of Davidson's argument as 
presented above. Compare (A6) and (A2) 
107 Davidson (1993) p. 300 
103 For stylistic convenience, I will continue to refer to the proponent of such a position as `Davidson' and 
the position itself as `Davidsonian, etc. This should not be understood as an implicit commitment to the 
actual Donald Davidson being willing to endorse them in letter or spirit. 
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(A2) If a proposed assignment of a metaphorical content to a utterance results solely from 
an unacceptable theory of metaphor, then the utterance does not express that content. 
(A6) An account of m-meaning which identifies it with the extra propositional content 
communicated by the author of the metaphor, over and above what it says, as 
determined by a linguistic theory of pragmatics, provides an unacceptably incomplete 
and misleading account of our practices of producing, using and reflecting on 
metaphors. 
The surface plausibility of these two principles seems to result from two quite different 
conceptions of an `unacceptable theory of metaphor'. Imagine that the only putative 
warrant we could get, even in relatively idealized conditions, for assigning a certain m- 
meaning to an utterance is a crazy theory of metaphor. Then, it seems, the utterance 
does not express that meaning. That's the intended sense of (A2), and it's the sense in 
which it ought to be common ground between Davidson and his opponents. Such a 
principle can be seen as resting on one incontrovertible principle, and one widely shared 
assumption about what metaphorical meaning must be like 
(Warrant) If a theory is crazy, then it doesn't give warrant to beliefs formed on the 
basis of it. 
(Epistemic Access) If a metaphor m-means that P, then (in somewhat idealized 
conditions) we can get some warrant for believing that it m-means 
that P. 
Assume that the only putative warrant that we could get for an ascription of m-meaning 
was a crazy theory. By (Warrant), no warrant for believing that the metaphor did have 
such a content would spring from that theory. So we would have no warrant at all for 
accepting the ascription. Modus tollens on (Epistemic Access) gives us that the 
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metaphor does not have that content, and conditional proof gives us the plausible version 
of (A2). 
However, (A6) is only plausible if we apply quite a different sense of `unacceptable 
theory'. Grant Davidson that any acceptable theory must account for all the marks of 
metaphor, and that a speaker-meaning account does not. Even so, if there are grounds 
for thinking that such an account is only unacceptable in the sense it is incomplete, 
partial or narrow in application, then that is a quite different thing than being the type of 
crazy theory that (Warrant) involves. Similarly, if the theory does not mislead us with 
respect to its proper objects, but only beguiles us into ignoring more complex cases of 
metaphor than straightforward implicatures. In those type of cases, an unacceptable 
theory may well be capable of giving warrant to beliefs, just as Newtonian mechanics 
gave warrant despite incompleteness and misleadingness of a similar kind. So it seems 
that Davidson currently lacks a unitary notion of `unacceptable theory of metaphor' 
upon which all of the principles he implicitly relies upon come out true. 
It seems, then, that even before we begin to evaluate Davidson's claim regarding the 
explanatory power of a pragmatic theory of metaphorical content, his argument runs into 
trouble. Even if we grant that a pragmatic theory is unacceptably incomplete in the way 
that he suggests, that does not warrant the application of (A2), in the sense in which that 
principle is neutral territory. 
The only answer available to a Davidsonian seems to be to restrict the scope of the 
argument. Let in be a metaphorical utterance that the pragmatic theory really does give a 
crazily unsatisfactory account of. Then (A2) and (A6) hold true of metaphors like in. 
The Davidsonian had better hope that a significant proportion of our metaphors are more 
like m, than the type of communicative metaphors adverted to by Searle et al. 
Otherwise, the pragmatic error theory seems to be a considerably less revisionary, and 
interesting, position than it originally seemed. 
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Imagine that Davidson is right to hold that a significant proportion of metaphors are not 
best explained in terms of pragmatic communication, but that some are. Does even this 
limited concession undercut the motivation for, or substance of, a pragmatic error 
theory? After all, we can't be making all that much of an error if we are right about 
metaphor expressing cognitive contents in a number of familiar cases. 
It is instructive to consider analogous cases from other areas of philosophy. Hartry 
Field, for example, does not hold that every mathematical sentence is false, just that a 
substantial and interesting class are. Negative existentials that are counted as true by 
realists about mathematics - there is no greatest prime number, for example - will also 
be counted true by Field. That case, admittedly, might be thought to turn on a peculiar 
feature of the case. But there is comfort elsewhere. Take a Nietzschean view on 
everyday moral talk, for example. Nietzsche rejects the idea that the majority of claims 
about moral worth are literally true, holding instead that people generally are radically 
self-deceived about e. g. the value of giving money to famine relief out of a sense of pity 
for the poor and suffering. He does not try to reconstruct the semantics for such talk in 
terms more acceptable to an anti-realist worldview, however. It is thus appropriate to 
regard him as an error theorist about everyday morality. But that does not entail that he 
rejects, or ought to reject, every claim that everyday morality would make. Folk 
morality and Nietzschean master-morality may well converge on their appraisals of e. g. 
the moral worth of character traits like creativity, self-sufficiency, inner strength and 
dedication. If we're content to continue to regard Nietzsche as the moral revisionist and 
error-theorist par excellence, then it seems that the Davidson has some room for limited 
concession. 
2.9 Two Marks of Metaphor 
What marks of metaphor, then, might a speaker-meaning account be thought to give a 
radically unsatisfactory account of? Davidson suggests two potential lines in "What 
Metaphors Mean". Though neither is developed in any great detail there, both have 
proved suggestive. Firstly, there is the idea that what a metaphor brings to our attention 
is in a certain sense limitless. 
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Stanley Cavell mentions the fact that most attempt at paraphrase [of metaphors] end with 
`and so on' and refers to Empson's remark that metaphors are `pregnant'. But Cavell 
doesn't explain the endlessness of paraphrase as I do, as can be learned from the fact that 
he thinks it distinguishes metaphor from some ('but perhaps not all') literal discourse. I 
hold that the endless character of what we call the paraphrase of a metaphor springs 
from the fact that it attempts to spell out what the metaphor makes us notice, and to this 
there is no clear end. I would say the same for any use of language. 109 
Secondly, there is the idea that this limitlessness has a partial source in the non- 
propositional character of what metaphor guides us to 
It's not only that we can't provide an exhaustive catalogue of what has been attended to 
when we are led to see something in a new light; the difficulty is more fundamental. 
What we notice or see is not, in general, propositional in character. Of course it may be, 
and when it is, it usually may be stated in fairly plain words. But if I show you 
Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit and I say, `It's a duck', then with luck you see it as a duck; if 
I say, `It's a rabbit', you see it as a rabbit. But no proposition expresses what I have led 
you to see... Seeing as is not seeing that. Metaphor makes us see one thing as another by 
making some literal statement that inspires or prompts the insight. Since in most cases 
what the metaphor prompts or inspires is not entirely, or even at all, recognition of some 
truth or fact, the attempt to give literal expression to the content of the metaphor is 
simply misguided. 1° 
There are two issues that become pressing here. Firstly, there is the question of how we 
should best understand the character of the suggested marks of metaphor. Secondly, 
there is the question of whether they are wholly inadequately explained by a pragmatic 
theory of metaphor. Since the last two chapters of this thesis will be concerned with 
addressing both topics in a degree of depth, I will offer a fairly compressed discussion at 
109 Davidson (1984a) p. 263 
110 Davidson (1984a) p. 263. It is worth drawing attention to the fact that Davidson here claims that in 
most cases, what the metaphor prompts is not propositional, giving textual support to the suggested 
interpretation offered above. 
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this stage. Nevertheless, it is worth dealing with a few issues here. I shall proceed in 
reverse order. 
A pragmatic account of metaphor typically distinguishes between what is 
communicated, or implicated, by the use of a sentence, and what that sentence literally 
says. Admittedly, pragmatic accounts need not limit themselves to such models. More 
radical pragmatist accounts challenge the idea that what a sentence means is wholly 
independent of the linguistic and social context in which it is uttered, even when all e. g. 
indexical and demonstrative elements of the sentence are taken into account. l"1 
Nevertheless, even such radical theories agree that pragmatic processes result in 
something that can be specified using a `that' clause. If John, holding a cigarette, asks 
Susan if she has any matches, we can take it that he is implicating, inter alia, that the 
matches are writable for lighting the cigarette. Even if Sperber, Wilson and Carston are 
right to hold that processes of pragmatic enrichment determine that saying "John has had 
breakfast" typically states, rather than merely implicates, that John has had breakfast 
this morning, the output of the pragmatic process is still a propositional content. 112 
Such convergence is unsurprising. The aim of a pragmatic theory isn't wholly clear, but 
often in practice amounts to the systematic investigation of what Gazdar has called 
`meaning minus truth-conditions'. 113 Since what is meant or said by using a sentence 
can typically be expressed using `S said that P' or `U means that P' constructions, 
pragmatics is typically concerned with assigning propositional contents to utterances. 
Moreover, since pragmatics aspires to the status of a well-confirmed linguistic theory, 
and linguistics aspires to be a (special) science, such attributions are typically literal 
statements of what is said by an utterance. 114 
111 See e. g. Searle (1978) and Travis (1997) for statements of a view similar to this. 
112 See Recanati (1993) p. 261 for a useful discussion of the case. 
113 Gazdar (1979) p. 2. Levinson (1983) pp 12-32 suggests `Pragmatics is the study of all those aspects of 
meaning not captured in a semantic theory' as the most promising definition. 
114 1 do not mean to suggest that metaphor has no place in science. It clearly does. However, the 
systematic attribution of contents to utterances by linguistic theories are typically not cases in point. 
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It is thus a serious problem for a pragmatic theory if what a metaphor gets across is non- 
finitely specifiable, and even worse if it is wholly non-propositional. We can argue as 
follows 
1) If a pragmatic theory of metaphor is to be successful, then it ought to 
issue in attributions like `Speaker S communicates that p by uttering 
metaphor M', or `Metaphor M states that p'. 
2) The limitlessness and non-propositional character of most metaphors 
means that no such attributions will be forthcoming by a pragmatic 
theory. 
3) A pragmatic theory of metaphor will not be successful. 
The first premise seems to be secured by the general aims of a linguistic pragmatics, 
while the second seems relatively secure, given then methods by which such a theory 
aims to match utterances and contents. It seems then, that if Davidson is right about the 
characteristic marks of metaphor, he has the chance to establish that pragmatic theories 
of metaphor are unacceptable in just the way that a unified reading of (A2) and (A6) 
demands. 
The matter turns, then, on the status of the two marks of metaphor. The first, 
limitlessness, has often been associated with a demand for paraphrasability. In 
specifying the pragmatic content of an indexical utterance, we may have to use a 
different but related sentence, that expresses a suitably related content. For example, if I 
ask you if you can pass the salt, implicating that I would like you to pass the salt to me, 
then a theoretical specification of that content might replace the two indexicals with 
suitable proper names. ' is Similarly, the thought goes, a demand for a theoretical 
specification of the pragmatic content of a metaphor will involve the identification of a 
suitably related proposition. 
115 Perhaps with an indication that the utterance was originally de se in form. 
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Thus Nogales reconstructs Davidson's argument as follows 
(1) Metaphorical utterances typically do not admit of paraphrasing. 
(2) Any cognitive content can be expressed in at least two different ways (i. e. it can 
be paraphrased) 
(3) Being (easily) paraphrasable is a test of whether the cognitive content of a 
sentence captures its cognitive effect. 
(4) Therefore, the cognitive effect of a metaphorical utterance does not lie in the 
cognitive content of its terms. 
(5) Metaphorical meaning is defined so as to capture the cognitive effect of the 
utterance through cognitive content. 
(6) Therefore, there is no such thing as metaphorical meaning as defined. 116 
The idea expressed in line 2- that Davidson thinks that anything can be said in two 
ways - has gained a strangely wide currency in recent work. Thus Goodman notes that 
`paraphrase of many literal sentences is also exceedingly difficult, and indeed we may 
seriously question whether any sentence can be translated exactly into other words in the 
same or other language", 117 an argument echoed approvingly by Nogales. Similarly, 
Denham suggests that the claim of non-paraphrasability, if it is to provide a distinction 
between utterances that express pragmatic contents and those that do not, must become 
one of two claims 
Either (1) metaphorical contents are non-replaceable because the truth-conditions of 
metaphorical sentences, unlike those of literal sentences, cannot be stated independently 
of the sentence itself, or (2) metaphorical contents are non-replaceable because they do 
not exist; unlike literal sentences, metaphorical sentences have no truth conditions (apart 
1 16 Nogales (1999) p. 75. I have set out Nogales reconstruction verbatim. In a footnote commenting on 
line (3), she says "Underlying this argument is Davidson's conception of what it means to be 
paraphrasable, which seems to involve not only the cognitive content of an utterance, as evidenced by its 
truth conditions, but also its effect, which seems to include feelings as well as thoughts we are led to 
contemplate". 
117 Goodman (1981) p. 176. 
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from those attaching to them as literally read) and hence no cognitive content (apart 
from their literal content. It is not open to Davidson to opt for (1) because he has 
already rejected the view that the truth-conditions of structurally simple literal sentences 
can be stated independently of the sentences themselves - which leaves them on a level 
with metaphors. He thus opts for (2): 118 
All these views seem to me to miss some fairly obvious disanalogies between the case of 
metaphors and those of other utterances. Firstly, Davidson is arguing against the idea 
that a pragmatic theory might ascribe speaker-meanings, or other pragmatically 
determined propositional contents, to metaphors. Since, in the case where theorist and 
speaker share a language, such a theory can straightforwardly give a literal specification 
of what is being said by a literal utterance by using that very sentence, or, in the case of 
indexicals, etc, a suitably related one, the issue of paraphrasability does not arise. When 
John utters assertorically `the cat is on the mat', he typically aims to communicate, inter 
alia, that the contextually salient cat is on the contextually salient mat. There is simply 
no need, contra Nogales, for Davidson to commit himself to the idea that everything can 
be said in two ways; nor, unsurprisingly, does he do so. Goodman's point is thus an 
ignoratio elenchi, based on a misreading of Davidson's line of argument. 
Denham's diagnosis of what motivates Davidson's concern with paraphrase is similarly 
misguided. ' 19 Davidson clearly does hold that the truth conditions of `structurally 
simple' sentences can be stated independently of those sentences, since e. g. (a) radical 
interpretation in the non-homophonic case would otherwise be impossible and (b) even 
in the homophonic case, indexical transformations require that quite different sentences 
be used to specify truth conditions. So Davidson could just as easily opt for (1), for all 
Denham has shown. (Denham is right to wonder whether the pragmatic theorist might 
profitably surrender the idea that a linguistic theory ought to issue specifications of 
content in only literal terms. I will discuss this idea in the next chapter). 
11$ Denham (2000) p. 259 
119 Rather unsurprisingly, given the wholly misleading and uncharitable construal of his position that 
precedes it, during which she accuses Davidson of `muddling' meaning with perlocutionary effect (! ) and, 
in an `oversight of convenience', having `neglected' the `sense/force' distinction. 
98 
The paraphrasability of literal sentences, and related red herrings relating to the non- 
preservation of Fregean `tone', ought then to be put aside. The question is whether it is 
reasonable to believe that a systematic pragmatics is likely to be able to assign suitable 
truth-conditional equivalents to metaphorical utterances. Unfortunately, however, it is at 
this point that the debate tends to collapse into appeal to theoretically loaded intuitions. 
Realists about metaphorical meaning, confident in the idea that metaphors can be true or 
truth-apt, tend to characterise Davidson's scepticism as mistaking difficulty for 
impossibility. Sometimes they even go so far as to provide putative paraphrases, often 
for relatively stale, straightforward or one-dimensional metaphors, and then extrapolate 
to the general case. Anti-realist attention is divided between two contrasting rejections. 
In the case of superficial and glib summary, they are wracked with the uneasy 
apprehension that more than mode-of-presentation is omitted from such construals. In 
the (rare) case where a substantive elucidation of a metaphor is presented, they become 
sceptical of the idea that the speaker could really have intended to convey all that by her 
metaphor. Even for a single theorist, it is easy to vacillate between rejecting the 
phenomenology of content (surely Wittgenstein was saying something about 
Mendelssohn, that we might reject, endorse as true, or ask for proof of? ) and the 
phenomenology of paraphrase (surely it's true that we can't say what a given metaphor 
conveys in non-metaphorical terms - isn't that partly why we appeal to metaphor? ) 
An account that attempted to reconcile both intuitions is clearly desirable, and has been 
much attempted. Since I will revisit the question of the possibility of paraphrase in some 
depth in the final two chapters, and offer a sustained discussion of the putatively non- 
propositional character of metaphor in Chapter 5, I shall draw my discussion to a close 
here. Let us return to (A6). 
(A6) An account of m-meaning which identifies it with the extra propositional content 
communicated by the author of the metaphor, over and above what it says, as 
determined by a linguistic theory of pragmatics, provides an unacceptably 
incomplete and misleading account of our practices of producing, using and 
reflecting on metaphors 
I have argued that this principle, and with it much of the surface plausibility of 
Davidson's case for a pragmatic error theory, depends upon (i) the way in which the 
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putative distinguishing marks of metaphor are developed and elaborated, (ii) the case 
being made that no suitable pragmatic theory can account for them and (iii) a significant 
class of metaphors actually displaying the supposed distinguishing marks. Each of these 
issues requires a good deal of work to be made good, and the principle is 
correspondingly far less plausible, prima facie, than the others adverted to in Davidson's 
argument. Nevertheless, we have not yet identified an unambiguous reason to reject it 
outright. 
2.10 Conclusion 
I have argued that we should think of Davidson as an error theorist about metaphorical 
meaning, whether construed in semantic or pragmatic terms. In the latter half of this 
chapter, I have examined the negative aspect of that position. Davidson's argument 
against metaphorical meaning relied on the following six fundamental principles. 
(Al) The parts of metaphorical utterances only acquire distinctive 
metaphorical senses if they thereby become associated with something 
that deserves to be called their `metaphorical meaning'. Nothing deserves 
to be called a metaphorical meaning unless (a) there is something 
genuinely meaning-like about it and (b) there is something about it that 
distinctively relates to the metaphorical nature of the utterances it is 
putatively associated with. 
(A2) If a proposed assignment of a metaphorical content to a utterance results 
solely 
from an unacceptable theory of metaphor, then the utterance does not 
express that content. 
(A3) If a sentence is associated with a metaphorical content solely in virtue of 
being a compositional product of its component semantic parts, then 
some of those parts must themselves have (or determine) metaphorical 
meanings. 
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(A4) The words employed in a metaphorical utterance do not come to be 
associated with anything that is both a) genuinely meaning-like and b) 
distinctively related to the metaphorical nature of the utterances in 
question. 
(A5) The m-meaning conveyed by a sentence used metaphorically would be 
identical with either a) what is said by the utterance, which results solely 
from the meanings of its component parts, together with their mode of 
composition, or b) the extra propositional content communicated by the 
author of the metaphor, over and above what it says, as determined by a 
linguistic theory of pragmatics. 
(A6) An account of m-meaning which identifies it with the extra propositional 
content communicated by the author of the metaphor, over and above 
what it says, as determined by a linguistic theory of pragmatics, provides 
an unacceptably incomplete and misleading account of our practices of 
producing, using and reflecting on metaphors. 
The first of these I took to be a priori defensible. The second, (A2), was derivable from 
two more fundamental principles, one a priori, and the other a substantive but widely 
endorsed anti-realist principle about meaning of any kind: 
(Warrant) If a theory is crazy, then it doesn't give warrant to beliefs formed on the 
basis of it. 
(Epistemic Access) If a metaphor m-means that P, then (in somewhat idealized 
conditions) we can get some warrant for believing that it m-means 
that P. 
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The third principle was defended on the grounds that its rejection entailed the rejection 
of independently plausible principles governing the relationship between the meanings 
of sentences and those of their parts, such as 
(Compositionality) The meaning of complex linguistic expressions is wholly 
determined by their syntax, together with the meanings of their 
parts (in context). For example, the meaning of `dogs bark' 
depends on the meaning of `dogs and `barks', and the manner in 
which they are syntactically composed. 
The fourth was defended by a dilemma. Either supposed metaphorical senses of words 
are compositional or they are not. If not, then they are not genuinely meaning-like. If 
so, then their distinctively metaphorical character has been covertly abandoned. The 
defence of (A5) had a similar structure: metaphorical meanings had better be meaning- 
like, so if they are not explicable in terms of word-meanings and composition, they had 
better be suitably related to some more general theory of communication. 
I took it that the arguments offered here gave us some reason to take these principles 
seriously. Of course, prima facie plausibility is not truth, and each of those principles 
needs considerably more in the way of defence than I have offered here. Some of this 
work will begin in the next chapter. Nevertheless, the majority of the remainder of this 
thesis will relate to the most controversial principle, (A6), and I will resume discussion 
of that principle in the final two chapters. For the moment, however, I turn to objections 
to the Davidsonian account outlined here. 
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3. Replies, Objections and Suggestions 
3.1 Introduction 
Davidson's error theory has rightly commanded a lot of critical attention over the last 
twenty five years. Each component of that theory - the negative case for semantic and 
pragmatic anti-realism about metaphor, the diagnosis of the mistakes that led theorists to 
posit metaphorical meanings, the suggested functional replacement - has been 
examined, reformulated and criticised. The evaluation of the theory has been far from 
uniformly negative. It is widely recognized, even by realists about metaphorical 
meaning, that the `conventional wisdom' about `discerning two senses of the predicate 
term' that Beardsley had adverted to three years earlier, was shown to be misguided by 
the considerations that Davidson brought to bear. 120 Contemporary recognition of the 
importance of elucidating the dependence of metaphorical language upon its literal base, 
and upon its context of utterance, can also be seen to have resulted from sustained 
critical engagement with Davidson's article. 
Nevertheless, and unsurprisingly, Davidson's position as a whole has not commanded 
widespread acceptance. An error theory of whatever stripe is typically a revisionary 
enterprise, so it is predictable that philosophers have been interested in investigating 
whether a more conservative position, consistent with the genuine insights of Davidson's 
argument, might enable us to preserve our pre-theoretic practice of ascribing truth and 
meaning to metaphors. In this chapter, I will outline and evaluate some influential 
objections to Davidson's theses. I do not pretend to completeness; there are no doubt 
many objections, good, bad and indifferent, that I do not consider here. My purpose is to 
rather complement and reinforce the discussion of the previous chapter by addressing a 
selection of the concerns that the Davidsonian approach regularly provokes. In 
particular, I will concentrate most of my attention on worries relating to the adequacy of 
an error theoretic `functional replacement' for talk of metaphorical meaning. 
120 See Beardsley (1976) 
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3.2 - Complaints about the `Causal Theory' 
Davidson's error theoretic approach fails to provide an acceptable functional 
replacement for our pre-theoretic talk about the workings of metaphor. His 
`Causal Theory' suggests that metaphors work by brute causation, `nudging us' 
into noticing similarities in a way that might just as well be brought about by a pill, 
or a bump on the head. But that's hopeless. In particular: 
1. Such an account ignores the fact that metaphors are produced and 
interpreted within `the space of reasons'. Metaphors can be misinterpreted, 
supported by evidence, produced for reasons, rejected as unwarranted or 
false, etc. (Lycan, Nogales) 121 
2. Such an account wantonly ignores the fact that we know very little about 
each other's cognitive architecture and subjective associations, and thus can 
hardly be expected to predict the causal effects of producing a given 
metaphor. 
3. Such an account cannot explain why the syntax of metaphors might be 
important, and thus cannot account for the clear metaphorical difference 
between e. g. "Surgeons are butchers" and "Butchers are surgeons" (Stern, 
Nogales). 122 Such an account also blurs the difference between metaphors 
and strings of nonsense syllables, or word-salads, which might equally well 
causally bring about some recognition of similarities, etc. (Lycan). 123 
Davidson is often presented as endorsing a `Causal Theory' of the way in which 
metaphor works its wonders, albeit one that is only sketchily developed. This is slightly 
misleading. In many ways, it would be more accurate to say that Davidson's scattered 
121 See Lycan (1999) p. 212, Nogales (1999) p. 121 
122 Stern (2000) pp. 47-48, Nogales (1999) p. 118 
123 Lycan (1999) p. 211 
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remarks on the subject are an attempt to indicate why we should not expect to have any 
interesting explanatory theory of the workings of metaphor. It is true, however, that, like 
many error theorists, he does see the need to explain how what is genuinely valuable 
about our practices can outlast the discovery of the falsity of much of our theorizing 
about them. The nature of this account has, however, been widely misunderstood. 
We began, in the last chapter, to investigate the source of the error that Davidson takes 
us to have fallen into in our pre-theoretic thought about metaphor. A misunderstanding 
of the nature of meaning in general - in particular, a failure to give proper weight to the 
a priori connections between word-meaning on the one hand and principles such as 
(Compositionality) and (Warrant) on the other - has led us to make a useless 
theoretical posit, a cog that turns out to be driven by what it was intended to drive. 
Getting clearer on meaning and metaphor is supposed to let us see that to the extent that 
systematic enquiry into the latter is possible, its place is external to linguistic theory 
properly so-called, being concerned instead with the realm of extra-linguistic goals and 
perlocutionary effects. 
To help us get clearer on Davidson's line of thought here, let us consider two analogous 
cases. Firstly, take the case of warnings. A warning is something that can be achieved 
without recourse to natural language. For example, one might draw a picture of a bull, 
and leave it attached to a suitable fence. Nevertheless, it is clear that warnings often are 
expressed linguistically, and that when they are, they make use of e. g. the syntactic and 
semantic properties of language. Consider the case of warning somebody that a bull is 
in the field, by uttering the sentence `there's a bull in that field'. Such a speech act can 
clearly be done for reasons, often very good ones in fact. It can be morally and 
practically evaluated, and one can be held to account for performing it e. g. on the basis 
of limited or irrelevant evidence. It can be misinterpreted by the unwary; as a dare, for 
example. One's purposes in so acting can go unrecognised, remain unfulfilled or be 
challenged. Nobody thinks that the words `bull' or `field' change their meaning in the 
utterance, and implications made by the utterance - that the bull is dangerous, for 
example - do not take on the status of a special `warning meaning' of the utterance. 
Consider also the case of speaking pedantically. When one speaks pedantically - 
"actually, you haven't shown that asserting the consequent is invalid, just invalid in first 
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order logic with identity" - one may aim to bring about quite definite effects. For 
example, one may wish to prompt one's student into being careful not to confuse logic 
as a whole with the type of logic we teach at an elementary level. Those aims, again, 
may be well- or ill-advised, pursued with wilful disregard for pedagogical evidence, etc. 
Nobody thinks that the words `logic' or identity' change their meaning in such 
utterances, and nobody confuses the aim of the utterance with what is conversationally 
implicated by one who makes it. Nor does anybody think that it is a particularly sensible 
project to investigate the mechanism by which warnings and pedantic reminders about 
logic work their wonders. (Apart from anything else, the holism of evidence means that 
there are simply too many ways in which we can come to believe that e. g. somebody is 
warning us of something). 
A Davidsonian thinks of metaphor in similar ways. In making a metaphor, one typically 
has some goal or purpose in mind. Often, the point of a metaphorical utterance is to get 
somebody to see similarities and analogies between two things, or two situations. Often, 
it is to get somebody to see or think of one thing as another; or to put it less 
conventionally, if just as obliquely, to think of one thing through another. This goal is 
typically extra-linguistic in the sense that it is often something that, in principle, one 
could achieve without using natural language. The purpose with which a metaphor is 
made can be evaluated, rejected or endorsed, and the means chosen to achieve that 
purpose criticised or applauded. People may fail to take up the metaphor in the intended 
sense, or may respond with ridiculously far-fetched comments and elucidations. 
This does not imply, however, that we should assimilate speaking metaphorically to a 
distinctive kind of speech act. Speaking metaphorically is most naturally contrasted 
with speaking literally, and speaking literally is not a distinctive speech act. To say 
something literally is a way of saying something, not an alternative to saying something. 
The same is true of making metaphors, although if Davidson is correct, our purpose in 
making metaphors only involves communicating a particular proposition in relatively 
atypical cases. Inviting someone to see philosophers as flies trapped in fly-bottles is 
something that could be done in a number of ways, only some of them linguistic; 
speaking metaphorically is one effective way to do it. In this respect, speaking 
metaphorically is more like the practice of speaking pedantically than that of giving 
warnings. 
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Nevertheless, it ought to be clear that such acts typically take place within the `space of 
reasons', on any reasonable understanding of that enigmatic phrase. An invitation is 
something that can be offered for good reasons or bad; its nature and purpose can be 
mistaken and misconstrued in a variety of familiar ways; it can be based on mistaken 
beliefs, or comprise an ineffective route to its goal. A Davidsonian simply need not 
think of metaphors as brute causal prompts, not amenable to intentional explanation, and 
to think that she must is to misread Davidson's remarks on the topic. 
A worry might remain about the case of falsehood. Surely, we can often reject 
metaphors, deny them, etc, in ways that go beyond the clash of purposes here expressed. 
I will deal with this in Section 3.3 below. For the moment, my concern has been to 
defuse a more general worry; that a causal account of metaphor assimilates it to brute 
psychological promptings, which do not admit of explication in terms of reasons, and 
whose effects it unreasonable to expect a normal producer of metaphor to predict. I take 
this charge to be misguided. '24 
It seems to be this misunderstanding of the Davidsonian account that underlies the final 
objection outlined above. 125 Stern claims: 
... 
in point of fact, Davidson's own explanation of how metaphor works does not appeal 
to more than the separate literal meanings of the individual words in the sentence, 
ignoring any contribution made by the string syntactically or semantically structured as 
a sentence. For Davidson, there is no difference between a metaphor and a poem like T. 
S. Eliot's "The Hippopotamus": both are "devices that alert us to aspects of the world by 
124 This misreading of Davidson seems to have been fostered by the construal of his account offered by 
Richard Rorty. See in particular Rorty (1991) p. 167, where he compares metaphors with `anomalous 
non-linguistic phenomena like platypuses and pulsars' that can prompt new insights in a wholly 
unpredictable manner. Much of what Rorty says in that article is strictly correct, if expressed in way 
which is likely to mislead, but some of it seems to me to be straightforwardly incorrect. For example: 
"'live metaphors can justify belief only in the same metaphorical sense in which one may `justify' a belief 
not by citing another belief, but by using a non-sentence to stimulate one's interlocutor's sense organs" p. 
169. This is about as plausible as holding that my recognition of the fact that somebody is warning me 
that a bull is in the field cannot justify my belief that a dangerous bull is in the field. 
125 Or at least, if it is not this, the objections seems to me to be wholly unmotivated. 
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inviting us to make comparisons. " But Eliot's poem works simply by the alternating 
presentation or display - the brute juxtaposition, as it were - of stanzas or clauses 
referring to hippopotami and the Church. Likewise, Davidson would have us believe 
that metaphor works simply by way of the linear sequence of literal meanings of the 
individual words of the utterance, regardless of its sentential syntax. '26 
Like many commentaries on Davidson's position, this is uncharitable and implausible in 
the extreme. A disaffected teenager who asserts that all politicians are the same is not 
thereby credited with believing that they resemble each other in every respect. 
Similarly, even if Davidson had said there is `no difference' between the way metaphors 
work and the way that poems like Eliot's work - which he didn't - he might be 
reasonably be taken to mean, given the immediate context, that they are both things that 
can alert us to similarities in the world without requiring special meaning-shifts. 127 He 
would not have thereby committed himself to regarding them as equivalent in every 
respect. In particular, he need not hold that it is simply the `brute juxtaposition' of the 
terms in the metaphorical sentence that `brutely causes' the perception of certain 
similarities to spring to our minds. When dealing with the complexity and efficacy of 
our norm-governed practices, he can easily afford to be far less brutish than that, without 
giving up on his basic claim, that we have mistakenly assigned to metaphorical meaning 
what belongs to the realm of perlocutionary effect. 
If Davidson's account relied on treating the sentences used in metaphor as unstructured 
strings of words or sounds, which then served to prompt comparisons between two 
subjects, then he would be vulnerable to the Surgeons/Butchers objection, and to the 
worry that he cannot distinguish the case. of metaphor from that of nonsensical strings. 
But it doesn't. For all Stem has shown, a Davidsonian can perfectly well hold that quite 
complex syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties of sentences play a practically. 
126 Stern (2000) p. 47-48 
127 Davidson (1984a) p. 256 comments on the poem as follows. "Here we are neither told that the Church 
resembles a hippopotamus (as in simile) or bullied into making this comparison (as in metaphor), but there 
can be no doubt the words are being used to direct our attention to similarities between the two. Nor 
should there be much inclination, in this case, to posit figurative meanings, for in what words or sentences 
would we lodge them? " 
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essential role in bringing about the intended perlocutionary effects. 128 1 take Davidson to 
be a Davidsonian in this regard. 
3.3 Metaphor and Context 
1. Davidson argues that the context-dependence of metaphor is inconsistent 
with semantic or pragmatic realism about m-meanings. But literal language 
is equally context dependent. Therefore, Davidson is either confused, 
inconsistent, or making an ad hoc ideological exception. (Kittay, Denham) 129 
2. The suggested defence of (A3) and (A4) ignore the possibility of treating 
metaphors as analogous to indexical and demonstrative utterances. 
(Stern) 130 
3. The suggested defence of (A3) and (A4) ignore the possibility of 
metaphorical meaning resulting from primary pragmatic processes (Sag, 
Recanati)131,132 
Davidson's famously compressed style of argument arguably reaches its apotheosis in 
the following much-cited passage 
Once we understand a metaphor we can call what we grasp the `metaphorical truth' and 
(up to a point) say what the `metaphorical meaning' is. But simply to lodge this meaning 
in metaphor is like explaining why a pill puts you to sleep by saying it has a dormative 
power. Literal meaning and literal truth-conditions can be assigned to words and 
128 The above quotation from Stern's immediately follows discussion of an objection of White's and 
Margalit's to the effect that metaphors taken literally are often nonsensical. Stern may think that the 
suggested feature of Davidson's account enables him to sidestep this latter objection, but if so, it's clearly 
a poisoned chalice. I discuss the White/Margalit objection below, in section 3.3 
129 Denham (2000) pp. 262-263 
130 Stern (2000) passim. 
131 Recanati (1993) p. 263-264 
132 Sag(1981)p. 264 
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sentences apart from particular contexts of use. This is why adverting to them has 
genuine explanatory power. 
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I have already made some suggestions regarding how I think we should understand 
Davidson's point here (in Section 2.6. above), which I will not recapitulate here. 
However, given that misunderstandings of the sense in which Davidson views the literal 
as essentially context-independent are still fairly commonplace, it may be worth making 
some brief remarks. Thankfully, a useful set of distinctions has recently been articulated 
by Josef Stem, that serve to address the Kittay/Denham mistake succinctly. Let us 
distinguish three types of context dependence; presemantic, semantic and post-semantic. 
Pre-semantic context dependence springs from the fact that in interpreting a linguistic 
act as involving the utterance of some sentence-type, we are forced to draw on a 
substantial number of rich and detailed contextual cues and clues. Stem gives an 
apposite example: 
I hear the sound pattern T. Even knowing that the speaker is speaking English, I must 
decide whether what I heard was the first person indexical `I' or the common noun `eye' 
or the affirmative `aye' or the groan `ai'. In making this judgement, we rely on all sorts 
of contextual cues - the appropriateness of the alternative types within the immediate 
string and then within the larger discourse, our beliefs about the speaker and his 
intentions, and so on. 134 
The fact that both metaphorical and literal speech are context dependent in this sense 
does not, clearly, invalidate Davidson's argument. For it is surely common ground that 
understanding what is being said in this sense requires contextual information. 
A sentence-type S is semantically context-dependent just in case an utterance of S only 
expresses a propositional content after its indexical and demonstrative parts are assigned 
determinate semantic values by context. Thus "That is a hat" is intuitively semantically 
context-dependent, and "The largest terrestrial sea is wet" is not. Stem accommodates 
the context-dependence of metaphor by assimilating it to a form of semantic context- 
dependence. But Kittay and Denham do not endorse such a view, and this is not the 
133 Davidson (1984a) p. 247 
134 Stern (2000) p. 42 
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significance of their claim that the metaphorical is on a par with the literal with respect 
to degree of context-dependence. 
The relevant conception required for Davidson's point is post-semantic context- 
dependence. Imagine that we have assigned a propositional content to S, by resolving 
pre-semantic contextual alternatives in order to identify literal word-meanings and mode 
of composition, and then filling in any indexical `gaps' with relevant semantic values. 
Call this the first meaning of the utterance. Then 
... that utterance may then 
be used for an indefinite number of extra-linguistic ulterior 
purposes or intentions: to warn, promise, deceive or threaten. Which of these secondary 
intentions is realized also depends on the context - the speaker's and interpreter's 
mutual beliefs, intentions and expectations. Yet, whichever further intention is 
attributed to the speaker, and however the utterance is used, its first meaning remains, 
indifferently , as the 
first of the means to these ends. Hence the first meaning is the 
meaning it has on all its uses or, more accurately, regardless of how it is so used. 135 
Literal meaning and metaphorical meaning, as conceived of by e. g. Richards and 
Beardsley, clearly differ with respect to this property of indifference. M-meaning, 
thought of as a new sense of the predicate term, varied from context to context, 
unpredictably, and in a way that could only be read back into the metaphor by somebody 
who had already grasped its impact. In the case of literal word meaning, in contrast, a 
predictable and systematic contribution is made to a whole range of utterances, across a 
whole range of contexts. Davidson's point - and this ought surely to have been clear - 
simply could not have been that literal sentences were in no sense dependent on context. 
That would have been crazy. Rather, it was that m-meanings were sensitive to both 
local linguistic context and broader, post-semantic purpose, while meanings proper are 
not. 
That said, more sophisticated theorists, like Stern, Recanati and Sag, have argued for a 
variety of conceptions of the dependence of metaphor on context that makes more 
trouble for the Davidsonian. For Stern, sentences like `Juliet is the sun' when used 
metaphorically, have a hidden indexical element, making them semantically context- 
135 Stern (2000) p. 43 
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dependent. For rich pragmatists, the proposition directly expressed by a sentence is not 
its first meaning, as defined above, but rather some related proposition, which the 
pragmatic context of utterance helps determine. 136 I do not have space to investigate 
either of these theories in depth here, and they must remain as standing and sophisticated 
challenges to any error-theoretic project. However, I will make the following few 
remarks with regard to Stern's theory. 
Stern's idea is that e. g. a sentence like 
a) Grey trees whose lungs had filled up with winter 
suddenly exhaled a breath of leaves 
does not have the semantic and syntactic structure that it appears to, but rather 
something like 
b) Grey trees whose Mthat <lungs had filled up> with winter 
suddenly Mthat <exhaled> a breath of leaves. 
Stern's outline and defence of the Mthat operator is fairly complicated, and I cannot 
explore its intricacies here. Suffice it to say that it is an operator, somewhat analogous 
to Kaplan's Dthat, 137 which converts a literal expression into a metaphorical expression, 
whose contribution to the truth-conditions of the whole sentence varies from context to 
context. Thus, while the context of (b) assigns `Mthat <exhaled>' one set of properties, 
the treatment of (c)-(e) as metaphorical expressions will assign it different ones. 
136 As well as the reference cited above, see e. g. Bezuidenhout (2001) for a defence of this type of 
position. 
137 See Stern (2000), passim, for a thorough introduction to and defence of the mysteries of the Mthat 
operator. Some significant differences from Kaplan include (1) the fact that whereas Dthat attaches to 
descriptive expressions to form directly referential terms, Mthat's paradigmatic use involves attaching to 
predicates to form new, context sensitive predicative terms (2) that whereas the character of a Dthat 
expression is a function from contexts to individuals, the character of an Mthat expression is a function 
from sets of pragmatic presuppositions to sets of properties (3) that whereas Dthat requires some form of 
demonstration, Mthat does not, being parametric, like genuine indexicals (`I', `now', etc). 
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c) The city languidly exhaled the vapour that it had breathed in from the clouds. 
d) Wittgenstein exhaled philosophy. 
e) This was Clinton; he exhaled, while never apparently inhaling. 
In each of (b)-(e), some distinct set of properties is determined as the semantic value of 
the metaphorical component `Mthat<exhaled>'. These properties are determined, as in 
the case of pure indexicals like `I' and `now', by a general semantic rule, namely, that 
the properties in question are those ni-associated with `exhaled' in the relevant context. 
How a property gets to be m-associated with a given expression in context is a pragmatic 
matter, rather unclear in detail, but Stern makes some more general suggestions. The 
key point is that Stem takes himself to have offered a broadly semantic model, similar to 
those applied in the case of indexicals and demonstratives, which can be used to model 
competence with metaphor. When one understands a metaphor, one (a) maps the literal 
string onto a string containing a Mthat operator (b) identifies the set of properties that 
the expression within the scope of the operator is pragmatically presupposed to be 
associated with in context and (c) substitutes those properties for those of the 
corresponding literal predicate. 138 Of course, to the sceptic, it will look as if all Stern has 
done is to defer all the difficulties attendant on explaining metaphor's relationship to 
context to a pragmatic `theory', thereby allowing himself a simple semantics. 
Nevertheless, the position is a serious challenge to the Davidsonian, and deserves to be 
taken seriously. 
I will content myself with the following observation. Stem apparently thinks of Mthat 
as expressing an tacitly known rule, which is `psychologically real' in the sense of being 
represented in some mental lexicon. 139 He explicitly defends the idea that nobody who 
failed to master such a rule could count as genuinely understanding or making 
metaphors. He says: 
Metaphorical competence involves mastery of a general skill that one can apply to 
arbitrary expressions across the language. More theoretically, metaphorical competence 
consists in knowledge of a schematic rule that applies to all expressions that admit a 
metaphorical interpretation. This schematic rule governs the characters of all 
138 Stern gives a different but related account for nominative metaphors, etc. See Stern (2000) p. 225-229 
139 See Stern (2000) p. 198-205 
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metaphorical expressions of the type `Mthat [CD]', for each substitution instance of (D. 
The metaphorically competent speaker knows how to generate metaphorical expressions 
given her knowledge of the expressions (1) to be interpreted metaphorically... . Either one 
knows this schematic rule and has the general skill or one doesn't. It makes no sense to 
say that one could know this rule, or have this skill, for some expressions but not for 
others. 140 
There are two key points here. Firstly, it only manages to seem even remotely plausible 
that a single rule is involved in interpreting all metaphors because Stem has kicked all 
the difficult work - of saying what determines which properties are m-associated with 
each given J, and how we recognise this - into the pragmatics. Secondly, Stem's claim 
seems to run into trouble with a test for semantic commitment that Kripke famously 
suggested we apply in the case of Donnellan-type objections to Russellian theories of 
definite descriptions. 141 Stem's theory clearly differs from the Davidsonian account 
with regard to the question of whether English contains a special 
indexical/demonstrative rule of metaphor. How are we to decide who is correct? 
Following Kripke's suggestion, we might consider a hypothetical language, which is as 
like English as possible, except that it is stipulated not to contain a psychologically real 
Mthat operator. In such a language, would people still formulate and understand 
metaphors in much the way that they actually do? If so, then there seems to be little 
need to posit such an operator, since it seems designed to explain the emergence of a 
phenomenon that would equally arise in its absence. As Kripke asks, why posit a 
semantic ambiguity that is "insufficient in general, and superfluous for the special case it 
seeks to explain"? 142 
It is rather difficult to apply this test with any certainty, given the obscurities about what 
determines which properties are m-associated with expressions, but the overwhelming 
tendency is surely to affirm that the phenomena would arise in any case. Even if we had 
not mastered a rule that mapped literal predicates onto sets of metaphorically apt 
properties, we could surely still come to see what somebody was getting at by means of 
a peculiar form of words. Indeed, given that there doesn't seem to be anything 
140 Stern (2000) p. 198 
'41 Kripke (1979) pp. 85-91 
142 Ibid p. 88 
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distinctively linguistic about thinking of one thing as another -I can have a sudden 
sense of the childish or animalistic character of a companion, without employing any 
expressions of natural language - it would be wholly surprising if the absence of such a 
rule prohibited metaphoric thought. Stern does tell us that the properties which are m- 
associated with an expression ct in a context C are pragmatically presupposed to be 
associated with (D in C, in the following sense: 
(P1*) Speaker S presupposes a proposition p in a context c by uttering the 
sentence s iff (1) S represents herself as believing that p; (2) S represents 
herself as believing that the other members of c represent themselves as 
believing that p; and (3) S represents herself as believing that the other 
members of c recognize that she, S, represents herself as believing that p 
from her utterance of s. 143 
But since Mthat only works when such presuppositions are identified, it seems that Stern 
can give no account of metaphorical thought in the absence of conversation. This is bad 
enough, but devastating in the context of Kripke's test. For since, in a community that 
lacked mastery of Mthat, speakers could presumably still articulate such thought, and 
hearers latch on to the fact that they were doing so, it seems that metaphorical practice 
could carry on much as it actually does. And that simply signals the uselessness of the 
appeal to Mthat in getting to the heart of metaphorical competence. 
3.4 Metaphor and Other Linguistic Phenomena 
Davidson's error-theoretical approach makes a mystery of some incontrovertible 
linguistic data related to metaphor. This undermines the claim to have provided a 
suitable functional replacement for ascriptions of metaphorical meaning. In 
particular 
143 On the basis of this root definition, Stern goes on to define what it is for a sentence and an utterance to 
presuppose a proposition, and defines Mthat with respect to the latter. But this makes no difference to the 
point made above. See Stern (2000) p. 122-123 for details. 
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(1) Error theory about metaphorical meaning cannot account for the behaviour 
of metaphors which are embedded in non-assertoric contexts. (Cohen, Stern, 
Moran). '44 
(2) Syntactic facts about metaphor demand the positing of metaphorical 
meanings which are independent of speaker intentions. (Stern). 145 
(3) Such an account is committed to treating metaphorical sentences as false 
when they are taken literally, when in fact many are neither true or false, 
but rather semantically anomalous (White, Margalit and Goldblum, Stern). 
146,147,148 
The Frege-Geach problem - the demand for an explanation of how utterances that lack 
cognitive content can embed in non-assertoric linguistic contexts, such as negated or 
conditional sentences - has been a deep and painful thorn in the side of expressivist 
accounts of e. g. morality, modality and aesthetics. At first glance, it is difficult to see 
why anybody would think that it was a problem for error-theorists, however. After all, 
the error-theorist diverges from the expressivist precisely in allowing the kind of 
straightforwardly truth-conditional treatment of such contexts that the realist herself 
proposes. 
Things are interestingly more complicated than that in the case of metaphor, and realism 
about meaning more generally. An error theorist about meaning in general cannot, it 
would seem, help herself to the above explanation of the semantic nature of non- 
assertoric contexts, for the simple reason that by she will, by definition, reject such 
explanations as erroneous, given the plausible assumption that a sentence cannot be apt 
144 Cohen (1993) passim, Stern (2000) p 69-71, Moran (1997) p. 260 
145 Stern (2000) p. 69 
146 White (1996) pp. 204-226 
147 Stern (2000) p. 47 
148 Margalit and Goldblum (1994) pp. 234-237 
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for truth if it does not say anything. 149 Assume that a theorist holds that we are wrong to 
assert any claims like 
(*) `Snow is white' says that snow is white. 
perhaps because they see semantic talk as a regrettable hangover of a scientifically 
dubious folk theory. 150 Given that all sentences like (*) are false, it seems that `snow is 
white' does not say anything, and is thus neither true or false, given the assumption that 
truth-aptitude requires content. We therefore cannot use the standard truth-conditional 
explanation of the way in which the meaning of 
(**) If snow is white then it is coloured. 
depends on the meaning of its parts, since that explanation relies on the antecedent 
sentence having a truth value. 151 An error theorist about the metadiscourse, who holds 
most of our claims about semantic talk is false, may thus also end up struggling to 
account for linguistic practice in first-order discourses. 152 
A similar phenomenon is alleged to occur in the case of metaphorical meaning. 
Stipulate that metaphors don't express (distinctively metaphorical) propositional 
contents, whether semantically or pragmatically construed. The question then becomes 
how we should understand linguistic contexts like 
149 I do not mean to suggest that every form or degree of anti-realism about meaning entails rejection of a 
truth-conditional explanation of negation and conditionals. A minimalist about meaning might give such a 
truth-conditional account, but characterise truth as superassertibility. Wright's response-dependent 
account of meaning can also endorse a truth-conditional explanation. (See e. g. Wright (1987), (1989a-c)). 
I discuss Wright's account, and its relevance to the case of metaphor, in the next chapter. 
150 Such a theory would be analogous to the eliminativism about `folk psychology' notoriously defended 
by the Churchlands. 
151 I do not mean to suggest that such a semantic error theorist is likely to see this failing as causing any 
further problems not already inherent in the position. 
152 This type of phenomenon provides another reason to substitute the type of `rush for coherence' adopted 
in chapter 1 for Wright's `burden of proof on the realist' approach. The a priori links between different 
discourses where realism is an issue means that it is implausible to treat them as a series of isolated 
debates, with realism always on the back foot. 
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(M1) It's just not the case that, as the Wittgensteinian quietists seem to think, 
philosophy is just getting flies out of fly bottles. 
(M2) If the garden was a slum of bloom, then it could hardly have been winter that 
Stevens was writing about in `Banal Sojourn' 
It is clear, firstly, that the immediate problem faced by the error theory about meaning in 
general can be avoided. Because metaphorical utterances are typically straightforwardly 
false, and thus truth-valued, when taken literally, there is space for a truth-conditional 
account of non-assertoric contexts. Unlike the crude expressivist about moral sentences, 
or the global irrealist about meaning, the Davidsonian can appeal to the literal content of 
metaphors to explain why they can imbed in more complex sentences at all. 
The Davidsonian isn't quite off the hook, however. The deeper challenge is to give an 
account of what is going on when we react to metaphors by apparently negating them, or 
making conditional inferences from them, or reporting beliefs concerning them. The 
realist about metaphorical meaning has a relatively straightforward account. For the 
semantic realist, the metaphorical sentence comes to express a new proposition, distinct 
from the literal, which can then be negated, conditionalised, feature in belief reports, etc. 
For the pragmatic realist, the implicated proposition is available to play a similar role. 
Assume that someone asserts 
(a) Susan has two children 
thereby implicating 
(b) Susan has exactly two children 
The following seem perfectly normal responses to (a) 
(c) No, she has three children 
(d) Well if she has two children, we'll only need two presents. 
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(e) You may believe that she has two children, but I think you're wrong - I'm sure 
she has three. 
In each case, however, it is the implicated proposition, and not the proposition which is 
literally expressed, that is negated, conditionalized, etc. (Or at least, if there is a more 
general problem here about how merely implicated propositions can apparently be 
negated, etc, the speaker-meaning theory of metaphor has only one problem to solve. 
The Davidsonian apparently has two: how negation can govern implied rather than 
expressed propositions, and how negation can govern metaphors when no proposition is 
implicated. ) 
The problem is not one that the Davidsonian can duck. Responses like (M1) and (M2) 
are'completely central and everyday aspects of our dealings with metaphor. Any attempt 
to write them off as the result of an unfortunate mythology of meaning would entail that 
the error-theoretic position was radically revisionary of our practice, so that it would 
require significantly more in the way of detailed argument than has been offered to'date. 
Let us return to the case of warnings. If, in response to your warning about the bull in 
the field, I reply with any of the following 
(i) If the bull's in the field, we had better walk around the long way 
(ii) It might be in the field, or it might be penned in there at the back. 
(iii) Yes, I had thought that it would be. 
the force of your utterance is not preserved in the new contexts. Similarly, although, on 
the Davidsonian account, Wittgenstein and Stevens may have put forward their 
metaphors as a means of encouraging us to see the end of philosophy as escape, or 
flowers as slum-dwellers, the illocutionary force of such speech acts is presumably not 
preserved in (M1) and (M2). So what is going on in those cases? 
The problem is a difficult one, and it is not an issue that I have resolved to my own 
satisfaction. But there is perhaps room for Davidsonian to take something like the 
following line. Although the illocutionary force of a warning, or an invitation, might not 
survive into non-asserted contexts, pedantry and literality certainly can 
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(iv) John hasn't submitted a list of his research publications, but rather a list of his 
publications along with those of his articles that have been accepted for 
publication but have not yet appeared. 
(v) If John hadn't submitted a list of his research publications, but rather a list of his 
publications along with those of his articles that have been accepted for 
publication but have not yet appeared, then we must point it out to him. 
(vi) John - and I'm speaking literally here - researches the sex life of pot plants. 
(vii) She had a sudden insight into university life when she realised that John - and 
I'm speaking literally here - researches the sex life of pot plants. 
Illocutionary force might not hold up well under embedding, but ways of speaking 
certainly do. In a similar vein, I don't think that it is unreasonable to construe 
(Ml) It's just not the case that, as the Wittgensteinian quietists seem to think, 
philosophy is just getting flies out of fly bottles. 
(M2) If the garden was a slum of bloom, then it could hardly have been winter that 
Stevens was writing about in `Banal Sojourn' 
as 
(M3) It's just not the case that, as the Wittgensteinian quietists seem to think, 
philosophy is just - to put it metaphorically - getting flies out of fly bottles. 
(M4) If the garden was indeed - as in Stevens' metaphor -a slum of bloom, then it 
could hardly have been winter that Stevens was writing about in `Banal Sojourn' 
How do this help? The basic 'problem, remember, was not to account for how 
metaphorical utterances can embed in logical and propositional attitude contexts, but to 
give an account of what is going on when we do so. The first step that might be made 
here is to hold that such a treatment of (M1) and (M2), taking them to be saying 
implicitly what their counterpart utterances say explicitly, makes space for thinking of 
their component sentences as governed by some kind of modifying operator, qualifier or 
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marker. '53 Our mutual recognition that such an element was, in some sense, modifying 
the component sentences, might help to explain why we react to such utterances in a 
fairly structured and predictable way. The problem now is to see how appeal to such an 
modifier can avoid surrendering the error-theoretic character of Davidson's account. 
For example, imagine that, with Stern, we think of the relevant sentence as governed by 
an Mthat operator. Such an operator, remember, converts a literal expression - "getting 
flies out of fly bottles" - into a metaphorical expression, whose contribution to the truth- 
conditions of the whole sentence varies from context to context, in somewhat the way 
that Kaplan's Dthat operator does. Then we have e. g. (M1) and (M3) modelled by 
(M5) It's just not the case that, as the Wittgensteinian quietists seem to think, 
philosophy is just Mthat (getting flies out of fly bottles). 
Since "Mthat (getting flies out of fly bottles)" is alleged to determine the same truth- 
conditional contribution, in our present context, as e. g. "dissolving persistent and 
frustratingly complex conceptual problems that impede our progress through life, and 
prevent our living in a fulfilling manner", we seem to have surrendered our anti-realism 
about metaphorical meaning completely. Employing an operator like Mthat - which is 
essentially just a way of mapping old expressions onto new metaphorical senses, in a 
context-dependent manner - entails adopting realism about metaphorical meanings. So 
a Davidsonian has to steer a careful course. He has to give an account of what is going 
on in when we embed metaphors, while preserving a suitably anti-realist account. What 
is at issue, in effect, is Davidson's right to subscribe to the final of his key theses, 
discussion of which I delayed to this chapter: 
(D4) Previous influential theories of metaphor falsely subscribed to doctrines thatwere 
inconsistent with (D1-D3) above. However, much of what such theorists wanted 
to capture about metaphor can be best upheld by dropping the idea that a given 
153 I do not mean to suggest that such an operator must be psychologically real, or syntactically 
represented. The hope is that some theory of `asides' will allow such modifiers to guide interpretation, 
without thereby becoming genuine parts of the string. They should rather be thought of as metalinguistic 
self-interruptions, intended to ease interpretation. In cases where the need for such interruption is left 
implicit, their separability from the sentence is not impugned. 
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metaphor is a vehicle for the communication of a distinctive cognitive content, 
and instead thinking in terms of what it `intimates', `brings to our attention', or 
`leads us to see'. 
The time has come to examine how a Davidsonian might earn the right to (D4), in the 
light of the phenomenon of metaphor's embedding in non-assertoric contexts. To help 
identify one potential such course, I suggest we return to Davidson's positive 
characterization of metaphorical practice, slender though that is: 
if I show you Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit and I say, `It's a duck', then with luck you see 
it as a duck; if I say, `It's a rabbit', you see it as a rabbit. But no proposition expresses 
what I have led you to see... Seeing as is not seeing that. Metaphor makes us see one 
thing as another by making some literal statement that inspires or prompts the insight. ' 54 
Let us set aside bizarrely literalistic interpretations of this passage, that take Davidson to 
be proposing an account of metaphor which relies wholly on the phenomenon of 
perceptual aspect perception. 155 Davidson's thought is clearly that, via the making some 
wholly literal statement, we are brought to some sort of imaginative insight into a 
situation. The metaphor presents us with a kind of lens or prism through which we think 
of one object, event or situation in the light of another. It is difficult to spell out what 
such a thought amounts to, although it seems fairly clear that such a process is (i) not 
intrinsically linguistic (ii) often passive, in the sense that a given metaphoric point of 
view can force itself upon us, as when I am suddenly struck by the sheer childishness of 
a colleague (iii) often draws on the rich resources of the imagination, in both 
propositional and experiential ways. Perhaps despite its vagueness, we might appeal to 
such a conception of the effects metaphor can have upon us, opening up the possibility 
that we might think of embedded sentential contexts as somehow relating not to the 
content of the metaphor, but to the content of such an imaginative engagement. We 
might take the qualifying marker -'metaphorically speaking' - as a pragmatic cue that 
such an shift in interpretive approach is required. '56 
154 Davidson (1984a) p. 263 
iss Kemp (1991) rightfully takes such theories to task. 
156 Similarly, we might take ` I'm guessing here' to defeat the normal presupposition of informed 
inference in "If John comes then - I'm guessing here - Jane will leave'. 
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A preliminary and crude attempt at this might be to take: 
(F) Metaphorical utterance S1 (in part) metaphorically-means* that P iff according 
to an apt act of imaginative insight I that SAl, in context, itself prompts or 
suggests, P. 
Consider an example. Wittgenstein's metaphor encourages me to imaginatively 
construe philosophers as flies trapped in fly-bottles. Such an activity might, inter alia, 
lead me to think of philosophical problems as essentially dissoluble puzzles that prevent 
us living in a fulfilling manner. Such a course of thought is, arguably, mandated by the 
metaphor itself in context, given Wittgenstein's view of philosophical endeavour. At the 
very least, such a construal is interpretively appropriate. So (F) warrants my claim that 
the famous metaphor metaphorically-means* that philosophical problems as essentially 
dissoluble puzzles that prevent us living in a fulfilling manner. But that claim is 
consistent with my holding that strictly speaking, there are no metaphorical meanings. 
It is true that expressions will become associated with metaphorical-meanings*, but 
that's simply a useful fiction; a convenient way of relating metaphors to the content of 
the imaginative acts they prompt. Nothing deserves to be called a metaphorical 
meaning, since nothing is suitably meaning-like, and suitably related to the metaphorical 
character of the relevant utterance. But we might mock up a simulacrum of our talk 
about metaphorical meaning, projecting a certain kind of perlocutionary effect of the 
metaphorical utterance back onto the metaphor itself. In this way, we can hope to avoid 
the charge that we confuse what the metaphor makes us notice with its meaning, while 
hoping to explain the inferential linkages that embedded contexts reflect. 157 
157 This move may seem very non-Davidsonian, in the light of the marks of metaphor discussed in Section 
2.9 above. After all, doesn't Davidson explicitly distance himself from such a suggestion? He says, 
remember: "If what the metaphor makes us notice were finite in scope and propositional in nature.. . we 
would simply project the content the metaphor brought to mind onto the metaphor" (Davidson (1984a) p. 
263). So it might well seem that he takes the kind of fictionalist projection suggested above to be ruled 
out by the limitless, non-propositional character of metaphor. There is much in this criticism, and I will 
address the relevance of such marks in later chapters. For the moment, my concern is less Davidson 
exegesis, than an examination of whether an error theorist who rejects metaphorical meaning when 
speaking strictu sensu can nevertheless give some structured account of embedding. But it is worth noting 
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What is it for a proposition to hold according to an apt act of imaginative insight? This 
is hard to spell out, although I hope the intuitive idea is clear enough. Basically, it is for 
that proposition to comprise part of the content of the imagining; the way the imagining 
presents things in general as being. This intuitive characterization allows for 
representations drawing on expressive resources from both the imagined world and the 
real tivorld to enter into the propositional content of the imagining. Thus, we can say 
both that Wittgenstein characterizes philosophical talk as being a useless, frustrated, 
buzzing, and that he thinks that it is not a worthwhile intellectual pursuit. The former 
type of propositions will often be presented in sentences that are themselves seemingly 
metaphorical in character. Those who believe in the eventual dispensability of 
metaphorical modes of speech will be able to hold that the content of the imagining will 
eventually be able to be fleshed out in wholly literal terms. Those who do not may be 
reassured that the `non-reductive' element of Davidson's account is preserved by such a 
fictionalist addendum. 158 
Given such a translation from the imagined world, the Davidsonian might try to develop 
a suitable semantics. I shall not try to outline such a semantics in detail here, but rather 
simply continue to sketch an approach which is avowedly rough, and no doubt flawed in 
detail, to illustrate how one might begin on such ä task. Imagine that we divide the 
sentences of our language up into literal sentences like: 
that the following remark can be taken in a way that accords fairly well with the suggested strategy. 
"Once we understand a metaphor we can call what we grasp the 'metaphorical truth' and (up to a point) 
say what the 'metaphorical meaning' is. But simply to lodge this meaning in metaphor is like explaining 
why a pill puts you to sleep by saying it has a dormative power. " Davidson (1984a) p. 247. This suggests 
that we do grasp something when we understand a metaphor, but that this is the effect, rather than the 
explanation, of the metaphor's success. 
158 Why not take the metaphors to be direct expressions of such imaginative states, rather than the more 
roundabout route canvassed above? While there is no doubt room for an expressivist or quasi-realist 
development of such a theory, I will not explore it here. It is worth noting that one primafacie advantage 
of the current proposal over such an account is that the above account does not require that anybody had 
such thoughts prior to reflection onthe metaphor itself, whereas the expressivist account would tend to see 
the metaphor as in some sense the result of some prior imaginative state. But there is no doubt room for 
skirmishing, and for compromise solutions. My primary concern here is with the standing of an error- 
theoretic account in the light of worries about embedding. 
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(1) Juliet is the sun 
and metaphorical sentences like 
(2) Juliet - metaphorically speaking - is the sun. 
Metaphorical sentences aren't a syntactic kind, obviously. Rather, they contain 
expressions that are correctly recognisable as having been uttered metaphorically. 
Sentences like (1) are typically straightforwardly false, whereas metaphorical sentences 
can be said (in an extended, fictional sense) to be true, when things are as a related apt 
act of imaginative insight I suggests they are. In more detail 
(F) Metaphorical sentence SA! (in part) metaphorically-means* that P iff according 
to an apt act of imaginative insight I that SAf, in context, itself prompts or 
suggests, P. 
Now let 
ISM, Pi-P. ] 
abbreviate 
S: SM metaphorically-means* that P1, & SM metaphorically-means* that P2, &... SM 
metaphorically-means* that P 
Such a notation simply lets us conjoin the various particular propositions that (F) allows 
us to ascribe to the metaphor. Then we have 
(1) Sf is true with respect to P; iff *[ SAf, P; ] & P; 
(2) SAf is true simpliciter iff Shf is true with respect to each member Pj of some 
suitably weighted subset of {P1, P2,... P} 
and then the standard semantics for non-atomic sentences 
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(3) "A & B" is true iffA is true and B is true 
(4) "not A" is true iff A is not true. 
(5) "If A then B" is true iff not-A is true or B is true. 
and so on. Such a semantics clearly doesn't commit the Davidsonian to realism about 
metaphorical meanings, since we are distinguishing them from the merely fictional 
metaphorical-meanings*. However, it seems that such a semantics can help the error- 
theorist set out a realist-style semantics for embedded contexts in a straightforward way. 
Take, for example, 
(Ml) It's just not the case that, as the Wittgensteinian quietists seem to think, 
philosophy is just getting flies out of fly bottles. 
Contextual clues help us identify this as equivalent to 
(M3) It's just not the case that, as the Wittgensteinian quietists seem to think, 
philosophy is just - to put it metaphorically - getting flies out of fly bottles. 
which (somehow) combines two propositions: 
(a) It's not the case that philosophy is just - to put it metaphorically - getting flies 
out of fly bottles 
(b) Wittgensteinian quietists seem to think philosophy is just - to put it 
metaphorically - getting flies out of fly bottles. 
For ease of presentation, I shall ignore the latter, and concentrate on the former. It has 
the form not-SN, where 
SN = "Philosophy is just - to put it metaphorically - getting flies out of fly bottles" 
Now we know that 
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Metaphorical sentence Sxf (in part) metaphorically-means* that P iff according to an apt 
act of imaginative insight I (that SAf, in context, itself suggests), P. 
Imagine that the relevant act of imaginative insight IN has as its content: philosophy's 
proper aim is to dissolve persistent and frustratingly complex conceptual problems that 
impede our progress through life, and prevent our living in a fulfilling manner. Then by 
semantic axiom (1) we have 
SN is true iff (according to IN, philosophy's proper aim is to dissolve persistent and 
frustratingly complex conceptual problems that impede our progress 
through life, and prevent our living in a fulfilling manner), & 
(philosophy's proper aim is to dissolve persistent and frustratingly 
complex conceptual problems that impede our progress through life, and 
prevent our living in a fulfilling manner) 
So by employing semantic axiom (4), we can derive 
not-SN is true iff it's not the case that [(according to IN, philosophy's proper aim is 
to dissolve persistent and frustratingly complex conceptual 
problems that impede our progress through life, and prevent our 
living in a fulfilling manner), & (philosophy's proper aim is to 
dissolve persistent and frustratingly complex conceptual problems 
that impede our progress through life, and prevent our living in a 
fulfilling manner)] 
Since, by hypothesis, first conjunct of the right-hand-side is true, the above 
biconditional is equivalent to 
not-SN is true iff It's not the case that (philosophy's proper aim is to dissolve 
persistent and frustratingly complex conceptual problems that 
impede our progress through life, and prevent our living in a 
fulfilling manner) 
and since 
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SN = "Philosophy is just - to put it metaphorically - getting flies out of fly bottles" 
we have more or less the desired result. The metaphorical sentence is correctly rejected 
just in case things aren't the way the imaginative viewpoint they prompt presents them 
as being. Similarly, from 
(M2) If the garden was a slum of bloom, then it could hardly have been winter that 
Stevens was writing about in 'Banal Sojourn' 
we move to 
(M4) If the garden was indeed - as in Stevens' metaphor -a slum of bloom, then it 
could hardly have been winter that Stevens was writing about in 'Banal 
Sojourn' 
which has the form IfSp then P, where the obvious abbreviations are made. Axiom (5) 
tells us that this is true iff not-Sp is true or P is true. And this. - modulo the standard 
worries about the paradoxes of the material conditional, is exactly what we would 
expect. The conditional comes out as false when things are as the metaphor prompts us 
to see them, and yet the interpretation presented in the consequent does not fit with 
them. So we have some explanation of the use of the conditional, and its place in our 
talk and thought about metaphor. In rejecting metaphors, we reject the imagined view of 
the world that they invite. In extending them via conditional thought, we implicitly 
move within such a worldview, and when we interpret them, we examine the actual 
world through the intellectual and experiential lens that they provide. 
It seems then, that in tackling metaphors which occur in e. g. negated contexts, mixed 
conditionals, belief-attributions, etc, the Davidsonian has some room to manoeuvre. 
Perhaps the above account, sketchy and provisional as it is, will ultimately prove to be 
unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, the general approach should surely seem attractive. The 
great appeal of such a fictionalist strategy is that it seems to provide the error theorist 
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with a means of appropriating realist-style semantics, while rejecting realist ontology. 159 
Such an approach makes it far easier to provide ftinctionally equivalent replacements for 
rejected discourses than would otherwise be the case. Of course, success is far from 
guaranteed, and must be earned, via the provision of a plausible translation scheme in 
and out of the fiction. A fully defensible version of fictionalism about metaphorical 
meaning can scarcely be attempted here. Nevertheless, I hope to have indicated one 
promising strategy for the Davidsonian, and given the beginnings of an outline of how 
such an account might go. 160 
Such an approach might also be employed to deal with an interesting problem recently 
raised by Stem. 161 Stem notices that though we might agree that both 
(1) Achilles is the sun 
(2) Juliet is the sun 
where the relevant imaginative viewpoints are very different in each case, there is 
something strange about the sentence 
(3) Juliet is the sun, and Achilles is, too. 
while 
(4) Sol is the sun, and Juliet is, too. 
is even worse. Stem holds that this shows that metaphorical meanings are necessary 
linguistic posits. He appeals to an analogous case, arguing that the semantic distinctness 
159 1 do not mean to suggest that the semantics sketched above works exactly like a standard fictionalism, 
say in modality or morality. The point is merely that the introduction of pseudo-meaning promises the 
best strategy for a Davidsonian who wishes to give some account of embedded contexts. 
160 1 do not pretend originality in linking metaphorical content and imaginative construal. The above 
account has obvious affinities to ideas set out in e. g. Walton (1990), (1993) and Yablo (1998). However, 
Yablo takes his account to underwrite a realism about metaphorical content, rather than the type of 
pseudo-fictionalism mooted here. 
16 
.1 
Stem (2000) p. 70-71 
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of the 'may' of possibility and that of permission is established by reflection that while 
in a given use of 
(5) John may leave tomorrow 
cmay' can be assigned either interpretation, in the following 
(6) John may leave tomorrow, and Harry, too 
grammar demands that we assign the same interpretation to antecedent and anaphoric 
term. Explaining such an external constraint on what speakers can manage to 111ean by 
(6) is just, thinks Stem, what we want word and sentence meaningfoi-. And since a 
seemingly similar phenomenon occurs in (3) and (4), it might seem that metaphorical 
meaning is required there too. 
However, it is clear that the account sketched earlier gives the Davidsonian some chance 
of addressing this worry. Firstly, reading (2) as 
2*. Juliet - metaphorically speaking - is the sun 
itself seems to might serve to explain why we find (4) problematic. After all, (2*) 
invites an imaginative construal of Juliet as the sun, which the literal statement 
frustrates. Davidson might argue that 
4* Sol is the sun, and Juliet is - metaphorically speaking - too. 
is actually semantically and syntactically fine, but that the intrusive presence of the 
literal identity claim simply frustrates the ability of the metaphor to conjure up a suitable 
imaginative viewpoint. Similarly 
3*: Juliet is- metaphorically speaking - the sun, and Achilles is - metaphorically 
speaking - too. 
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is actually true, but simply makes a demand on imaginative focus that we find it hard to 
discharge. After all, Stem's case is surely overstated if the claim is supposed to be that 
we simply can't hear the sentences in their intended sense, as happens in the case of 
'may'. The following sentence seems fine to my ears: 
7. Juliet is (metaphorically speaking) the sun, and Achilles is (metaphorically 
speaking) too; but the sense in which the fonner characterization is apt is very 
different from that of the latter. 
whereas no such move seems available in (6). Again, such a prospective reply needs to 
be examined and defended in greater detail than I can spare here. My aim is only to 
examine whether it is obvious that a Davidsonian must retreat in the light of such 
linguistically based objections. And, although the matter is a delicate one, it doesn't 
seem to me that the case has yet been established. 
What then, about the charge that Davidson cannot give a plausible account of clearly 
anomalous sentences? That worry, remember, was expressed as follows: 
Such an account is committed to treating metaphorical sentences as false 
when they are taken literally, when in fact many are neither true or false, 
but rather semantically anomolous (White, Margalit and Goldblum, 
Stern) 162,163,164 
Several philosophers have taken issue with Davidson's remark that 'most metaphorical 
sentences are patently false ... on occasion patent truth will do as well'. 
165 Even 
philosophers like White and Stem, who are in general sympathetic to Davidson's 
position, or at least willing to accept that he is right about words retaining their usual 
literal meaning in metaphor, resist the idea that the sentences composed out of those 
words need have any literal meaning at all. Such philosophers are willing to give up the 
idea that a syntactically well-formed sentence composed of significant parts must also be 
162 White (1996) pp. 204-226 
163 Margalit and Goldblum (1994) pp. 234-237 
164 Stern (2000) p. 47 
165 Davidson (1984a) p. 258. Davidson make related remarks elsewhere. 
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significant; insisting instead that metaphors like "they donated his face to the wildlife 
fund" are semantically anomalous, or nonsensical. 
Stem suggests that Davidson might argue that the suggested distinction between the 
literally meaningless and the false rests on a discredited analytic-synthetic distinction. 
He envisages a 'persistent objector' who replies that the rejection of analyticity is 
primarily a rejection of 'its epistemological use to ground an a priori /a posteriori 
distinction which is simply not what is at issue here. 166 But actually, leaving aside his 
actual motivation for assimilating the nonsensical to the false, it is not clear that 
Davidson need appeal to that principle at all. A more straightforward procedure would 
be to argue as follows. Let W be a thing that it is supposedly nonsensical to imagine 
donated to a wildlife ftind - my face, say - and let sentence S be instance of the form "W 
is donated to the wildlife fund". Then Davidson can run through instances of the 
following schematic argument 
(1) It is a priori that for all x, if x is donated to the wildlife fund, then x is the kind of 
thing that can be donated to wildlife funds. (Assumption) 
(2) It is a priori that, for all x, if x is not the kind of thing that can be donated to 
wildlife funds, then it is not the case that x is donated to the wildlife fund. 
(From 1, Modus tollens) 
(3) It is a priori that W is not the kind of thing that can be donated to wildlife funds. 
(Assumption) 
(4) So, it is a priori that it is not the case that W is donated to the wildlife fund. 
(From 2 and 3, Universal Quantifier rules and Modus ponens) 
(5) It is not the case that W is donated to the wildlife fund. (From 4) 
(6) Line 5 follows from a priori true statements by truth-preserving steps, and is thus 
true. (A prioricity of 1,3) 
(7) Line 5 is the sentential negation of S (Definition of S) 
(8) For all sentences X, if X is the sentential negation of Y, and Y is true, then X is 
false. (Definition of classical negation) 
(9) S is false (from 6,7,8, &-1, Universal Quantifier rules and Modus ponens) 
(10) If S is false, then it is not nonsensical. (Assumption) 
166 Stern (2000) p. 328 
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(. 11) S is not nonsensical. (From 9,10, Modus ponens) 
Thus it seems that Davidson has an argument that proceeds from relatively 
uncontroversial steps, from plausible or shared assumptions, to the conclusion that 
metaphorical sentences are false when taken literally. The issue of analyticity needn't 
arise. 167 
This section has been a long one, so let me recap briefly. As in the case of many other 
error-theories, a lot turns on whether a suitable functional replacement for our existing 
practices of ascribing m-meanings can be provided. I have argued that, unlike many 
error-theorists, the Davidsonian faces a difficult variant of the Frege-Geach problem. I 
have attempted to sketch the beginnings of a reply to this worry on behalf of Davidson, 
introducing a way of talking as ifthe content of the imaginative viewpoints that 
metaphor provokes really comprised the meaning of the metaphorical utterance. On the 
basis of such a fiction, I have attempted to show how worries about e. g. metaphor's 
appearance in negated or conditional contexts might be addressed. I do, not pretend to 
have set out anything detailed enough to be regarded as a theory; rather, my aim was to 
set out a strategy for the Davidsonian, hoping to provide just enough illustrative detail 
for its contours to be discerned. I then speculated whether the appeal to imaginative 
viewpoints might help finesse Stem's problem regarding metaphor and anaphora, and 
concluded by rejecting a distinct set of worries related to semantic anomaly. 
3.5 Metaphor and Reduction 
(1) Davidson's objection to simile theories of metaphor illegitimately 
characterises such theories as committed to the idea that metaphors be 
reduced to explicit literal similes. (Fogelin) 168 
(2) Davidson's account illegitimately demands that a linguistic theory ought to 
issue specifications of content in only literal terms (Denham) 
169 
167 Thanks are due to Gary Kemp for the argument presented here (inter alia! ). 
168 Fogelin (1988) Ch 2. 
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Davidson makes a series of objections to simile theories of metaphor. Famously, he 
argues that everything is like everything else, so if metaphors were literal comparisons, 
they would be trivially true, instead of interestingly significant, as the supporters of 
metaphorical meanings had held. Recently, Fogelin has argued that this reply overlooks 
the obvious; the simile-theorist should identify the meaning of the metaphor with the 
figurative meaning of the corresponding simile. Fogelin sketches an account of the 
difference between literal similitude and its figurative counterpart in terms of varying 
standards of salience, 'modes of relevance and evaluation governing the likeness 
claim'. 
170 
The reply masks a deeper worry, which is the sheer underdevelopment of the'Simile 
theory, whether literal or figurative. We are simply not shown that every metaphor can 
be parsed into a corresponding simile. Davidson's jokey paraphrase of Virginia Woolf's 
definition of a highbrow is designed to highlight the point. Woolf's 
(a) A highbrow is a man or woman of thoroughbred intelligence who rides his 
mind at a gallop across country in pursuit of an idea. 
becomes 
(b) A highbrow is a man or woman whose intelligence is like a thoroughbred 
horse and who persists in thinking about an idea like a rider galloping 
across a country in pursuit of ... well, something. 
The attempt is manful, and the joke light-hearted enough, but the philosophical point is 
there, and ought to have been addressed by Fogelin. We simply haven't been shown 
how to turn e. g. 
(C) The garden was a slum of bloom 
169 Denham (2000) p. 259. See pp. 318-328 for an extended discussion. 
170 Fogelin (1988) pp. 75-76 
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into simile form. Perhaps: "The garden was like a slum of bloom"? But what's a slum 
of bloom? It seems that we have to understand the metaphor in order to make the 
comparison, so rephrasing as a comparison scarcely casts light upon the metaphor. 
Similarly with e. g. 
(d) The Dean gloated into the office. 
(e) The Dean did something into the office that was like gloating. 
Grammar and insightful analysis tend to come under strain, if we take Fogelin's 
approach seriously. 
A more interesting question is whether Davidson implicitly appeals to reductivist 
presuppositions that can be challenged even by non-simile theorists. Perhaps the idea 
that a systematic linguistic pragmatics requires the possibility of literal paraphrase can 
be challenged. If I understand her correctly, that is what Alison Denham aims to do in 
her Metaphor and Moral Experience and elsewhere. 171 There, Denham is interested in 
what she terms the conceptual autonomy of the metaphorical. She gives two different 
glosses on the nature of conceptual autonomy as applied to metaphors. The first seems 
to coincide with the condition that Wright has called disputationalptirity; 
(DP) A discourse conceming a particular realm of fact - moral discourse, modal 
discourse, etc - is disputationally pure just in case there is no other discourse 
such that "the rational intelligibility of differences of opinion expressible in the 
fonner will depend on the existence of differences expressible in the latter". 172 
Denham, citing Wright, gives the following definition of conceptual autonomy 
171 See Denham (1998) and (2000), passim. 
172 Wright (19 94) p. 15 5. 
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(W) A discourse is conceptually autonomous if and only if it is not possible to state 
the truth conditions of assertoric utterances within it solely in terms of concepts 
extraneous to it. 173,174 
She goes on to assert the equivalence of this account with Wright's notion, as expressed 
in (DP) 
An alternative way of thinking about conceptual autonomy is this: A discourse fails to 
be conceptually autonomous if and only if all intelligible disagreements about the truth 
ofjudgements expressible in the discourse finally depend on disagreements about the 
truth ofjudgements extraneous to it. If it fails in this way, we may say that it is 
conceptually supervenient. 175 
I do not disagree with this equivalence claim, but since it may not seem immediately 
obvious how the intended equivalence with Wright's original forraulation runs, it is 
worth examining a little further. Let us take, for example, assertoric utterances of the 
form 
(M) Metaphorical utterance m in context C metaphorically means that p. 176 
If it is possible to satisfactorily state the truth conditions of claims like (M) in terms 
which do not mention metaphorical meaning or the like, then, if two subjects should 
disagree about whether or not (M) is true for a given m, C and p, this should ramify into 
some disagreement statable in those other terms. Intelligible disagreement is going to 
presuppose that either some aspect of the subjects' reasoning is incorrect, or that they 
disagree about whether or not the truth conditions of (M)-sentences have been met. 
Moreover, if these truth conditions can be stated in other terms, then the two subjects 
ought, if they are thinking rationally, to disagree about whether some fact expressible in 
173 Denham actually uses'if on both occasions where I have usedif and only if; since this weaker claim 
seems unmotivated, and since Wright makes the stronger, I have used the latter. 
174 Denham (2000) p. 283. n. 5. A similar definition is given in Denham (1998) p. 228 n. 3. 
175 Denham (2000) p. 283. n. 5. 
176 We don't actually say this kind of thing too much , so (M) has to be heard as a useful simplification. 
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these other terms obtains, since their disagreement should carry over into the new idiom. 
Call the way of thinking about conceptual autonomy expressed by (W) the Wright ivay. 
The second elucidation of conceptual autonomy that Denham gives, however, seems 
rather different. On this account, metaphorical utterances are conceptually autonomous 
if and only if "the contents they express are not reducible to literal paraphrase" 177 or 
"metaphorical assertions admit of no non-circular analysis in non-figurative terms". 178 
This is not an entirely happy characterisation, since Denham wants to hold that theorists 
like Davidson and Rorty, who are anti-realists about metaphorical content, agree that 
metaphors are conceptually autonomous. Let us amend the definition, then, to 
(D) Metaphorical utterances are conceptually autonomous if and only if either they 
do not express propositional contents, or the contents they express are not 
reducible to literal paraphrase or admit of no non-circular analysis in non- 
figurative terms. 
Call this way of thinking about conceptual autonomy the Denhani way. 
Denham clearly thinks that (D) is relevantly equivalent to (W). Thus, in the same 
footnote as she gives the two definitions cited above, she writes 
Thus some claim that it is not possible to state the truth-conditions of moral discourse in 
non-evaluative terms; the parallel thought here is that it is not possible to state the truth 
conditions of some metaphorical discourse in non-figurative terms. 179 
Again, in her introduction she writes 
The parallels [between moral judgements and metaphors] run deep, as can be seen by 
reflecting for a moment on the kinds of questions which often arise with respect to each. 
177 Denham (1998) p. 228. 
178 Denham (2000) p. 307. 
179 Denham (2000) p. 283. n. 5. 
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For instance ... can moral concepts be analysed in wholly non-evaluative terms? 
Compare: can metaphorical expressions be reduced to literal paraphrase? "O 
I have argued above (Section 2.3) that distinguishing between discourses and 
inetadiscourses help us see that this has to be the wrong way to think about the 
relationship between metaphors and morals. I will not repeat that discussion here. 181 
My interest is rather in the second elucidation of conceptual autonomy that Denham 
gives. 
(D) Metaphorical utterances are conceptually autonomous if and only if either they 
do not express propositional contents, or the contents they express are not 
reducible to literal paraphrase or admit of no non-circular analysis in non- 
figurative terms. 
Since Denham's aim is to show that certain metaphors which meet this condition do 
express propositional contents, she clearly embraces the second disjunct of the right- 
hand-side of (D). The category of metaphors Denham is concerned with are those she 
terms phenomenological metaphors. These, she holds, have the following properties 
(a) They function catachretically, in that they introduce a new use for an old 
concept, to fill a lexical gap. 
180 Denham (2000) p. 2. 
181 It is perhaps worth noting that the two definitions offered by Denham, (W) and (D), seem non- 
equivalent. Say we grant that metaphors express propositions that don't admit of literal expression. Still, 
it seems at least consistent to hold that the truth about whether a given metaphor expresses such a 
proposition p is analysable into some statement about whether its author intended to say that p, or about 
some pattern of use of p, or the like, as long as p remains non-literally expressible. Thus disagreements 
stated in terms of metaphorical meanings might be held to depend on disagreements about speaker 
intentions, or about use properties. Hence, an issue of whether m metaphorically means that p or not 
might be conceptually autonomous is Denham's sense and not in Wright's. Conversely, if all metaphors 
were amenable to literal paraphrase, it might still come out that disagreement about metaphorical meaning 
was compatible with complete agreement on facts concerning speaker intentions, use, context and the like. 
Just as disagreement about whether some particular incident is funny might be consistent with shared 
knowledge of all other relevant facts of the matter (to take Wright's example of a disputationally pure 
discourse), so metaphorical meaning might be more intimately related to individual taste and preference 
than we tend to think. 
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(b) They "take on a representational role which would otherwise be fulfilled by a 
response-dependent concept, i. e., a role which would be filled by a response 
dependent concept were one available in the speaker's lexicon". 182 
(c) They are minimally truth-apt. 
(d) They are conceptually autonomous, in the sense expressed by (D). 
Moreover, given that she holds that a metaphor implicitly proposes some relation of 
similarity to obtain between its topic and vehicle, she suggests 
(e) If any metaphors are of this kind, then their truth or assertibility conditions will 
consist in the obtaining of some relation of similarity that is i) capable of yielding 
determinate truth assignments ii) cannot be expressed in non-figurative terms and 
iii) is a property that would otherwise be identified by a response dependent 
concept. 
Denham introduces the notion of austere similarity, to describe such a relation, and 
argues that it is best thought of as being constituted by the responses of suitably situated 
subjects. She draws an analogy with the perceptual case. Defenders of response 
dependent accounts of colour hold that the similarity between two shades of e. g. pink is 
not reducible to any 'deeper' metaphysical feature that the two shades have in common, 
but consists merely in the fact that epistemically well-placed subjects judge that they 
look the same. In the same way, argues Denham, the relations of austere similarity 
expressed by phenomenological metaphors does not pick out a set of common features, 
that we might in principle enumerate. Rather, such relations obtain in virtue of the fact 
that certain external states of affairs, picked out by the vehicle of the metaphor, strike us 
as brutely similar to certain of our experiential states. We may not be capable, even in 
principle, of setting out any exhaustive list of common features 'underwriting' such 
judgements, but only of to appealing to a limited and provisional set of seemingly 
relevant features. In extreme cases, we may even be debarred from 
doing much more than recording the proposed similarity in the very same terms as the 
metaphor, merely making explicit that the relation is one of similarity by inserting the 
182 Denham (1998) p. 236. 
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requisite 'like' or 'as'. Even if the reader is able to proffer some non-circular 
elucidation, that elucidation may fail to be given in wholly non-figurative terms - it may 
be that his best prospects lie in offering further metaphors and further figurative 
similarity claims as elaborations of the target one. 183 
Denham's theory thus bears some resemblance to the Fogelin's theory outlined above. 184 
Fogelin's is a non-reductive simile theory, since it does not attempt to assimilate 
metaphors and similes to cases of literal comparison. 185 Denham's theory of 
phenomenological metaphors is doubly non-reductive, however. Not only does she 
claim that the simile obtained from the metaphorical. utterance is an (implicit) non-literal 
comparison, but she casts doubt on the idea that either explicit or implicit figurative 
comparisons can be fully spelled out in literal terms. Fogelin takes similarity to consist 
in a shared set of salient features, and differentiates between literal and non-literal 
comparisons by postulating a contextually variable parameter for salience. Denham, in 
contrast, holds that the facts about similarity that constitute the metaphor's truth 
condition need not hold in virtue of any shared set of features, except, trivially, their 
striking us as similar. 
To summarise, Denham seems committed to the truth of the following schema 
(PI) Phenomenological metaphor q means that phenomenological state Xis like Z 
where Z is a placeholder for some actual or possible type of state of affairs picked out by 
the vehicle of the metaphor q, and where the relevant concept of likeness is one that can 
be fully captured via the following (a priori and necessary) provisional equation 
(P2) For all subjects S in ideal epistemic circumstances, (Phenomenological state X is 
like state of affairs Z iff S judges that X is like Z) 
The truth conditions for the metaphor q can thus be given as follows 
183 Denham (1998) pp. 249-250. 
184 Fogelin (1988) 
185 See Tirrell (199 1). 
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(N) q is true iff for some X and Zq means that phenomenological state Xis like Z, 
and all subjects S in ideal epistemic circumstances would judge that X is like Z. 
Since the truth conditions essentially include a type of state of affairs picked out via a 
figurative comparison, ('X is like T) phenomenological metaphors are conceptually 
autonomous in the Denham sense. 
Is an analysis of this kind consistent? As we can see, Denham's preferred account of the 
truth conditions for phenomenological metaphors involve appeal to ideal subjects. The 
judgements of such subjects constitute the facts about whether a given experiential state 
is primitively similar to the state of affairs picked out by the vehicle of the metaphor. 186 
Now, there are well known problems with explicating metaphorical meaning in terms of 
likeness, some deriving from the fact that as can be like Ps in irrelevant respects, and 
some from the fact that as can fail to be like Ps and yet befalsely believed to be so. For 
example, Wittgenstein is like Kim Cattrall in virtue, inter alia, of being human, but the 
metaphor 'Wittgenstein was a real Kim Cattrall' is not thereby appropriate. Similarly, 
gorillas are shy, retiring creatures, but 'The bouncer was a gorilla' does not convey that 
he was shy and retiring. If Denham is to avoid these. problems carrying over her 
account, she needs some principled way of excluding the possibility that her supposedly 
ideal subjects might make their judgements as a result of false or irrelevant beliefs. 187 
It might seem that Denham's appeal to austere similarities would circumvent this 
problem. After all, that appeal was supposed to allow Denham to reject the idea that 
whether a given metaphor is true ultimately depends on the obtaining of some set of 
similarities which might, in principle, be stated in literal terms. However, it is important 
to be clear that this move does not remove the need for an account of the ideal subject 
that explains why such subjects would not have false or irrelevant beliefs. Denham 
agrees with Wright that any j udgement- dependent account of some putative realm of 
186 The connection with the Order of Determination test outlined in Chapter I should be obvious. I 
discuss the various tests for realism further in the next chapter. 
187 It's not enough to simply rule this out by fiat, since that would render (P2) trivial, violating the 
substantiality constraint on provisional equations. I refer the reader back to Section 1.7 for further 
discussion of the constraints on such equations. 
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facts must give a substantive account of the nature of the subjects and conditions that 
allow constitutive judgements to be made. 188 
Denham is, of course, aware of the old worries about similitude. She writes 
As Goodman and Davidson are fond of pointing out, all similarity statements are 
trivially true: they cannot fail to be true, since everything is in some respects similar to 
everything else ... If I were concerned with absolute truth conditions attaching to 
sentences in null contexts this would be problematic, for it would suggest that the truth 
conditions of metaphors (viewed as implicit similes) were hopelessly underdetermined. 
However, the level of meaning at which I have located the determination of truth 
conditions is context relative (Grice's utterance type occasion meaning), and so that 
worry need not detain us: we can rely on our knowledge of the background discourse 
and situational context in which the metaphor occurs to constrain the range of possible 
similarities to a class of relevant ones. 189 
The idea seems to be, then, that the ideal subjects whose judgements constitute the facts 
about whether X austerely resembles Z can be a priori guaranteed not to do so on 
irrelevant grounds, since their background linguistic knowledge will always constrain 
the range of similarities to relevant ones. 
As above, then, we can represent such putative background knowledge as I, and the 
linguistic knowledge that entitles us to constrain the 'range of possible similarities' as a 
conditional of the form I -> F, where F stands for the class of similarities relevant to a 
given utterance of, say q. But now an incoherence emerges in Denham's theory. For if a 
given phenomenological metaphor q is to be conceptually autonomous in the sense of 
being irreducible to literal paraphrase, then F must include either the corresponding 
simile s or some other irreducible figurative expressions f] -fn. Otherwise we would 
have identified some set of similarities which could provide a literal paraphrase of q, 
namely, the very set specified in the consequent of the relevant conditional I -> F. The 
class of similarities F, if it is not to provide exactly the type of literal paraphrase that 
Denham aims to avoid, must therefore itself include figurative elements. 
188 See Wright (1994) p. 112, Denham (1998) pp. 45-49 
189 Denham (2000) pp. 292-293. 
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Now, however, we are back where we started. For the problem of how we narrowed 
down the set of possible similarities, excluding irrelevant ones in a principled manner, 
was supposed to have been solved by citing our mastery of such conditionals. Since it 
seems that, in order to master such conditionals, we must already have identified the 
relevant set - given that the conditionals involve either the very figurative expression in 
question or some other for which the original problem arises - it seems that we have 
merely deferred the hard question; why those similarities. 
Moreover, this requirement seems inconsistent with one of the defining characteristics of 
phenomenological metaphors, namely, the fact they represent an instance of catachresis, 
plugging a lexical gap by introducing a new use for an old word or phrase. Denham 
writes 
Phenomenological metaphors are used to represent phenomenally characterized states of 
affairs and so used because (to the knowledge of informed and competent speakers) no 
equally suitable word or expression occurs in the language ... they are one way of 
attempting to conceptualize phenomenology in contexts in which the character of an 
experience or its objects is too fine-grained or too idiosyncratic to be represented by our 
standard reperto . ire of linguistic concepts - our standard lexicon. 
190 
But if, ex hypothesi, a phenomenological metaphor is being introduced to make up for 
the lack of a linguistic concept in our standard repertoire, how could we have already 
mastered conditionals like I -> F, which use either thevery concept that was supposed to 
be being introduced, or some other, for which analogous problems arise? 
To summarize, Denham's theory seems committed to both 
(a) grasping a conditional which includes some irreducibly metaphorical element q 
is part of, or entailed by, speaker competence with a given language L 
and 
190 Denham (2000) pp. 283. 
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(b) the metaphor q can be introduced into a language for the first time, 'to fill a 
lexical gap', by means of some linguistic rule that only draws on the existing 
conceptual resources of the language L. 
But the two theses seem inconsistent. Since it seems that q (or some other figure for 
which a parallel problem arises) must be apart of the pre-existing linguistic rule that 
supposedly enables us to master its truth-conditions, (a) and (b) are mutually exclusive. 
I conclude that we have, so far, no reason to believe that phenomenological metaphors 
are both cognitive and conceptually autonomous, on either of the resolutions of that 
notion. So Denham's attempt to elaborate a theory of metaphor that allows metaphors 
both to express distinctive cogniti ve contents, and to be resistant to literal paraphrase, is, 
I believe, unsuccessful. 
That said, it is clear that rejecting an instance of a theory-type is clearly not to 
undermine the approach in general. In Chapter 5,1 will outline an approach to 
metaphorical content that would provide the combination of propositional content and 
irreducibility that Denham aims to secure. 
3.6 Conclusion 
There are many objections to Davidson's theory of metaphor, and many rival theories 
have been constructed in the thirty or so years since 'What Metaphors Mean' was 
published. I have not attempted to address all of them here, and nor have I aimed to treat 
those I did discuss in the depth that they deserve. However, I hope to have demonstrated 
that certain influential objections may be more tractable than is sometimes 
acknowledged, and that some key rival theories may face distinctive difficulties of their 
own. My central aim has been to elaborate the Davidsonian position in a way that 
complements the discussion of the previous chapter, and to demonstrate its prinlafacie 
defensibility in the light of popular criticism. 
I will now broaden my focus of attention, turning to the 'marks of realism' outlined in 
Chapter 1. How do considerations of Truth-Minimalism, Evidence Transcendence, 
Cognitive Command and Order of Determination bear on my conclusions to date? 
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4. Metaphor and the Tests for Realism 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1,1 set out a generic approach to disputes involving the objective status of a 
given realm of fact. I elaborated Wright's minimalist and pluralist approach to truth, and 
outlined the range of 'tests' that he suggests might serve to focus debate between the 
realist and anti-realist. In the next chapter, I went on to examine the nature of 
Davidson's well known anti-realism about metaphorical meaning, and to describe what I 
took to be his motivation for that position. The detailed character of Davidson's error 
theory emerged more clearly in the last chapter, in the course of correcting misplaced 
objections to it. Moreover, I there attempted to highlight the range of dialectical 
resources, defensive and offensive, that are seemingly open to the error-theorist in 
securing his position against more serious objections, and making trouble for his realist 
opponents. 
My stated aim in this work is to offer a preliminary examination of the significance of 
recent work on realism for the question of whether we should think of metaphors as 
expressing propositional linguistic contents. It ought to be clear at this stage that I face a 
strategic difficulty. On the one hand, a comprehensive review of theories of metaphor, 
and putative replies to Davidson, is far too ambitious a project to attempt here. I have 
endeavoured to develop error-theoretic rejoinders to central, widely endorsed and 
influential objections, and to point out some of the difficulties faced by Davidson's 
opponents, but no doubt many questions still remain, with many more being raised by 
my suggested replies. 
On the other hand, having outlined in some degree of detail the motivation and 
dialectical resources of error theory about m-meaning, and offered a cautious optimism 
about that position's standing in each case, it might seem that I have rather foreclosed on 
146 
a broader examination of the various cruces I set out in Chapter 1. As I will argue in 
Section 4.2 below, the fact that the error theorist's fundamental motivation relies on 
appeal to norms which are internal to semantic discourse, broadly construed, seems to 
entail that such a discussion could only concern the realist standing of semantic talk in 
general, since that is what realists about m-meaning can be defensibly held to aspire to. 
Such a task is clearly also much too ambitious to be undertaken here. Moreover, given 
that such work would have served merely a prelude to pointing out the error-theoretic 
reasons for holding that, in the case of metaphor such talk failed of truth, whatever its 
realist pretensions, the overall effect would be rather bathetic. 
I intend to proceed as follows. From Section 4.3 onwards, I bring the detailed 
discussion of the character of Davidson's error theory to a close, and instead embark 
upon a slightly more neutral enquiry into the standing of his (A6). I shall try not to rely 
on the assumption that other aspects of a broadly Davidsonian theory have been 
demonstrated to be correct, since (a) there are significant rival theories that I have not 
(and will not) consider in depth, and (b) I have conceded that even a Davidsonian should 
accept that a 'speaker-meaning' account of metaphorical meaning has its place. I will 
endeavour to relate the supposed limitlessness and non-conceptual character of metaphor 
to the tests for realism about m-meaning in a way that of interest to, and consistent with, 
a number of different theories of metaphor. 
However, I do think that the ontological parsimony and printafacie defensibility of an 
error-theoretic account places a significant burden of proof on Davidson's realist rivals. 
Ib egin, therefore, by considering one final argument against a generic error-theoretic 
position, an argument that, if good, and applicable to the case at hand, would 
successfully serve to undermine the motivation for Davidson's position. 
4.2 Wright's Argument against Error theories 
Wright, remember, is a minimalist and a pluralist about truth. His truth minimalism 
consists of two claims, relating to (1) truth and (2) truth-aptitude. The former amounts 
to the claim that it is sufficient for a given predicate T to meet the conceptual 
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requirements on truth that it accord with a series ofpIatitudes. A richly metaphysical or 
epistemic account of truth is not secured merely by reflective appeal to such 
uncontroversial principles. Minimalism about truth aptitude comprises two sub-claims; 
(a) that possession of truth aptitude is co-extensional with possession of assertoric 
content and (b) that it suffices for an utterance or discourse to be assertoric that it meet 
two constraints regarding (i) syntax and (ii) discipline. Roughly, if a sentence embeds 
appropriately under negation, etc, and there are publicly shared standards which 
determine when it is correct and incorrect to employ it, then the sentence possesses 
assertoric content. Finally, Wright's pluralism results from his view that although truth 
is conceptually minimal, it may be metaphysically robust, in a variety of kinds and 
degrees, across different subject areas. Truth can be de/Ined in minimal terms; but what 
falls under or realizes that definition in particulaK cases may be metaphysically 
substantial. 
Wright argues that such a conception of truth makes life difficult, if not impossible, for 
error theorists. Discussing the question of whether scope for error theory is simply 
closed off by a minimal theory of truth, he writes: 
The position, I think, is that error-theoretic proposals remain theoretically feasible but 
that their development is interestingly constrained. Suppose a philosopher denies that 
anything or much of what we say within a given discourse is true but grants that its truth 
predicate admits interpretation as superassertibility by its standards of assertoric 
warrant. 191 Then he has to produce reason to deny that anything, or very much, of what 
we say is superassertible by the lights of those standards. And that will be a 
commitment to denying that any, or very many, of the statements of the discourse are 
even assertible by those standards. 
Wright goes on to identify two possible strategies for the error-theorist who aims to 
show precisely this: 
191 A sentence is superassertible, remember, if we are episternically justified in asserting it, given our 
current state of information, and we would remain so justified given any way that that state of information 
might be 'enlarged or improved'. 
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One is to contend that while the standards in question are perfectly coherent, little of 
what we accept really complies with them; our 'error', on this view, will consist in a 
propensity to apply those standards erroneously. The other is to argue that the discourse 
is not governed by coherent standards of assertoric, warrant, and consequently that 
nothing is genuinely warranted by those standards ... The great question, it seems to me, 
is not the coherence of error theory but its motivation; why insist on construing the 
discourse in terms of a notion of truth which has us in massive error when the alternative 
of superassertibility isprintafacie available and would avoid the charge? 192 
Wright's question is an important one, and pressing in the present instance. Davidson's 
theory of metaphor apparently represents everyday talk and thought as being in massive 
error. When we call metaphors true or false, or talk about what they say, or signify or 
mean, we are completely mistaken. How can this be the most charitable interpretation of 
our practice? Isn't the minimalist account - that represents us as being answerable to 
standards of warrant which are internal to the practice of making/interpreting metaphors, 
and which can, therefore, secure the defensibility of our standard ways of thinking about 
metaphorical meaning - by far the more plausible position? This seems especially 
worrying in the light of the 'mocked-up' account of truth and falsity that I sketched on 
behalf of the Davidsonian in the last chapter. If some such account is available, then 
why not simply identify the norms governing our attributions of m-meaning with the 
norms of the alleged fiction? The error theorist seems compelled to explain why he 
takes the standards of correct use that govern our way with metaphors as having been set 
so high that we almost always fail to accord with them, when he himself is committed to 
the existence of a much lower standard, whose demands we manage regularly to respect. 
The idea that minimalist theories of metaphorical meaning have such a default status has 
been defended in the literature, notably by Denham. 193 She writes: 
How does my account of phenomenological metaphor answer the objection that 
irreducible metaphors do not express truth-apt judgements? Can it show that 
phenomenological metaphors are held accountable to sufficiently stable standards of 
correctness in the absence of any non-circular analysis in literal terms? I aim to do that 
192 Wright (1992) pp. 86-87 
193 Denham (2000) Ch 7-9 
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somewhat indirectly, by showing how we might assess whether or not a subject 
understands a given metaphor; I take it that if we have to hand standards or norms which 
are sufficiently disciplined to determine attributions of understanding, we have also 
standards or norms which are sufficiently disciplined to confer the status 'truth-apt'. 194 
I actually agree with many of the suggestions Denham makes regarding the criteria for 
'manifesting understanding' of a metaphor. The capacity to elaborate a metaphor using 
a mixture of literal commentary and further figuration; the fact that one is able to pick 
out paradigm instances of objects, events, etc, that would fall under particular 
metaphorical characterizations; the ability to extend the metaphor in the natural way - 
all these suggestions seem eminently sensible. So it may seem that Wright's minimalist 
-challenge to the error-theorist can be reinforced by the development of a set of plausible 
proposals describing the nature of the more modest standards the minimalist appeals to. 
However, such an argument is not, I think, nearly as attractive in the case at hand as it is 
in e. g. that of moral, aesthetic or mathematical talk. Consider an analogy. It ought to be 
uncontroversial that error-theory about phlogiston, or the humours, is the appropriate 
position to take. When scientists posited the existence of such substances, it was hoped 
that they would thereby play a genuinely explanatory role in accounting for certain 
natural phenomena. When it turned out that such explanatory work could not be 
delivered in a way that was consistent with other of the commitments of natural science, 
the original motivation for believing in such entities simply lapsed. The good standing 
of assertions about phlogiston depended upon their being sanctioned by the existing, 
reflectively endorsed norms governing scientific practice and discussion. It would have 
been wholly inappropriate to think of retreating to a less denianding norin of correctness 
for e. g. phlogiston-assertions. The point of the standards that govern scientific discourse 
as a ivhole would simply have been undermined by such a move. The same, the 
Davidsonian should maintain, is true of the case of metaphorical meaning. Better 
founded, more fundamental commitments of our thought about meaning count seriously 
against us our taking talk of m-meaning seriously. 
194 Denham (2000) p. 318-319 
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It is no doubt arguable that talk about meaning is less robustly objective than theoretical 
science, although this is scarcely uncontroversial. The issue can be pressed on a number 
of fronts. For example, in Section 2.8 above, I committed the Davidsonian to the 
following principle; 
(Epistemic Access) If a metaphor m-means that P, then (in somewhat idealized 
conditions) we can get some warrant for believing that it m-means 
that P. 
Such a principle bears in an obvious way on the question of how the objective standing 
of the discourse is illuminated by the first of Wright's key tests: 
(Evidence Transcendence) Does the discourse at issue include sentences with regard 
to which a) we'95 have no evidence that bears on their 
truth value, and b) we lack a conception of any way in 
which we might-come to get such evidence? 
Moreover, Davidson's well-known identification of amenability to radical interpretation 
as the constitutive mark of the semantic might lead us to think that meaning-talk is best 
construed in a response-dependent manner, with semantic facts being constituted rather 
than tracked by the judgements of a suitably informed radical interpreter. 1 96 So the 
Order of Determination test might also be taken to be resolved in the favour of the 
anti-realist about semantic facts, broadly construed; 
(Order-of-Determination) Given that we can identify a true Provisional Equation 
involving the discourse at issue, do the best judgements of 
ideally placed subjects constititte the relevant facts, or 
merely track independently constituted facts? 
Questions regarding Wide Cosmological Role seem similarly resoluble, since there 
seems little priniafacie reason to suppose that semantic facts enter into a suitably wide 
195 Or, perhaps, some suitably idealised counterparts of us. 
196 See (1984) passim, especially Essays 1,2,9 and 10. 
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variety of explanations. Finally, it is unclear whether it is really apriori that every 
disagreement over a semantic fact results from a cognitive failing, in the way that 
Cognitive Command demands, since it is unclear exactly what e. g. Quinean-style 
semantic indeterminacy shows us about the cognitive standing of judgements of 
linguistic meaning. 197 So it might seem that minimalism about meaning in general is 
mandated by broadly Davidsonian commitments in other areas of philosophy of 
language, providing a disanalogy with the scientific case alluded to above. 198 
This would be to mistake the point of the analogy with outdated scientific theory, 
however. The point is rather that ivhatever the realist standing ofthe constitutive nornis 
governing a given discourse, it must always be a live possibility that assertions which 
appeared to be warranted by such norms might turn out not to be. So much is written 
into the notion of a genuine norm or standard. A standard that could not, even in 
principle, fail to be lived up to, could provide no conceivable influence on action or 
belief, and thus would hardly be playing a normative role at all. One cannot sincerely 
intend to bring one's actions into accord with something that will sanction them no 
matter what. 199 Susceptibility to error is built into the notion of respecting a norm. So 
even if semantic discourse is accountable to merely minimal standards of correctness - 
which is itself, of course, hotly debatable - there ought still to be an open possibility that 
we have mistakenly taken certain of our judgements to be warranted by those standards, 
when in fact they ought to have been rejected. 
That, in effect, is the contention of the Davidsonian position I have been sketching in 
earlier chapters. Such a position does not accept that discourse about the meaning of 
metaphors is independent of semantic discourse more widely construed. Rather, it holds 
that constitutive elements of that wider discourse - Compositionality, Episternic 
Access, the constitutive goals of a pragmatic theory, et al - provide the resources for a. 
demonstration that no suitable account of m-meaning is genuinely forthcoming even by 
the potentially minimal lights of that very discourse. Just as in the scientific cases, 
principles and data that we count as better grounded, or at least more fundamental, are 
197S ee e. g. Quine (1960) Ch 2, Evans (1975) for discussion of such semantic indeterminacy. 
198 Wittgensteinian and Kripkean worries about rule-following might also serve to establish a meaning- 
minimalism. For relevant discussion of the stability of such a position, see Wright (1992) Ch 6. 
199 See Petitt (1990) for an extended defence of this thought. 
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alleged to overthrow the apparent warrant for committing to a given theoretical entity. 
This does not seem a wholly implausible position to take. Accord with principles like 
Composition ality, or something very in their neighbourhood, seems simply mandatory 
for anything worth regarding a properly semantic discourse at all. And if discourse 
about m-meaning - realism about distinctive propositional contents conveyed by 
metaphors - is not a form of semantic discourse, it becomes very unclear what is. 
In a sense, then, the Davidsonian error theorist takes the first of the two dialectical 
strategies that Wright offers: 
to contend that while the standards in question are perfectly coherent, little of what 
we accept really complies with them; our 'error', on this view, will consist in a 
propensity to apply those standards erroneously. 
However, this has to be understood in a qualified manner. The error theorist will 
typically concede that much of semantic discourse is well-founded in the light of its 
proper standards, rejecting only those parts of it that mistqkenly extended to the story of 
'how metaphor works its wonders'. The intended lesson of the phlogiston example was 
that the debate regarding the existence of metaphorical meaning is a debate which is 
internal to semantics. Theorists like Denham, who aim to give a 'self-standing' 
minimalist account of the metaphor, simply fail to give sufficient regard to the internal 
connections between superficially 'different' discourses. Such a mistake is unsurprising, 
and tempting, in the light of the sketchy and intuitive notion of 'discourse' that Wright 
appeals to in the course of setting out his framework for debates about realism. But it is 
a mistake nevertheless. Metaphorical meaning, if it lives at all, lives in the shadow of 
meaning proper, and inconsistency with key commitments of that grolinding discourse 
spells doom for realism about metaphorical content., Mere surface discipline in 
insufficient in this kind of case. 200 
200 Similar arguments could be adduced against e. g. minimalism about the analytic/synthetic distinction. If 
it turns out that the notion of analyticity is thrown into confusion by central facts about dicaning in 
general, then adverting to the surface discipline of ascriptions of analyticity could not -pace minimalist 
descendants of Grice and Strawson - suffice to rehabilitate it. 
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The foregoing line of thought no doubt requires much more in the way of elaboration 
and qualification. Like many other aspects of this work, it marks more of a direction of 
travel than a route map. If it can be made defensible, however, then it marks one, 
admittedly modest, area in which debates about the nature of realism can be clarified by 
examination of the case of metaphor. It is easy to overlook how much is built in to 
Wright's notion of a discourse, and equally easy to assume that change of focus marks 
change of subject. Do moral talk, aesthetic evaluation and epistemology count as three 
different forms of discourse, or as three sub-branches of a more general language-game 
involving the making andjustifying of non-native ascriptions? It's difficult to tell, but a 
lot hangs on the answer. If it turned out, for example, that deep, constitutive epistemic 
commitments undercut a certain species of moral or aesthetic judgement, Wright's plea 
for charitable construal of everyday talk would carry quite different weight, depending 
on, how we individuated discourses. 201 1 do not pretend that Wright is unaware of this, 
nor that the plea for charity of construal might not be reformulated in a way that would 
help address it. But as the case of Denham has shown, it is easy for even sophisticated 
theorists, familiar with the details of Wright's work, to overlook the possibility of appeal 
to internal clash of standards. Even if the dialectical strategy that I have offered to the 
error theorist fails in a given case, or even in every case, it at least ought to be considered 
seriously and argued against. The case of metaphorical meaning, I believe, brings this 
simple moral out quite nicely. 202 
4.3 Metaphor and Evidence Transcendence 
In Section 2.5,1 outlined what I took to be the best 'master-argument' for Davidson's 
key theses about metaphor. A central plank of that argument was principle (A2): 
(A2) If a proposed assignment of a metaphorical content to a utterance 
201 Similarly, transcendental arguments for the existence of epistemic norms would bear in quite a different 
way on the metaphysical possibility of moral norms. 
202 Moreover, it gives further support to the broad church, holistic methodology that I defended in Chapter 
1. If we aren't sure exactly what a discourse is, it can hardly be wise to rely on such a semantic notion to 
the exclusion of other equally well-founded epistemic and metaphysical commitments. 
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results solely from an unacceptable theory of metaphor, then the utterance does 
not express that content. 
I expressed the hope there that (A2) would be common ground between realists and anti- 
realists about metaphor. Such an expression can often turn out to be overly optimistic. 
In Section 2.8, in a slightly different context, I did set out one obvious defence of (A2), 
were one to be demanded, as follows. Grant the following two principles: 
(Warrant) If a theory is crazy, then it doesn't give warrant to beliefs formed on the 
basis of it. 
(Epistemic Access) If a metaphor m-means that P, then (in somewhat idealized 
conditions) we can get some warrant for believing that it m-means 
that P. 
Now, assume that the only putative warrant that we could get for an ascription of m- 
meaning was a crazy theory. By (Warrant), no warrant for believing that the metaphor 
did have such a content would spring from that theory. So we would have no warrant at 
all for accepting the ascription. Modus tollens on (Episternic Access) gives us that the 
metaphor does not have that content, and conditional proof gives us the plausible version 
of (A2). 
I noted above that the latter principle, (Epistemic Access), seems, if good, to resolve the 
first of Wright's cruces: 
(Evidence Transcendence) Does the discourse at issue include sentences with regard 
to which a) we 203 have no evidence that bears on their 
truth value, and b) we lack a conception of any way in 
which we might come to get such evidence? 204 
203 Or, perhaps, some suitably idealized counterparts of us. 
204 1 will abbreviate these principles to (EA) and (ET) for ease of reference in this section. 
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If we can always get some warrant for the true belief that a metaphor means that P, then 
it seems harmless to think of some moderately idealized counterpart of us as actually 
possessing such evidence. Moreover, our grounds for accepting something like (EA) 
presumably depends upon our having some conception of how we might go about 
getting some evidence relating to. what the metaphor means. Either way, commitment to 
(ET) seems assured. 
Most extant realists are likely to agree with such a position. The general strategy 
embarked on by a realist theory of metaphor is to show how some well-founded 
linguistic theory justifies us in ascribing meaning to metaphors. Admittedly, 
presumption of global knowability is rarely explicitly stated, but that is in general best 
explained by the fact that it is widely adhered to. 205 - 
Take, for example, any theory of metaphor that gives a special determinative role to 
speaker's intentions. 206 We typically assume that we can come to possess warrant for 
belýefs about what people intend, and that such an assumption is not merely a reflection 
of wholly contingent epistemic luck, but something that reflects on ivhat it is to form an 
intention.. There are, of course, complications. We might be skeptical about whether 
intentions are always really warrantable from the third person point of view, or might 
have theoretical or dispositional reasons for ascribing widespread self-deception 
regarding our actual goals and purposes. Nevertheless, first person access is a perfectly 
respectable way of getting access about one's plans, and even the most extreme Freudian 
has soine idea about how we might go about getting some evidence regarding what 
somebody intends to do. So it seems that adherents of the 'default', speaker's meaning 
position ought to sign up to an anti-realist reply to (ET). 
More generally, contextualists like Recanati, Bezuidenhout or Stem are likely to include 
the intentions of the speaker as one relevant factor determining the nature of the context 
in question. 207 Since sensitivity to such contextual factors is'generally a feature of such 
205 It is easy to see why this might be so. Wittgenstein's insistence that meaning be manifested in use, and 
Quine's rejection of the 'myth of the museum', have had lasting influence in the philosophy of language. 
206 For example, Grice (1975), Searle (1993), Martinich (1984), etc. 
207 See e. g. Stem's account of presupposition, that plays a central role in the semantics of the Mthat 
operator, and that relies on recognition of what a speaker is 'representing themselves' as doing. Stern 
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contextualists' accounts of linguistic mastery, commitment to the epistemic tractability 
of intention seems secured. A similar argument can be given for sophisticated 
comparison theorists such as Fogelin, who make essential play with shifting contextual 
standards in giving their non-reductive account of figurative likeness. Similarly, 
theorists who make essential appeal to linguistic convention, like Denham, seem 
committed to our knowing, perhaps tacitly, what such conventions demand of us. 
Nevertheless, I shall, in Chapter 5, sketch a robustly realist account of limitlessness, that 
entails that (ET) fails. As far as I know, no contemporary realist endorses such a 
position, but it does admit of some independent motivation. Since it turns on 
assimilating the open-endedness of metaphor to a kind of vagueness, however, the most 
interesting construal of (ET) is not threatened. For the distinction between e. g. the 
domain of mathematical truth, which we can conceive of as containing interestingly 
unknowable elements, and judgements of the relative painfulness of our experiential 
state, is surely not wholly undermined by granting that it is conceivable that we could 
(essentially) lack warrant in certain borderline cases of the latter. 
I provisionally conclude, then, that (ET) ought to be answered in an anti-realist spirit, in 
the case of metaphorical meaning. The case of metaphor, like that of colour, morals, 
beauty and phenomenology, seems fated to be fought within a more closely 
episternically demarcated area than e. g. realist/anti-realist disputes about mathematics, 
fundamental physics, or the past. 
4.4 Metaphor and Cognitive Command I 
The case of (Cognitive Command) is more difficult to appraise, even putting aside 
Wright's broader worries about that supposed test. 208 A discourse is held by Wright to 
accepts that his account of presuppositions relies on the idea that they are 'somehow ... manifest in the 
utterance'. Stern (2000) p 122. That seems enough to secure the suggested answer to (ET). 
20' For ease of discussion, I will assume that (Cognitive Command) has somehow been improved so that 
it can test for questions relating to the sense in which talk about metaphorical meaning is robustly, 
cognitively representational. If this simplifying assumption turns out to be false, the Quandary account of 
the difference between 'disputes of inclination' and 'matters of fact' is presumably an available fallback 
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be robustly, cognitively, representational, remember, just in case some defensible 
version of the following holds; 
(CC) It is a priori that differences of opinion arising within a given discourse can be 
satisfactorily explained only in tenns of 'divergent input' (that is, the disputants 
working on the basis of different information, and hence guilty of ignorance or 
error, depending on the status of that information), or 'unsuitable conditions' 
(resulting in inattention or distraction, and so -in inferential error, or oversight of 
data, etc. ), or 'malfunction' (for example, prejudicial assessment of data, 
upwards or downwards, or dogma, or failings in other categories already 
209 listed). 
On the one hand, it is difficult not to agree with the letter of Davidson's claim when he 
claims that 'there is no test for metaphor that does not call for taste'. 210 On the other, it 
is difficult to get clear on what precise significance this is supposed to have for the 
debate about cognitive standing, particularly when the broader context of his remarks 
make it clear that his primary concern is to reject the idea that metaphor production, 
recognition and interpretation is rule-governed in any 'mechanical' sense of that term. 
Such a position is perfectly compatible with a certain kind ofparticularist, intuitional 
epistemology of metaphor. 
Perhaps, then we ought to apply Wright's 'forced march' for the cognitivist about 
metaphorical meaning. One who holds that metaphorical meaning accords with some 
suitable revised cousin of (CC) must make the case by identifying a 'cognitive' route to 
the relevant facts. Such a cognitive route will be either inferential or direct. If direct, 
then the intuitional epistemology needs to be defended. If inferential, then the nature of 
position. If that also fails -and I suggest later that it can be put under pressure -then a fallback to brute 
intuitions regarding cognitive status seems inescapable. 
209 Wright (1992) pp 92-93. See also Ch. 4, passim, where he defines the notion as follows (p. 144): a 
discourse meets Cognitive Command if and only if it is a priori that differences of opinion formulated 
within the discourse, unless excusable as a result of vagueness in a disputed statement, or in the standards 
of acceptability, or variation in personal evidence thresh6lds, so to speak, will. involve something that may 
properly be regarded as a cognitive shortcoming. 
21 0 Davidson (1984a) p 245 
158 
our robust warrant for the conditionals that capture such inferences must be explained. 
Pending provision of such a substantive epistemology, we are entitled to construe talk of 
cognition in a merely minimal manner, a mere reflection of the platitudes requisite for 
minimal truth. 
I cannot examine every such potential epistemology here, (although later in this chapter I 
will examine an under-explored acco 
, 
unt which is amenable, inter alia, to the speaker- 
meaning theory). Rather, I will content myself with brief consideration of two broader 
issues. The first is, that in the light of my earlier methodological scepticism regarding 
burden of proof, it is not wholly clear that Wright's demand is a fair one. Imagine a 
theorist who thinks that metaphorical meaning is determined via a two stage process; 
We display a sensitivity to a rich variety of relevant features of context, 
somehow integrating them into our unconscious linguistic processing 
In the case of many metaphors, such pragmatic knowledge 'intrudes' into 
the 'derivation' of the proposition expressed by a given utterance. This 
might happen e. g. (i) because, prior to availability to consciousness, the 
semantically determined proposition is delivered to a pragmatics 'module' 
which applies some function from propositions to propositions or (ii) 
because, prior to availability to consciousness, the semantic derivation of the 
relevant proposition is coeval with apragmatic derivation, so that the 
eventual proposition expressed is already partially pragmatically 
conditioned. 
Now, imagine that it proves difficult to deliver a detailed account of the nature of such a 
complex contextual sensitivity. Ought we to conclude that such a putative realist 
explanation is thereby disfavoured, and anti-realism wins by default? Such a verdict 
seems to me to be excessively harsh. Perhaps in discourses about mathematics or 
modality, where we it is difficult to see how we could even stand in the right kind of 
relations underwriting such a sensitivity, appeal to intuitional. epistemology carries a 
heavy burden of proof. But in the case of e. g. sensitivity to one's context, or the 
intentions of others, or the tacitly recognized demands of linguistic convention, or the 
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contents of one's imaginings, 211 it seems an unfairly strong constraint on the realist that 
a full epistemology is to be provided. Surely, we might think, we can begin to 
understand how a causal sensitivity to contextual factors might exist, even if we are 
unable to give a theoretical account of it. If that's right, then the lesson of theTailure of 
Wright's suggested forced-march is unclear. 
Wright does give us more general guidance on when appeal to intuitionism is 
permissible; 
We ought not to associate a special faculty with a particular region of discourse, a 
faculty, that is, apt for the production of non-inferentially justified beliefs essentially 
involving its distinctive vocabulary, unless the best explanation of our practice of the 
discourse, and especially the phenomenon of non-collusive assent about opinions 
expressed therein, has to invoke the idea that such a faculty is at work. 212 
The problem here, as so often, is to see how such a principle can properly serve to 
constrain debates about realist standing. For one important contributory factor to an 
explanation's good standing is its coherence with prior probability and other theoretical 
commitments. Somebody who, like Nogales, Stern, or Yablo, simply finds it 
overwhelming pre-theoretically plausible that metaphors typically express propositions, 
is unlikely to accept any theory as 'best' that doesn't deliver that result. 213 If the only 
way to secure such a result is to appeal to a broadly intuitional epistemology, based on 
e. g. an under-specified causal sensitivity to contextual factors, then that appeal will be 
211 1 do not mean to suggest that the kind of ersatz account of metaphorical meaning sketched in the last 
chapter is a realist account. Být it is an interesting question whether every disagreement about the ersatz 
meaning of a metaphor must depend on some cognitive disagreement. It might, if e. g. the only apt act of 
imaginative insight is that originally engaged in, or intended, by the maker of the metaphor. I attempt to 
make such an account slightly less implausible than it would otherwise be later in this chapter. On the 
other hand, if a plurality of apt such construals are available, some sort of relativism about metaphorical 
meaning might be defended. I cannot pursue these matters here, except to note that decisions relating to 
the logic of the 'according to' operator will play a large role in this case, as in that of more straightforward 
fictionalisms. 
212 Wright (1992) p. 152 
213 Stern (2000), Yablo (1998), Nogales (1999). 1 pick these theorists merelY for illustrative purposes; 
many other philosophers and linguists share their intuitions. 
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made. Again, if we had it written into our methodology that the anti-realist position 
wins by default, the spectre of a dialectical stand-off need not be particularly worrisome. 
But I have distanced myself from such a position on a number of occasions now. 
The difficulty of establishing a neutral framework for the resolution of divergent 
intuitions about cognitive standing, then is the first of the broad issues that I wanted to 
deal with. This difficulty might lead us to look not for general constraints, but on local 
argumentation, to resolve the question. The second issue I will discuss in this context 
concerns the potential of one seemingly promising such attempt. 
4.5 Metaphor and Cognitive Command 2 
In recent work, Robert Hopkins has developed and defended Kant's claim that aesthetic 
judgements are autonomous, in a sense that I will describe below. 214 He argues that a 
straightforward line of argument seems to show that a discourse that mainly comprises 
such autonomous judgements cannot display Cognitive Command. Since it also seems 
defensible to ascribe autonomy to ascriptions of metaphorical meaning, it might seem 
that Hopkins argument provides a more direct and effective route to settling their 
cognitive status than Wright's 'forced march' approach. I will set out the suggested 
argument below, and go on to argue that while interesting, it does not provide an 
obviously new route to determining whether discourse about m-meaning is cognitive in 
the relevant sense. 
In introducing the notion of autonomy, Hopkins compares aesthetic and colour 
judgements. Imagine that you are looking at a surface that you judge is blue, on the 
basis that it looks phenomenally blue to you. Now imagine that some larger group of 
people, whom you have no reason to believe are in any worse a position to judge the 
colour of an object on the basis of the way it looks, and whom are apparently careful and 
sincere, dissent from yourjudgement. Let's say that they insist that the surface is clearly 
red. What is it rational for you to do? Intuitively, you ought to withdraw your 
214 See Hopkins (2000) and, especially, Hopkins (2001) 
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judgement. Even in the case where the surface genuinely is blue, and yourjudgement 
had previously amounted to knowledge, it seems that the presence of so much apparently 
informed disagreement acts as an epistemic defeater. 
What might be underwriting such an epistemic defeat? Hopkins suggests, plausibly 
enough, that it may have something to do with the faU that colour judgements are 
cognitive in something like the following sense; 
Cognitive: Cognitive judgements are genuinely representational judgements. In 
particular, (i) it seems a priori that when two subjects make contradictory 
cognitive judgements, the warrant for the judgement of at least one can be 
rationally criticised and (ii) if two subjects make contradictory cognitive 
judgements, prescinding from vagueness, etc, exactly one of them must 
be correct. 215 
Given such a characteristic feature of colour discourse, it seems that the following line 
of thought - thefault-allocating argument - is open to a rational subject who finds 
herself in the above situation: 
1) 1 and my opponents disagree about whether the surface is blue. 
2) One of us is at fault 
3) They outnumber me, in general I and they are equally competent in matters of this 
sort, and we've all tried to access the facts in the same way. 
4) So it is likely that I am fault. 
5) So it is likely that the surface is not blue, as my opponent says. 
The first and third premises simply reflect the situation as described, while the second 
reflects the apparently cognitive status of colour judgements. Hopkins thus holds that 
commitment to Cognitive's application to colour, plus the supposition that the two 
parties are of equal competence but different size, suffices to secure the transition from 
2 15 Hopkins explicitly draws on Wright's work on Cognitive Command in his discussion here. I hope the 
analogy is obvious. 
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(1)-(5). The availability of such a pattern of reasoning is what explains the fact that I 
ought, rationally, to withdraw my intuitive colour judgement in such circumstances. 
Hopkins contrasts that example with the case of beauty. In this case, he argues, it is 
intuitively not always rational to withdraw one's judgement in the light of disagreement. 
If you find, say, a piece of music very beautiful, you may be surprised and baffled to 
find that those who you had previously taken to reliably agree with your considered 
aesthetic judgements now disagree. You may return to the music, asking them for 
reasons to support their judgements. But if your disagreement persists through these 
procedures, it is far less clear than it is in the colour example that you are rationally 
compelled to withdraw your judgement, although perhaps you should place less 
confidence in it. Thus, Hopkins takes judgements of beauty to be autonomous in the 
following sense; 
Autonomy: When one party finds herself disagreeing with (several) others who share 
a view then; 
(a) for ordinary empirical matters this is sometimes reason enough for 
her to adopt their view, but 
(i) this happens much more rarely in the case of beauty, and 
(ii) the opposing view does not act as a defeater to my judgement to the saine 
extent as it does in the empirical case. 
Instead 
(b) she should place less confidence in her view; and 
(c) she should, if possible, test the issue by re-examining the disputed item. 
Now, imagine that judgements of beauty were cognitive. In that case, it would seem, we 
ought to be able to run through exactly the same kind offault-allocating argument as 
we could in the colour case. That argument would move from the stipulated fact of my 
disagreeing with a greater number, as apparently well-placed as 1, together with 
observation that, by Cognitive, one of us must be at fault, to the conclusion that it is 
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likely that I am that the one in the wrong. But the availability of that transition seems to 
be in irrevocable tension with Autonomy. So it seems that we are forced to give up 
either the idea that aesthetic judgements of this kind are cognitive, or that they are 
autonomous. We seem to have some kind of test for genuine cognitive character. 
What about the case of metaphorical meaning? Consider the famous conclusion of 
Fitzgerald's The Gi-eat Gatsby 
And as I sat there brooding on the old, unknown world, I thought of Gatsby's wonder 
when he first picked out the green light at the end of Daisy's dock. He had come a long 
way to this blue lawn, and his dream must have seemed so close that lie could hardly fail 
to grasp it. He did not know that it was already behind him, somewhere back in that vast 
obscurity beyond the city, where the dark fields of the republic rolled on under the night. 
Gatsby believed in the green light, the orgiastic future that year by year recedes before 
us. It eluded us then, but that's no matter - tomorrow we will run faster, stretch out our 
arms further ... And one 
fine morning - 
So we beat on, boats against the current, carried back ceaselessly into the past. 
Imagine I interpret the final line along the following lines: our individual projects and 
concerns, that imbue our lives with meaning, involve a constant, pointless struggle to 
achie ve an impossible objective that is both determined and frustrated by the 
contingencies of our past histories, personal and social. And imagine that friends or 
critics that I respect agree on interpreting the line rather differently: the mention of 
boats alludes back to the 'Dutch sailors' mentioned a few paragraphs earlier, who first 
gaze on the "fresh, green breast of the new world", that had "pandered in whispers to the 
last and greatest of all human dreams". The line expresses, according to them, a 
fundamentally American theme; the inevitable corruption of the seemingly new world 
by European decadence, symbolized by capitalism, consumerism and elitism. I see the 
line as making a universal claim about what it is to be human, they see it as making a 
claim about what it is to live in a certain kind of American society. 
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Surprised by their disagreement, I re-draw their attention to the phrase 'the last and 
greatest of all human dreams', and to the recalled advice of Nick Carraway's father, 
which opens the novel. 216 They respond by reminding me in turn of the role that the 
contrast between the cosmopolitan East and the moral Midwest plays in the novel, and 
point to the thematic significance of Oxford education and World War I, not to mention 
that stock Modernist image of corrupt European capitalism, the cigar smoking, thick- 
tongued, bulbous-fingered, Jewish gangster Meyer Wolfsheim, of 'The Swastika 
Holding Company', fixer of the World Series. Imagine that things go on like this, 
without an obvious resolution of the issue. 217 Do the mere facts that I have no reason to 
think that they are insincere or limited in capacity, and that they are numerically 
superior, give me good grounds to think it is I who am in the wrong? It is surely at least 
defensible to hold that they do not, and that judgements of metaphorical meaning are 
autonomous. It is quite normal for us to feel that metaphors are precisely open to 
interpi-etation in a way that literal language is not. 218 It is in any case interesting to 
explore the question of whether establishment of such autonomy would provide the anti- 
realist about metaphor with a telling argument against treating judgements of m-meaning 
as subject to (Cognitive Command). 
Given the worries about a stand-off I raised earlier, in the context of Wright's 'forced- 
march' argument, it would be reassuring to be able to identify some such focus of 
discussion. Nevertheless, I intend to argue that it is not obvious that there is an 
inconsistency in holding that judgements are both autonomous and cognitive. The fault- 
allocating argument niay be valid. But it seems that there are enough apparently 
cognitive discourses where something like autonomy seems permissible, for us to be 
justifiably concerned about whether it genuinely can be relied upon. 
216 "Whenever you feel like criticizing anyone, ' he told me, 'just remember that all the people in this world 
haven't had the advantages you've had'. 
217 Assume for convenience of example that neither of us is convinced by the other party's positive case. 
Agreed multiple 'meanings' of metaphors raise interesting issues, but they are distinct from my concerns 
here. 
21 8 Again, any fully satisfactory Davidsonian semantics for "fictional' metaphorical meanings would have 
to make a decision about how to account for these. One would be to supervaluate on acceptable 
interpretations. Another would be to use a non-standard logic, that allowed for inconsistent claims to be 
held true of the same utterance. Another would be to relativize metaphorical ly-means* to interpretations. 
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To see why, we can begin by noting that it isn't quite right to suggest that granting 
premises (1)-(3) of the fault-locating argument immediately secures the transition to (4). 
Imagine that aesthetic judgements are robustly true or false, but in a way that completely 
escapes our epistemic powers. Then the mere fact of their being cognitive in the above 
sense, together with my being at a numerical disadvantage, in no way warrants the move 
from (3) to (4). (If an unseen ball is either red or blue, then a hundred people guessing 
blue in no way makes it more likely that it is blue! ). We can see that when a certain kind 
of epistemic drcnv is secured - in this case, a nil-nil draw - Autonomy is not threatened 
by the mere fact of the discourse being cognitive. Endorsing Autonomy is fine, for all 
Hopkins has shown, as long as the move from (3) to (4) can be resisted. 219 
Let's say we attempt to remedy this by appealing to an earlier commitment to epistemic 
transparency: 
(Epistemic Access) If a metaphor m-means that P, then (in somewhat idealized 
conditions) we can get some warrant for believing that it m-means 
that P. 
This principle is, of course, independently plausible, at least on standard construals of 
metaphorical meaning, so a defender of Hopkins' line ought to be able to take it for 
granted. However, it's not clear that adding this as a premise will always help. 
Consider an analogy. Scientific judgements are often warranted via standard scientific 
enquiry. Now, imagine that I am a scientist who believes that there is intelligent 
humanoid life on other planets, and that a significant number of my friends and 
colleagues, on the basis of similar evidence and methodology, disagree with me. Does 
such disagreement give me grounds to conclude that it is likely that I am at fault, and 
ought to adopt their view? Not at all. For a start, I may have a different subjective 
probability set than they. Since the shared scientific methodology includes the 
commitment to favour theories that are e. g. simple, elegant and coherent with prior 
probabilities, it doesn't seem obvious that I ought simply to adopt my opponent's view, 
219 Of course, in the case where the facts are unknowable, clauses (b) and (c) of Autonomy will be 
independently implausible. But that hardly distracts from the point. 
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or even to become agnostic. In this case, it seems perfectly defensible to maintain my 
existing belief, despite the paradigmatically cognitive nature of scientific discourse. 220 
Mere disagreement does not warrant me in revising my judgement. 
Perhaps then, we ought to bracket differences that merely result from such subjective, 
non-cognitive differences: 
(Epistemic Access*) If a metaphor m-means that P, then (in somewhat idealized 
conditions) we can get some warrant for believing that it m-means 
that P, and such warrant does not rely even in part on subjective, 
non-cognitive differences. 
But the issue is delicate. In the first place, it is not clear whether the capacity to undergo 
certain kinds of creative imaginings, of the type that seems important for thinking of one 
thing as another, is relevantly non-cognitive. Surely, however, no account of 
metaphorical meaning will want to risk cutting it off from some fundamental notion of 
'thinking-as'. In the second place, it isn't wholly clear that it is irrational for me to 
persist in my judgement in the scientific case even if e. g. our prior probabilities are 
similar. It seems at least conceivable that I may simply come to a different view to you 
on the basis of similar evidence, and yet be rationally warranted in maintaining it in the 
face of opposition, simply because the case is one where we have so little evidence 
either way. Such a position certainly seems true of e. g. philosophical practice. Timothy 
Williamson is an epistemicist about vagueness, while many of his professional 
colleagues are not. Neither need be ignorant of any relevant a priol-i consideration, and 
may well start off their investigations with similar degrees of intuitive attachment to 
certain principles. But it's extrem ely uncomfortable to think that the merefact ofsuch 
disagreement acts as a defeater for Williamson's philosophical beliefs. And it's equally 
uncomfortable to think that e. g. philosophy of language, or metaphysics is not cognitive 
220 Of course, one might respond to the fact that subjective probabilities play a role in scientific 
methodology by becoming an anti-realist about science. My concern with this move is that it tends to 
impose a global anti-realism, whereas the most interesting forms of anti-realism seem contrastive with 
6genuine matters of fact'. 
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in the above sense, or depends ultimately on non-cognitive preferences . 
22 1 So it seems 
that, even in the presence of (Epistemic Access*), the transition from (1)-3) to (4) is 
more complicated than Hopkins seems to suggest. 
Consider one final example. I am playing poker, and have been lucky enough to 
improve on the draw to the highest hand, a royal flush. Various parties are observing the 
game, including each player's hand, and making side-bets on the eventual outcome. To 
my surprise, they don't bet heavily on me, but instead start backing my opponents. I 
have no reason to believe that their perceptual equipment, etc, is any better or worse than 
mine, nor that they are engaged in any great conspiracy or subtle strategy. I check again 
with my co-players what the rules are, and have my prior beliefs apparently confin-ned. 
Is it rational for me to fold? After all, my belief that I have the best hand relies 
ultimately on causal sensitivities employed in perception, memory and elementary 
computation, just as in the colour case. But somehow I don't feel that I would fold in 
such a situation, nor that there is any great rational pressure on me to do so. The case 
would seem strange to me, but not one in which it would not seem obvious to me that I 
am at fault. So the matter seems autonomous, but also, surely cognitive. 
The issue is clearly a difficult one, but I suggest that the valid instances of the fault- 
allocating arguments offered by Hopkins are really enthymematic, implicitly relying on 
like the following premise; 
1) 1 and my opponents disagree about whether the surface is blue. 
2) One of us is at fault 
3) They outnumber me, in general I and they are equally competent in matters of this 
sort, and we've all tried to access the facts in the same way. 
4) The best explanation of the disagreement in this scenario is that I am at fault. 
5) So it is likely that- I am fault. 
6) So it is likely that the surface is not blue, as my opponent says. 
22 1 Apart from anything else, such a view threatens the kind of 'globalizing' argument canvassed in 
Section 1.10. 
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Our new premise is made probable by (1)-(3) in e. g. the colour case, and provides a 
suitable abductive link to (5). It fails in e. g. the case where no evidence at all is 
forthcoming, and the scientific case, just as we would intuitively predict. (Similarly, the 
fact that philosophy is very difficult, and poker-type cases very rare and weird, seem to 
provide competing explanations of divergence, blocking the move to (4) in those cases). 
But its inclusion somewhat diminishes the interest of Hopkins' argument for the 
question of whether discourse about m-meaning is cognitive. For the original promise of 
the argument related to its ability to circumvent a frustrating realist/anti-realist stand-off 
regarding best explanation. It is now far less clear whether a genuinely new route for. 
profitable debate has really been identified. 
4.6 Metaphor and Intention 
So far this chapter, I have (i) provisionally concluded that even the realist ought to grant 
that talk about metaphorically meanings is episternically constrained, and (ii) expressed 
some methodological worries about the application of Cognitive Command, or some 
improved descendent thereof, for settling questions of the cognitive status of such 
judgements. I now want to turn to the last of Wright's tests for realism that I will 
discuss here, the Order-of-Determination test. 222 1 will approach this issue somewhat 
indirectly in this section, via an examination of the relationship that intention stands to 
metaphorical meaning. I will then conclude my discussion of Order-of-Determination 
in Section 4.7. 
Intention plainly has soniething to do with metaphor. We can choose to make a 
metaphor, and intend our utterance to be taken as such. We have a certain authority with 
respect to our utterances; we are entitled in many circumstances, to treat lack of respect 
for a prior intention as a cognitive failing. You've misunderstood me, we might say, I 
wasn't speaking literally, or I didn't intend that aspect of the metaphor to be emphasised. 
Admittedly, this need not be, and in all probability isn't always the case. When speaking 
222 As I noted in Chapter 1, Wright's other test, Width of Cosmological Role seems unlikely to be passed 
by metaphorical contents. However, I will suggest in the next chapter that the contents of some metaphors 
may play a role which isn't always mediated by the attitudes of concept users, thus defending a wider 
cosmological role for them than might have been expected. 
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to a psychoanalyst, or writing a novel, for example, one might implicitly or explicitly 
renounce a certain degree of authority over the interpretation of one's metaphors, along 
with some of one's literal utterances. Moreover, there might be many other types of 
cases where speakers happily allow their metaphorical utterance to be extended in a way 
that is new or surprising to them. We should not let consideration of these cases blur an 
important distinction, however. To take a somewhat analogous case, there is a big 
difference between being happy with a way a witty remark is picked up and elaborated 
upon, and claiming the embellishments as one's own.. We need an. account of the role of 
intention that allows us to make just this kind of distinction in the case of metaphorical 
utterance. 
This is important both for the type of Davidsonian position that I have outlined and 
defended in earlier chapters, and for the most plausible realist positions. Everybody 
ought to grant that metaphor's effects, whether or not they are taken to involve the 
expression of propositional contents, are highly context dependent. But our best models 
of context represent them as highly sensitive to conversational purposes and goals, local 
and general. 223 Since these in turn are likely to depend on the aims and intentions of 
conversational participants, a satisfactory account of the metaphor and intention is 
desirable for all concerned. For the Davidsonian, such a theory will be important in (a) 
the cases where the speaker-intention model is appropriate and (b) developing the kind 
of pseudo-fictionalist semantics seemingly necessary for avoiding the Frege-Geach 
problem. For realists who hold the default, speaker-meaning view, the need for a 
plausible account of intention and metaphor will be inescapable, while for their strongest 
rivals, contextualists, the need to tell a story about what a context is should provide 
suitable motivation. 
On the other hand, there might seem to be a problem in reconciling this consideration 
with the peculiarly open-ended quality of metaphor. Many commentators, for example, 
have felt dissatisfied with a straightforward "speaker's meaning" account of metaphor, 
which in its crudest form holds that: 
223 1 say more about the nature of context in Chapter 5. 
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(1) S's metaphorical utterance M means that P iff S intends M to convey that p. 224 
Such an account is clearly so over-simplistic as to allow straightforward disqualification 
as a serious theory of metaphorical meaning; the spiralling complexities of speech act 
theory have taught us that. Yet we might be sceptical of the prospects for any such 
account, however hedged and qualified, and not only for this crude precursor. Surely, 
we might want to say, this whole approach to metaphor is in danger ofjust 
misrepresenting the phenomenology of metaphorical utterance. We don't typically have 
a distinct content 'in mind', as it were, that we then express via the use of metaphor. 
Indeed, if we did, it would seem to render the motivation behind metaphorical utterance 
a little mysterious. If you intend to say that P, then why not just say it? We seem to be 
close to a view of metaphor that characterises it merely as amusing embellishment, or 
useful shorthand. And such a view has often been felt to be philosophically and 
phenomenologically unsatisfying. Of course, one response to this worry would be to 
deny that we have any privileged access to the content of our own intentions, to hold that 
we can have at best inductive evidence, resulting from a process of self-interpretation, 
for what we intend and mean, even in the most everyday cases. But this move, in turn, 
makes a mystery of the very authority we grant to speakers, which originally counted in 
favour of the speaker-intention model. We need a theory of metaphor that allows us to 
be faithful to the phenomenology of metaphor making, while also delivering a satisfying 
account of how we interact with metaphor makers. It may seem, however, that no 
speaker-meaning theory can deliver both desiderata. 
David Cooper has objected to the speaker's meaning view of metaphor along related, if 
not strictly analogous, lines. 225 His objection contends that such a view cannot account 
for the indeterminacy of metaphorical content. A metaphor is indeterminate in Cooper's 
sense iff it admits of more than one interpretation, none of which can be demonstrated as 
uniquely correct. Cooper holds that any successful account of metaphor must give us a 
story about metaphorical indeterminacy. . 
224 See Searle (1993) for one of the first accounts of this kind. 
225 Cooper (1986) pp. 71-77. Cooper characterises the speaker's intention model of metaphor as the 
'standard view'. 
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It is clear that Cooper's characterisation is unsatisfactory as it stands - it lets in cases 
where all interpretations are clearly incorrect, for example. 226 Rather than try to offer an 
improved version, however, I intend to take it merely as gesturing at some important 
aspects of our normal thought about metaphor: namely, that metaphor is apt for 
competing, independently satisfying interpretations of which there is seemingly no a 
priori guarantee, in the general case, that we wi 11 have reason to adopt one rather than 
another. The relation between this thought and our sense that attribution of meaning to 
metaphor is apparently autonoinous, and that what metaphor leads us to is in some sense 
linfitless, are, I hope, fairly obvious. 227 
Cooper considers three possible ways in which the speaker-intention model could try to 
account for such indeterminacy. Firstly, the indeterminacy might be caused by our 
ignorance of what exactly it is that the speaker intended. Secondly, the speaker's 
intention might be somehow 'open-ended' or indeterminate. Cooper characterises this 
option, following Searle, as implying that when S utters some metaphor of the form 'A 
is B', he intends to mean or implicate a range of meanings; A is C1 and/or A is C2, C3 
etc. Finally, we might take the indeterminacy to be a feature related to the fact that 
different possible speakers could use the same sentence to convey different contents. 
Cooper rejects all three of these proposed accounts. 
Cooper has a number of objections to the first proposal: 
226 There are lots of other worries that could be raised against the definition. If Quine and Davidson are 
right about the indeterminacy of translation, then all metaphors will count as trivially indeterminate, for 
example. 
227 1 do not intend to suggest that relations of simple entailment are involved here. Clearly, a metaphor 
could be indeterminate in Cooper's sense, and yet admit of a competing series of quite determinate and 
limited paraphrases. I take Cooper to be guided in part by the intuition that metaphor is limitless both 
horizontally and vertically as it were; that any one interpretation is 'open-ended', and that rival 
interpretations can be equally defensible. His definition of indeterminacy makes it seem as if it is the 
latter that is at issue, but the second of his suggested replies on behalf of the speaker-meaning theorist 
suggests that he is just as concerned with the former. The relevant notion of open-endedness is multi- 
dimensional and plural. I say some more to help disambiguate it slightly in Section 4.7, and in the next 
chapter. 
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(MI) A metaphorical content M is indeterminate iff we are ignorant of what an actual 
speaker S intended to convey by his corresponding metaphorical utterance P. 
He first considers the case were we have no knowledge of S at all, and concludes that 
this case collapses into a special case of the third proposal (M3, see below); with the 
indeterminacy being caused by the speculation about what different possible speakers 
might have meant. He then argues that even if we do know quite a lot about the identity 
and context of S, a limited amount of ignorance about his environment can still leave us 
completely in the dark about S's intention. He cites solely literary cases 
In learning about writers such as Rimbaud, Mallarm6, Marinetti and Ezra Pound, one 
soon learns that speculation as to what they intended to communicate by individual 
metaphors is pointless - in the dual sense of being a waste of time and beside the point. 
But this does not mean that it is pointless to try and interpret the metaphors, nor that any 
old interpretation will do. 228 
Having argued that the interpretation of metaphor can be relatively determinate even 
"Aen we know little about the speaker's intentions, Cooper goes on to argue the 
converse; that we can be sure of what the speaker's intentions were without determining 
the metaphorical content. 
The speaker, poet or painter does not have exclusive rights to interpretation - and even if 
he did his interpretation would not have to mimic his intention at the time of 
composition. 229 
So, he concludes, ignorance of an actual speaker's intention is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for a metaphor tq have an indeterminate content. 
If the point here is solely that we can come up with satisfying interpretations of 
apparently metaphorical utterances that mention little about the actual speaker, then the 
point is well taken. But that is surely not what should be at issue here. We should be 
careful not to conftise the idea that we can interpret what a person knowingly said in 
228 Cooper, (1986) p. 72 
229 Cooper (1986) p. 73 
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making an utterance with the idea that we can interpret the sentence he uttered in a way 
that satisfies us in some respect. The whole idea of something being an unintentional 
double entendre, for example, relies on there being a gap between what a speaker 
actually said and the possibility of construing it in a satisfying way. We should similarly 
admit the existence of non-intentional metaphors - in the sense of sentences or 
utterances that ive can intelligibly or usefully treat as if they were metaphors - which we 
can generate and interpret for particular purposes. Perhaps Burroughs' technique of 
cutting up newspapers and randomly assorting often suggestive sentences would be a 
clear- example of how we can intentionally bring about such non-intentional metaphors. 
Nobody should claim that only intentional utterances can be interpreted as if they were 
metaphors, just as nobody should suggest that only intentional jokes - or joke shaped 
utterances - are funny. But this should not lead us to play down the role of intention in 
the practice ofjoke telling, nor in metaphor. 
In addition, we must be careftil not to assume that we can give a unified account of how 
we should best interpret metaphors, no matter in what context they may arise. The cases 
Cooper cites, involving Modernist literary writers, may well demand a different 
treatment than the everyday case, but this is not to say that we haven't identified an 
important feature of the everyday case when we link metaphor to an intended use of a 
sentence. 
Let us assume, in the interests of charity, that Cooper's target is only the 'naYve' intention 
theorist, who thinks that MI says all that needs to be said about metaphoric 
indeterminacy. His arguments against naYve intentionalism then seem cogent; 
metaphoric determinacy and actual speaker intention can come apart. What about the 
second idea then, namely; 
(M2) A metaphorical content M is indeterminate iff the speaker's intention is open 
ended. 
Cooper admits that a speaker can, on occasion, intend for a metaphor to be taken in 
'several ways at the same time'. 230 Perhaps when I say "John is a real giant among men", 
"' Cooper (1986) p. 74 
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I can intend that his mother will think that I am praising him, while knowing that you 
will really know that I am drawing attention to his weight problem. But, Cooper argues, 
this is not happily characterised as intending to mean CI or C2 by P, but rather CI and 
C2. Moreover, it cannot suffice for a metaphor to be indeterminate that the relevant 
intended meaning be vague, since that would suggest not incommensurate 
interpretations but a single one that 'matches the speaker's intention in vagueness'. 231 
Nor can S intend merely to try out a striking sounding sentence, for that would render 
the relevant speaker's meaning non-existent, not open-ended. 
Cooper claims that there is only one kind of case that 
might happily be described as one of'speaker's open ended meaningý. This is where the 
proposition meant by the speaker is of the open-ended form'P or Q or [But] To say 
that a speaker might have meant P or might have meant Q, is not equivalent to saying 
that he meant a disjunctive proposition P or Q or ... 
232 
Cooper rightly points out that whereas we might be happy to say of a notoriously ironic 
friend that we often don't know whether he is saying P or saying not-P, we never take 
him to be uttering the tautology P or not-P. 
All these arguments, I would suggest, are fine as far as they go. But Cooper is wrong, I 
think, to take the best construal of M2 as involving vagueness or disjunction. In the 
latter half of this essay, I want to outline what I take to be a better picture of how 
intention and indetenninacy are related. 
We can deal briefly with 
(M3) A metaphorical content M is indeterminate iff different possible speakers could 
mean different things by the corresponding utterance P. 
This is untenable, and Cooper rightly demolishes it. Firstly, there are just too many 
possible speakers. We have to narrow them down to the'most reasonable ones', and 
231 Cooper (1986) p. 75 
232 Cooper (1986) p. 75 
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Cooper argues, we can do so precisely because we have a prior idea of what counts as a 
reasonable interpretation of the metaphor. Our grasp of the metaphoric content 
determines the relevant possible speakers, and not vice versa. I am slightly sceptical 
about the general effectiveness of this response to more plausible modifications of (W), 
but do not intend to take issue with it here. 
Instead, let's go back to the problem that we started out with. There is a tension between 
two ways we might want to think about metaphor. On the one hand, we are pulled in the 
direction of saying that the speaker's intention must in some sense constrain acceptable 
interpretation of metaphor. After all, how else are we to explain the common sense idea 
that the speaker has often selected a particular metaphor, that she has reasons for using 
the expression that she does, etc? On the other hand, there is definite substance to the 
intuition that lies behind Cooper's objection. The idea that in metaphorical utterance we 
have a definite and pre-existing content to convey, that the problem of selecting a 
metaphor is one of how best to dress up such a content in borrowed clothes, seems to 
completely misrepresent the phenomenology of what we do. Typically metaphors spring 
to mind with a rather vague feeling of aptness. We can often struggle to express or even 
elucidate in literal language what we meant by a metaphor. Yet typically we can 
recognise interpretations of a metaphor as being in or out of accord with the way we 
meant them to be understood. We ought not to envisage ourselves as throwing 
metaphors out into the world, semi-randomly as it were, to fare as they happen to be 
taken up and elaborated on, whether by ourselves or others. 
But similarly, it seems difficult to see how, after the metaphor has been correctly and 
fully interpreted, taken in the ivay ive ineant it, we could have had a prior intention to 
mean or implicate all of that. Spelling out the intended effects of a metaphor, even in 
the case where one has produced it oneself, can be a long and tortuous process. 
Plausible interpretations that are out of accord with one's intent need to be set aside; 
good suggestions about how to convey in literal terms what one was getting at need to be 
enthusiastically adopted, even when the idea of putting things that way would never 
have sprung to one's mind in a million years. The problem - or at least, one important 
problem - is to see how any half-way motivated theory of speaker intention can account 
for first-person authority over metaphor, while not surrendering the datum that one 
rarely has some clearly delimited proposition in mind at the time when the metaphor is 
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made. And if my earlier discussion is correct, that seems to be a problem for realists and 
error theorists alike. 
4.7 Metaphor and Order-of-Determination 
I think we should see this tension as an instance of a more general issue about intentional 
states, discussed by Crispin Wright in a number of papers 233 and usefully summarised by 
Jim Edwards: 
The problem is to reconcile the first person epistemology of such intentional states, the 
fact that we normally take a person's sincere avowals of his own intentional states to be 
authoritative, with the fact that an intentional state may also 'have to answer to' future 
behaviour, behaviour which the subject need not 'have had in mind' when he made the 
avowal. 234 
In the case of metaphor, the intentional state in question is what the speaker intended to 
mean by the metaphor. The future behaviour is the responses and judgements made by 
the speaker concerning which interpretations and extensions of the metaphor are in 
accord with his original intention. Wright's attempted resolution of the problem 
involves taking the speaker's considered belief about what he intended to mean to 
constitute the facts about what he meant, rather than seeing them as tracking an 
independent fact of the matter. What I intend by a metaphor can be open-ended 
precisely because for any given interpretation, extension or development of the 
metaphor, there is not an independently determined, pre-existing fact about whether it 
accords with my intention. 
Before we go on to consider the particular case of metaphor, let's remind ourselves 
Wright's general account is structured, since we have covered quite a lot of ground since 
my discussion in Chapter 1. He is interested in different ways of interpreting what he 
calls 'Provisional Equations', which take the following general form 
233 See, for example, Wright (1987), (1989a), (1989b), (1989c). and (1992). 
234 Edwards (1992), p. 21. 
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(PE) For a set of optimal conditions C, a state of affairs P, and a subject S: 
If C holds, then (it would be the case that P iffS wouldjudge that P). 
There are two contrasting ways, Wright thinks, that we could understand the case where 
a given provisional equation holds for a particular C, P and S. We could understand the 
C-cond itions as being such as to allow S to successfully track an independently 
obtaining fact that P. That is, we could understand the biconditional as indicating that S 
judges that P because P is the case, and S is infallibly good at tracking that fact in those 
conditions. Call this the extension-reflecting sense. . 
On the other hand, we could understand the biconditional as indicating that it is S's best 
opinion that constitutes the fact that P. In this case, we understand it as telling us that for 
P to be the case consists in nothing more than that subjects like S judge that P in C- 
conditions. In this sense, Macts would be metaphysically dependent on certain 
tendencies of human response. Call this the extension-deterniining sense. 235 
We are to determine which way the Provisional Equation should be read by checking 
whether (1) the C-conditions have been specified substantially, not by means of a 
'whatever it takes' ceterisparibus clause (2) the equation holds true a priori. (3) 
whether the C-conditions are satisfied must be logically independent of facts about P and 
(4) that there is no better explanation of why the first three conditions are satisfied than 
the claim that S's best judgements constitute the fact that p. 236 If the result of all four of 
these checks is positive, then the relevant instance of PE is to be read in the extension 
determining sense. If not, it is to be taken as extension-reflecting. 
How might such an account look with respect to first person self-ascriptions of 
intention? Consider the Provisional Equation for Intention (PEI) for any subject S and 
content P 
23' As I noted in Chapter 1, since the PE only tells us about what is happening in optimal conditions, 
Wright normally describes our optimal judgement of whether P as at best partially determining the facts 
about P. I continue to ignore this distinction here. 
236 Wright's motivation for these constraints is explored in more detail in Section 1.7 
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(PEI) If conditions C hold then (S believes that S intends that P iff S intends that 
P). 237 
Wright argues that in suitable conditions a subject's judgements about his own intentions 
constitute the fact that he has such and such intention. It is not at best a contingent 
matter whether or not we have access to our own intentions, he thinks. Rather, it is 
precisely the fact that our best opinion determines whether or not we have a particular 
intention that explains why we are 'effortlessly, non-inferentially and generally reliable 
about [our own] psychological states. ' 238 
Of course, it is possible for us to be self-deceived about our own states of mind. 
Moreover, there seems to be no straightforward way of ruling out such self-deception in 
formulating the C-conditions in PEI without running into trouble with the substantiality 
condition. Nevertheless, Wright plausibly argues, the 'grammarof intention is such that 
we are a priori entitled to presume that we are not deceived, unless we have actual 
evidence to the contrary. That is, although we cannot include a'no self-deception' clause 
in the optimality conditions and still fulfil the substantiality condition, we can still be a 
priori justified in holding that any given instance of PEI is true. 239 
Such justification is a priori but defeasible, since evidence that S was in fact self- 
deceived would remove it. Wright's claim, therefore, is that the fact that PEI is apriori 
justified is, in the absence of a better explanation, enough to show that our best opinions 
about our own intentions are extension-determining rather than extension reflecting. 
240 
Since it is our best judgements about what we intend or intended that constitute the facts 
about our intentions, we can reconcile the idea that we have a definite authority with 
respect to our own intentions with the fact that there need be no propositional content 
237 Statistically standard health, statistically standard external conditions, possession of relevant concepts, 
judging after a period of careful reflection, etc 
238 Wright (1989b) p. 289.1 have drawn here on the useful outline of Wright's position given in Edwards 
(1992) 
239 That is, we are not a priorijustified in holding that the universal closures are true, but we are in holding 
that any given instances are. 
240 For a defence of the move from apriori truth to a priori justification see Divers and Miller (1994) 
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that we need have 'in mind, in the sense of being able to spontaneously or even 
reflectively identify. at the time of making a metaphor. 2- 41 
We now have the resources to make the case that in making a metaphor, the speaker's 
intention concerning how it should be understood can be essentially 'open-ended'. The 
suggested reply is that intentions concerning the communication of a metaphorical 
content are merely a special case of intending in general. In the c orrect conditions, my 
judgements about my own intentions are, as Wright has plausibly argued, constitutively 
linked to the facts about what those intentions are. It's simply difficult to make sense of 
a genuine intention that could 'float free' of our sincere, undeceived self-ascriptions. 242 
So there is apparently no need for the intention theorist to have to make the case that in 
intending to authoritatively convey a propositional content P by uttering a metaphor M, a 
speaker S must somehow have had the resources to specify or delimit P available to him 
when intending to utter M metaphorically. It may be a perfectly acceptable picture to 
conceive our access to the facts about what S intended by a particular metaphor as 
I primarily relating to when, under optimal conditions, he would judge that a particular 
interpretation is in accord with what he intended. 
Cooper originally defined a metaphor as being indeterminate just in case it admitted of 
more than one interpretation, none of which can be demonstrated as uniquely correct. 
We have seen that we must distinguish the idea that there can be satisfying and 
productive interpretations of 'non-intentional metaphors' from the notion that a speaker's 
utterance has a metaphorical content that admits of more than one interpretation. So 
Cooper requires a narrower definition of what indeterminacy consists in. What I want to 
argue is that the intuition that metaphors are in some sense indeterminate because a 
241 1 have concentrated on the case of intention, but it seems highly likely that a similar account could be 
devised for our first person authority over the nature of our imaginings. Experiential imagination is a 
puzzling case, however. In the case of intention, we generally do not 'check back', phenomenologically, 
with the content of our thought. In the case of imagination, we often have the sense that we do. Imagine a 
metal fork lying in clear light on a white tablecloth. Do your best to visualize it. Now, are the prongs 
pointing up or down? There's a definite sense of checking back against a prior image, in the way that we 
might redirect perceptual attention to one aspect of a perceived scene. But it is clear our epistemic 
relationship to the merely intensional world of the imagination is very different from the perceptual world, 
that we causally engage with. 
242 See Peacocke (1999) for a contrasting account of this phenomenon, however. 
180 
speaker simply couldn't have had that complicated and open-ended andyet determinate 
a content in his mind's eye, as it were, may be simply misplaced. The speaker typically 
does not have a independently determined content in mental view, which he then 
conveys with a greater or lesser degree of success. Nor does such a content live, wholly 
determinate yet inaccessible, in some 'intention box' in the lower reaches of the 
speaker's sub-personal psychology. 243 Nor is he merely in equal hermeneutic standing 
with his interlocutor, forced to interpret his own metaphors' in just the same fashion as he 
interprets those of others, and as others interpret him. Rather, the speaker can inhabit an 
episternically optimal position from which to arbitrate between different interpretations, 
making constitutive judgements as to which was in accord with his earlier intention. But 
this doesn't entail that indeterminacy in Cooper's sense is completely removed, that one 
can uniquely demonstrate that one interpretation is correct. Such a demonstration is not 
possible since the interpretation at hand is always defeasible, conditional not only on the 
possession of a continuing warrant to hold that the relevant epistemic conditions are 
ideal, but also on the speaker's ftiture judgements and avowals relating to alternative or 
modified interpretations. 
Of course, all this still leaves plenty of room for a speaker to be mistaken about what he 
intended. If optimal conditions do not hold, or there is evidence that he is self-deceived, 
then PEI is silent about whether or not Ss judgements constitute the facts about what he 
means. We might favour a subjunctive account, appealing to what the speaker would 
have meant. Alternatively, in many cases where the optimal conditions for PEI do not 
hold, the optimal conditions for radical interpretation still might, and we might take the 
facts to be constituted by the judgements of a actual or hypothetical radical interpreter. 
In other cases, including perhaps the case of the Modernist novelist and the psycho- 
analytic patient, I might be taken to have renounced my first person authoritative 
standpoint with respect to my intentions, even when I actually inhabit best conditions. 244 
24' As e. g. Sperber and Wilson seem to suggest at times. See their (I 986a) passim, and (I 986b) pp. 547- 
549 
244 We might characterise what is happening herein different xvýays. Is it a refusal to make the judgement 
about my intentions, even if ideal conditions hold? Or a second order intention that my first order 
intention not be taken as authoritative? (I might of course still require that my second order intention be 
taken as such. ) 
181 
But there will be a wide area of cases in which it is precisely my best judgements that 
are authoritative. 245 
We have the beginnings of a potential solution, then, to the problem we started off with. 
In the everyday case, there is a firm link between speaker intention and metaphor. But 
we needn't imagine that this entails having the whole metaphorical content antecedently 
'in mind'in any philosophically problematic way. This was the one aspect of a 
problematic picture that Cooper, in suggesting that metaphorical content is 
indeterminate, was no doubt reacting against. Instead, it is open to us to replace this 
picture with another which allows the nature of our knowledge of intention itself to be 
characteristically 'open'. Wright's theory has just this feature, since the existence of facts 
about what I intended are conditional on my bestjudgements, many of which, at any 
given time, I shall not have considered or made. 
Much more than this has to be said, of course, in order to differentiate metaphorical 
limitlessness from the general indeterminacy highlighted by Wright's account of 
intention. After all, that account applies as much to applying the rule for 'Y' as to 
reflecting on what Eliot meant by "Midnight shakes the memory/As a madman shakes a 
dead geranium ". There is room for tinkering with this proposal.. Perhaps in some cases 
we are happier to admit that, at the time of utterance, we didn't quite know exactly what 
we meant to convey, while in the literal case we resist this much more strongly. 
Moreover, there will no doubt be many cases where the particular propositional content 
intended to be conveyed by the speaker is just not to the point: we like the metaphor 
because of its non-propositional effects on us, say the way the words sound together. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that important aspects of the intuitive open-endedness or 
limitlessness of metaphor have been omitted. In the next two chapters, I turn some other 
ways in which they might be accommodated. 
245 Or if not, the case has to be made. I take it that e. g. postmodernist critics aim to show that the 
optimality conditions are never fulfilled - the lures of patriarchy, ideology or the unconscious mean I am 
always self-deceived. I leave open the question of whether this is a coherent thought. 
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4.8 Conclusion 
I began this chapter by examining an argument of Wright's which, if good, would have 
served to undercut much of the primafacie motivation for the type of error theory 
canvassed in Chapters 2 and 3.1 concluded that the continuity of ascriptions of 
metaphorical meaning with semantic ascriptions generally was likely to provide a 
convincing answer for the Davidsonian, and undercut Denham's attempt to provide a 
minimalist account of metaphorical meaning. I then broadened my focus slightly, 
endeavouring to examine the objective standing of metaphorical discourse in the light of 
Wright's test, in a way that did not prejudge more detailed issues relating to the good 
standing of particular realist theories. I concluded that most contemporary parties to the 
debate were likely to conclude that metaphorical meaning was not evidence 
transcendent, and had an at best limited 'Cosmological Role'. I discussed two strategies 
for settling questions of the cognitive status of such judgements, due to Wright and 
Hopkins, but concluded that neither of them provided a promising general strategy for 
settling disputes about realism, contrary to first appearances. I then noted that all 
parties, including the Davidsonian, were likely to require some suitable account of the 
relationship between metaphorical meaning and speaker-intention. Having discussed 
and evaluated Cooper's presentation of the issues, I suggested that a first-person, 
response-dependent account of speaker-intention might provide a suitable and under- 
explored model of that relationship. Such an account would clearly impose an anti- 
realist response to the Order-of-Determination test. Nevertheless, I concluded, such an 
account could only hope to provide at best a partial explication of the key notion of 
limitlessness, appealed to by Davidson in his rejection of the speaker-meaning account. 
I will examine two further treatments of that notion in what follows. 
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5. Metaphor and Non-Conceptual Content 
5.1 Introduction 
Any satisfactory theory of metaphor ought to have an answer to the question: why do 
we use metaphors? This question is especially pressing for the realist about 
metaphorical meaning. Given that you want to communicate some proposition, why not 
just say it outright? There are of course straightforward answers; to be entertaining, to 
enliven, to be elegant and concise, to enhance rhetorical effect. These answers, 
however, despite their classical ancestry, have often seemed to miss something 
important out. Other purposes for metaphorical speech have been suggested, such as the 
'cultivation of intimacy' between speaker and interpreter, and there is no doubt much 
more that could be usefully said about this type of issue. 246 Moreover, the idea that 
intending to express some proposition means having it there in mind, ready to be 
suitably adorned in metaphorical garb, is clearly mythology, which the broadly 
Wittgensteinian account of intention offered in the last chapter can help us begin to see 
past. Nevertheless, these solutions, and dissolutions of the puzzle are apt to seem 
unsatisfying. Something seems still to be missing - the sense that, when one employs a 
metaphor, one is often doing the best one can to get something across. 247 
The error theorist about meaning has some kind of answer to our question: one uses 
metaphor to try to get us to think of one thing as another. 248 This is something that could 
246 See Cohen (1978). Cohen's suggestion is discussed, elaborated and endorsed in Cooper (1986) pp. 
153-178. 
247 Yablo (in his (1998)) says that the cardinal rule of metaphor is: make the most of it. But often this is 
clearly not what we want at all. Interpretive fireworks are not at all to the point in many cases; we're 
trying to convey something, just those words are the best we can do at formulating it, and we want our 
interlocutor to catch on, not take off on flights of associative creativity. 
24 8 Thus Lamarque and Olsen (1994) p. 360. "The constitutive aim, definitive of metaphorical utterance 
per se, is simply this: to invite or encourage a hearer to think of, conceive of, reflect on, or imagine one 
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be done in other ways; by use of simile, mimicry or juxtaposition, for example. But 
what is it to think of or imagine one thing as another? Why invite someone to do such a 
thing, and what good does it do? These are no doubt bad questions, although it is not 
always easy to think of which better ones should replace them. In any case, the sheer 
generality of the answer involves a loss as well as a gain. A real question seems in 
danger of being drowned out in the hubbub of a general theory of experiential and 
propositional imagining. So let us ask it again: in what sense, in employing metaphor, 
are we doing the best we can? 
In this chapter, I intend to argue that figurative language plays an important and 
distinctive role in helping us talk about aspects of the world that would otherwise be 
resistant to linguistic expression. Moreover, that role neatly coheres with the distinctive 
Davidsonian 'marks' of metaphor outlined in section 2.9. This ought to be good news 
for the realist about metaphorical meaning, since it helps provide the resources for a 
principled rejection of (A6). However, if I was right to suggest previously that 
everybody, including the Davidsonian error-theorist, ought to sign up to at least the 
possibility of pragmatic communication via metaphor, such an account ought to be of 
interest to both sides in the realism debate. 
In particular, I will claim that we use metaphors to capture aspects of representational 
states which have a content that the attributing subject lacks the concepts to specify 
directly. When we lack the concepts to specify the character of certain states in 
straightforwardly literal terms, metaphor helps us employ the concepts we have to do so. 
In that sense, what metaphor draws our attention to is often non-conceptual and non- 
propositional in character. Moreover, such specifications are 'limitlessness' in a number 
of relevant senses. We naturally feel that such characterizations are often irreducible to 
literal paraphrase, that the process of interpretation is self-sustaining and constantly 
developing, and that 'the idea of finishing would have no clear application' . 
249 in each 
case, the non-conceptual character of the content in question helps us to provide an 
account of why this should be so. 
thing (state of affairs, idea, etc) in terms associated with some other thing (state of affairs, etc) often of a 
quite different logical type. " 
249 Davidson (1984a) p. 263 
185 
I begin by outlining the model with attention to the case of the emotions. I argue that 
there are elements of our representations of our own emotional states which are non- 
conceptual in character, and suggest that metaphor and other figurative language often 
best captures the precise phenomenology of such states. I then extend the model to the 
case of religious metaphor, demonstrating in detail how it can be used to answer a 
challenge raised by William Alston to the coherence of 'irreducible' metaphors in 
theology. 
5.2 Metaphor and Emotional Content 
It is an important and interesting feature of our normal experience of our emotions that 
we find it difficult to describe in literal terms the exact qualitative and experiential 
character of what we are feeling. In communicating with each other about our emotions, 
we often use metaphors and other figurative expressions to try and capture the fine- 
grained phenomenology of our emotional states. Proper appreciation of such metaphors 
can often be an essential precursor to empathetic and imaginative identification with 
another person's emotional states, and to the development of explicit knowledge of the 
nature of our own emotions. A distinctive and valued aspect of literary skill concerns 
the ability to provide depth of characterisation - making the character 'live' - precisely 
by imaginatively recreating recognisable emotional states via such figurative use of 
language. 
Take, for example, Nick Carraway's description of his distorted, emotionally charged 
dreams of West Egg: 
I see it as a night scene by El Greco: a hundred houses, at once conventional and 
grotesque, crouching under a sullen, overhanging sky, and a lustreless moon. In the 
foreground four solemn men in dress suits are walking along the sidewalk with a 
stretcher on which lies a drunken woman in a white evening dress. Her hand, which 
dangles over the side, sparkles cold withjewels. Gravely the men turn in at a house - 
the wrong house. But no-one knows the woman's name, and no-one cares. 
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Or James's description of the coldly avaricious nature of Osmond's emotional 
attachment to Isabel Archer 
Her mind was to be his - attached to his own like a small garden plot to a deer park. He 
would rake the soil gently and water the flowers; he would weed the beds and gather an 
occasional nose-gay. It would be a pretty piece of property for a proprietor already far- 
reaching. 250 
Such metaphors evoke a quite precise sense of the specific emotional charge, intensity 
and hue of the emotional states inhabited by the characters, a sense that we would find 
difficult to capture in literal terms. I have chosen fictional examples for ease of 
reference, but I want to maintain that figurative language plays an exactly analogous role 
in our everyday expressions and descriptions of emotion; we capture best how we feel at 
times by sticking resolutely to the figurative. It's easy to recognize this, even in one's 
own case; we grasp for pictures and analogies to convey how we feel, or how others 
seemed. The problem is not to recognize the phenomenon, but to explain it. 
I have noted several times that well-founded worries about semantic treatments of 
metaphor have prompted many theorists to move to a pragniatic theory of metaphor, 
where metaphor is accounted for at the level of speaker-meaning rather than sentence 
meaning. On this type of account, the producer of a metaphor utters a sentence that 
literally means that q in order to convey or implicate some other proposition r. 
Metaphor is thus seen as structurally analogous to irony or sarcasm, where my utterance 
of e. g. 'that was really clever' can serve, in the right circumstances, to implicate my 
belief in the negation of the proposition I literally expressed, or made as if to express. 
However, I have also noted that this type of account seems to run into difficulties in 
accounting for the marks of metaphor. One central problem relates to 'paraphrasability'. 
In the typical case of sarcasm, I could have said literally what I instead implicated. It is 
this kind of ability that, in part, makes it appropriate to identify the implicated 
proposition as what I was really trying to get across. In the case of metaphorical 
utterance, on the other hand, it often feels simply inipossible to say in literal terms what 
250 Cited in Denham (2000) p. 327 
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a speaker got across by using a metaphor. In simple cases, with practically dead 
metaphors or near idioms, of course, this isn't difficult at all; I can utter 'he isn't the 
sharpest knife in the drawer', and convey my belief that he is stupid. With even 
moderately complex metaphors, however, paraphrases are often implausible and hard to 
identify. Since the type of pragmatic theory described seems to rely on the producer of 
the metaphor having some proposition 'in mind', as it were, which she intends to 
communicate obliquely by uttering some other sentence in the appropriate context, this 
constitutes a real problem for proponents of the theory. A natural temptation is to retreat 
to a generalized error-theory about all but the simplest and stalest metaphors, that admit 
of quite straightforward elucidation. Again, we seem to tick-tock between two 
conflicting inclinations; on the one hand the inclination to reject the wooden 
paraphrases, and the pragmatic theory that seems to demand them, and on the other, the 
sense that we clearly do often reach for quite complex metaphor when we most sincerely 
want to get something across about what it's like to feel a certain way. 
I want to resolve the felt tension between these compelling lures of thought. Perhaps in 
purely literary cases, what a metaphor-maker means by his words is less important than 
what meanings can be made from them. In the everyday case, however, the use of 
metaphor is rarely a symptom of the fact that the speaker was really playing around with 
words; instigating a game where each participant's aim is to come up with striking and 
original similarities and analogies based on the metaphor. Rather, using metaphor often 
involves doing the best ive can to get something across that we can't convey in any other 
way. The emotional case is a useful illustration precisely because it is so clear that we 
may well be trying to communicate something tremendously significant by using 
metaphor. We needn't be trying merely to politely invite certain thoughts or attitudes in 
our interlocutor, nor to let her come up with her own inventive readings of what we said, 
since it seems difficult to see why should we care about them. Rather, we're trying to 
communicate the i, vay things arefor us, something that (a) genuinely possesses content, 
and thus can stand in the right kind of normative relations to our attempt at putting it into 
metaphor, and yet that (b) we don't seem to be able to get across in other, more 
straightforward ways. A natural idea is to hold that the reason that these two conditions 
obtain is that we're dealing with non-conceptual content. 
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5.3 Metaphor, Emotion and Non-conceptual Content 
Let's take a simple case where I turn my attention inward onto my own emotions; let's 
say I realise that I am feeling more resentful and competitive towards a colleague than I 
had first realised. Now, it -seems primaJacie non-controversial that I am representing a 
particular aspect of my current psychological state. Of course, there have been 
philosophers who have denied this (thus conforming to the well confirmed universal 
generalisation that for all primaJacie non-controversial claims C there exists a 
philosopher who has maintained not-C. ) In particular, error-theorists about the emotions 
hold that most folk terms for emotion almost certainly lack an objective reference, so 
that there is nothing for such terms to represent, while avoivalists have held that self 
ascriptions of mental states should not be thought of in representational terms at all. 251 
Nevertheless, there are well known problems with these positions, especially relating to 
the motivation for adopting them. In particular, the latter seems committed to providing 
a plausible theory of representation which entails that our self-ascription of mental states 
come out as non-representational. It seems, however, that the opposite is true. A recent, 
and convincing set of necessary criteria for a given state to count as representational has 
the consequence - unsurprising no doubt - that my second order thoughts about the 
emotional states I am in are genuinely representational. They count a state as 
representational only if 
1. It serves to explain behaviour in situations where the connections between sensory 
input and behavioural output cannot be plotted in a law-like manner (Parshnony) 
2. It admits of cognitive integration; it connects uP in the right way with other 
psychological states, both representational and motivational (Integration). 
3. It is compositionally structured in such a way that their elements can be constituents 
of other representational states (Conipositionality) 
4. It admits the possibility of misrepresentation (Error). 
25 1 Eliminativists about emotion may include Churchland (1981) and Griffiths (1997). Wittgenstein is 
oflen read as the paradigmatic avowalist. 
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It is clear that these criteria (proposed by Jose Bermudez) are met in the case of my 
thought about my emotional states. 252 There is no relevant causal story to be told about 
the way that e. g. my realisation that I am more resentful than I had thought affects my 
behaviour, and how it does so will be in part a function of psychological interaction 
between that state and other of my beliefs and desires. I can think other self-involving 
thoughts, and thoughts about other people's emotional states, so compositionality is 
respected. And I can be wrong about the character and quality of my emotional states; 
mistaking justified resentment for envy, or a short-lived romantic crush for genuine 
feelings of love, for example. 
The interesting thing about these criteria, however, as Bermudez points out, is that while 
they are all satisfied paradigmatically by the conceptual contents that are the objects of 
folk psychological propositional attitudes ... it does not follow that conceptual 
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propositional content is the only genuine form of content . 
In particular, there is theoretical space here for the ascription of non-conceplual content 
to our experiences of emotional states, where a non-conceptual content of an experience 
is defined as follows 
(NQ An experiential state E of a subject, S has a non-conceptual content iff it meets 
the criteria for being a representational state outlined above, and S could be in 
the state E even if S lacked the concepts requisite to specify the content of E. 
Notice that this definition does not rule out the possibility that a subject might indeed 
possess the concepts necessary to specify the content of the experiential state that they 
are in. Indeed, in examples like the one above, where I came to realise that I was angry, 
I do have certain of the relevant concepts. The central point is, of course, that I needn't 
have the concepts to be in the state; there is no intrinsic or essential connection between 
my being able to represent in experience e. g. my emotional state as being thus and so, 
and my possessing the concepts to do so. 
252 See Bermudez (1998) Ch 3 and 4 for extensive discussion of these criteria. 
253 Bermudez (1998) p. 94 
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What might give us theoretical reason to decide that my experience of my emotional 
states possesses non-conceptual content? There are, I believe, several motivating 
factors, familiar from discussions of non-conceptual perceptual experience 
1. My experience of my own emotions is more fine-grained than my conceptual 
repertoire. I can internally discriminate states that fall under the same conceptual 
descriptions. For example, I can distinguish the character of the longing boredom 
that I experience waiting for a bus, from that I undergo while awaiting a tiresome 
acquaintance's punch-line. Similarly, I can distinguish the feelings of liking or 
attachment I have towards a range of new workmates, even though I may not be able 
to verbalise or even express in thought precisely what the relevant difference comes 
to. 254 
2. Uncontroversially limited concept users such as young children or higher mammals 
can nevertheless seem to manifest a relatively sophisticated emotional repertoire 
(boredom, self-satisfaction). Such attributions aren't obviously a result of misguided 
anthropomorphism. 255 
3. It seems primajacie possible that I might recreate exactly in memory states of 
emotion that I underwent before acquiring the relevant concepts, such as a moment 
of resentment or euphoria undergone as a young child. Since such states would be 
by hypothesis phenomenologically identical before and after acquisition of the 
relevant concept, and would seem to meet the constraints on being genuinely 
representational outlined above, the most natural explanation is that the states 
possess non-conceptual content on both occasions, now and the remembered past. 256 
If the above comprises a defensible set of theses, then I believe that we have the 
resources to explain the fact that we often seem forced to resort to metaphorical 
constructions, if we are to do justice to our experience of emotions. Moreover, we can 
simultaneously account, at least in part, for the non-paraphrasability of an important 
254 See Peacocke (1993) Ch 3 and Peacocke (1994) for further elaboration of this line of thought applied in 
the case of perception. 
255 There is a sharply increasing body of research on the contrasts and inter-relations between human and 
animal emotions. For an illustrative discussion, see McNaughton (1989) Ch i 1. 
256 See Martin (1992) for an analogous argument in the case of perception. 
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class of metaphors, without resorting to the abandonment of any notion of metaphorical 
meaning. The story we should tell goes roughly as follows. In experiencing our 
emotional states, we are presented with states which, while representational, are non- 
conceptual in character. Unsurprisingly, therefore, given the fine-grainedness noted 
above, we often lack the necessary concepts to communicate such states to others 
directly. We therefore use metaphor to tell each other about the states that we are in, 
using the concepts that we do possess to get across the way things are with us that we 
don't have concepts for. Nevertheless, since non-conceptual states are genuinely 
representational, they provide the kind of normativeftiction which is necessary to 
account for our practice of not always treating metaphorical utterances as just invitations 
to contemplate salient similarities, or useful devices for the promotion of lateral 
thinking, but rather sometimes as genuine attempts to get something, currently 
unspecifiable, but often proposition-like, across. 257 
If that's right, then a realist has resources with which to take some of the sting out of 
Davidson's (A6): 
(A6) An account of m-meaning which identifies it with the extra propositional content 
communicated by the author of the metaphor, over and above what it says, as 
determined by a linguistic theory of pragmatics, provides an unacceptably 
incomplete and misleading account of our practices of producing, using and 
reflecting on metaphors. 
257 The content communicated by such a metaphor may correspond to what Peacocke (1992) p. 77 calls a 
profo-proposition, compQsed of individuals and properties. See Bermudez (1998) pp. 96-100 for a useful 
introduction to this notion. Having such 'Russellian' propositions in play opens up the possibility that 
metaphorical content may have a wider 'Cosmological Role' than it is natural to expect. In a sense, the 
sensitivity of non-concept users to such representational states already serves to establish this. It is clear, 
however, that while non-concept users may be sensitive to the content expressible by metaphors, they are 
not thereby credited with such sensitivity via metaphor. The sketchiness of Wright's Wide Cosmological 
Role constraint makes it difficult to settle finally on ajudgement as to the correct view to take on this 
matter. See Stem (2000) p. 188 for a related distinction between referential and purely conceptualized 
propositions. My conception of metaphor as apt for the expression of non-conceptual content was 
developed independently of Stern, and differs in detail but the two approaches share a common theme. It 
is of course a very old and intuitive idea to hold that metaphor helps us say what we could previously 
grasp, but not put into words. 
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That principle, remember, was supported by the following line of thought: 
a) Anything worth regarding as a tolerably complete and infonnative account of 
our practices of producing, using and reflecting on metaphors must account 
for all of the distinctive marks of metaphor. 
b) An account of metaphor that, like Searle's, characterizes such practices as 
being in essence a special case of saying one thing and meaning another, 
cannot account for all of the distinctive marks of metaphor. In particular, it 
cannot give an account of the limitlessness and non-propositional character 
of what -metaphor draws to our attention. 
c) Therefore, such pragmatic accounts of metaphor provide at best an 
incomplete and misleading account of our practices of producing, using and 
reflecting on metaphors. 
If the above sketch of an account is defensible, then the pragmatic theorist has 
established some room for manoeuvre. A form of limitlessness is established, since no 
literal paraphrase is likely to seem satisfying. Our existing vocabulary will be far too 
impoverished and clumsy to capture the complex fine-grainedness of our emotional 
lives, as tracked from the inside. Moreover, there is scope for the realist to argue that the 
relevant form of non-propositionality is also captured. After all, trying to convey to 
somebody hoiv one isfeeling, is unnaturally thought of as trying to communicate that 
such and such is the case. Davidson's motivating examples of non-propositionality - 
perceptual and pictorial content - share many relevant features with our experiences of 
our own emotional states. Pictures, perceptions and emotions are analogue in form, 
admitting of shading and degree. They are multi-dimensional, and experientially 
integrated in a hugely complex manner. They admit of gestalt shifts, as when one is 
forced to see one's black mood as suddenly self-indulgent and ridiculous. They are 
resistant to judgement: a tromp Voeil picture can still seem strikingly real once the 
illusion has been unmasked, and anger can outlast the revelation of its unmotivated 
character. Such observations, however, do not seem to undercut the idea that pictures. or 
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perceptions can be genuinely representational. In a broad sense of proposition, they 
possess propositional content. 258 
5.4 Further Thoughts on the Limitlessness of Metaphor 
The pragmatic realist can do even better in accounting for our intuitions of the 
limitlessness of metaphor. I have already distinguished two forms of this intuitive 
notion; one relating to the dependence of m-meaning on future judgement, and the latter 
on the unavailability of literal, conceptualised paraphrase. It is clear, however, that there 
are other strands to the original conception that might be profitably teased apart. One 
involves a kind of open-endedness, the capacity for continual elaboration and 
development. It is this notion which is often taken to motivate anti-realisms about 
metaphor. However, given the gestalt-type nature of our representation of our emotional 
state, it is clear that the realist can begin to account for why we might feel that 
metaphors are open-ended in this sense also. 
Let's go back to the case of Nick Carraway's dream: 
I see it as a night scene by EI Greco: a hundred houses, at once conventional and 
grotesque, crouching under a sullen, overhanging sky, and a lustreless moon. In the 
foreground four solemn men in dress suits are walking along the sidewalk with a 
stretcher on which lies a drunken woman in a white evening dress. Her hand, which 
dangles over the side, sparkles cold withjewels. Gravely the men turn in at a house - 
the wrong house. But no-one knows the woman's name, and no-one cares. 
It is clear that Nick does not intend us to take much of this literally; he does not literally 
see the dream scenario as a night scene by El Greco, and the sky is not literally presented 
as sullen. Nevertheless, the metaphors provide an effective, almost indispensable means 
of capturing and communicating the fine-grained representational content of the dream, 
258 Moran (1997) p. 257-258 makes a similar move, noting that we might e. g. model propositions as sets of 
possible worlds. As befits my attempt to remain fairly neutral about controversial semantic issues, I will 
not critically examine this possibility here. My purpose is merýly to note that a workable model of 
propositional content may be open to the realist. 
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including the emotional charge and timbre that pervades it. So much was argued for 
above. 
We needn't, and shouldn't, rest content with a purely reflective account of emotional 
metaphor, however, metaphor as miffor to the soul. In employing the metaphors in 
reflecting upon his emotional states, Nick brings those states into a light that illuminates 
but also colours and contours. In employing the El Greco metaphor, Nick at once 
expresses and casts neiv light upon his emotional state. Aspects of the dream that 
originally provoked the figure may seem afterwards to be less important than other 
elements of it that the metaphor fits; the strange static quality of the movement within 
the dream-narrative, for example, or perhaps a quasi-religious sense of sin, abandonment 
and foreboding. The metaphor is not used up in its original expression, but establishes a 
new gestalt under which the significance of the dream can be re-examined and 
assimilated. 
Similarly, consider the following passage, from the fourth of Abelard's personal letters 
to Heloise: 
And so I ask you, sister, to accept patiently what mercifully befell us. This is a father's 
rod, not a persecutor's sword. The father strikes to correct, and to forestall the enemy 
who strikes to kill. By a wound he perceives death, he does not deal it; lie thrusts in tile 
steel to cut out disease. He wounds the body, and heals the soul; he makes to live what 
he should have destroyed, cuts out impurity to leave what is pure. 
Abelard is almost certainly consciously punning on fatherly punishment as symbol of the 
justice of God, and as infamous component of his own Historica calainitatuln. 
Nevertheless, we can easily imagine that it is not so; that the original metaphor, drawing 
on stock Christian imagery in-the service of theodicy , comes to organize Abelard's sense 
of his situation in a way that suddenly reveals to him the tortuous character of his 
relationship with his own sexual nature. Simply stating literally that God only inflicts 
evil upon us for our own good is clearly far less likely to provide such a moment of 
insight and reorientation. Metaphor, motivated by one set of insights, can come to 
reconfigure one's sense of things in a way that provides smoothly and fittingly for 
others. In this sense, the earlier picture of emotional metaphors can also seemingly lay 
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claim to a satisfying notion of open-endedness. Of course, it need not be non-conceptual 
content that provokes such an episodic reflective pattern. Nevertheless, it seems clear 
that the way in which metaphor serves to focus and elaborate one's sense of such 
emotional episodes, the very states that one lacks conceptual resources to tackle 
reflectively, entails that metaphor has a special role to play here. 
5.5 Metaphor and Religious Language 1 
I now want to turn to my second example of the role that non-conceptual content can 
play in the philosophy of metaphor, namely, religious metaphor. William Alston has 
presented an argument which, if sound, would prove the impossibility of irreducibly 
metaphorical talk - where such talk is irreducible iff it says something which cannot be 
said, even in part, in literal ternis - about God. 
259 In this section I examine two answers 
to Alston that might be given by a theist. The first develops a late suggestion of 
Alston's, which seems to undermine his main argument. I conclude that this reply, 
though logically consistent and independently motivated, is weaker than a second reply, 
which argues that Alston's argument has little force against a theist who subscribes to the 
idea described above, that such metaphors can express non-conceptual contents. 
Alston argues against the possibility of irreducibly metaphorical talk about God, where a 
metaphor is irreducible in the relevant sense if what it says cannot be said, even in part, 
in literal terms. It is clear that the denial of this type of strong irreducibility (SI) is 
perfectly consistent with maintaining that metaphor plays an important or even essential 
role in our theological talk and thought, and that such iveak irreducibility might 
ultimately turn out to be the more puzzling and interesting variety. Moreover, there may 
well be room for doubt as to whether there are any good grounds for endorsing such 
strong irreducibility in the first place; Alston notes his independent disagreement with 
claims about God's transcendence and ineffability, and wit h the non-vcrifiability of 
religious language, each of which might potentially be employed in arguments which 
motivate an appeal to the strong form of the position. Nevertheless, since I take it that 
both the position and Alston's argument against it is are of some interest in their own 
259 Alston (1989) 
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right, I propose to examine the merits of Alston's case against the possibility of strong 
irreducibility, and to offer two replies on behalf of the opposing position. Although it is 
not strictly implied by the position as stated, I will take it that the defender of SI is a 
theist, and moreover, I will assume that there is no special burden of proof placed on her 
by Alston simply in virtue of her theism. 
It is as well to be clear from the beginning how Alston thinks of metaphorical meaning. 
He holds to a pragmatic realist theory, where, as ought to be familiar by now, speakers 
use sentences with a given literal meaning to convey or implicate some propositional 
content distinct from that expressed by the sentence taken literally; this metaphorical 
content is equivalent to what the speaker is saying via his use of the metaphor. It is of 
course possible for speakers to use metaphor for purposes other than assertion - to invite 
a hearer to reflect on (or play with) a model or exemplar of a given situation, in order 
that she might identify striking similarities and analogies for herself, for example - but in 
many cases, the speaker will have some fairly definite set of resemblances 'in mind' 
which he wishes to convey. Thus Alston writes 
[In] the typical metaphorical statement is "building on" the relevant meaning of his 
predicate term in two ways. First, he is presenting the kind of thing to which the term 
literally applies as a model of the subject. Secondly, he has in mind one or more. 
resemblances between model and subject, and he extracts from these resemblances what 
he means to be attributing to the subject. 260 
For the purposes of this section, I will allow Alston that this is a convincing theory of 
metaphor, although there are clearly many issues of substance and detail that might 
reasonably be challenged. How, then, given such a theory, does his argument for the 
impossibility of SI proceed? Let us concentrate on the example Alston gives: 'God is my 
rock'. Alston's argument can then be represented as follows 
1) Strong irreducibility is true. (Assumption, for reductio) 
2) Alston's model of metaphor is correct. (Assumption) 
260 lbid p. 23 
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3) 'God is my rock' is an example of the type of irreducible metaphor SI is concerned 
with, and can be used to say something about God. (Assumption) 
4) 'God is my rock' is irreducible (by I and 3) 
5) 'God is my rock' expresses a proposition (by 2 and 3). 
6) 'God is my rock' must attribute some property to God which isn't literally 
expressible, even in part Call this property P. (by 4 and 5). 
7) Since the speaker is attributing the property P to God by means of the metaphor, the 
speaker must have cognitive access to P (by 2 and 6)261 
8) If the speaker has cognitive access to P, then the speaker has a concept of the 
property P. 
(Assumption) 
9) If it is possible for the speaker to fonn a concept of the property P, then other 
members of the language community can form a concept of P. (Assumption) 
10) If other members of the language community can form a concept of P, then P can 
become the literal meaning of a predicate term in the language. (Assumption) 
11) If P can become the literal meaning of a predicate term in the language, then 'God is 
my rock' can be expressed in wholly literal terms. (Assumption) 
12)'God is my rock' can be expressed in wholly literal terms, contra 4. (7,8,9,10,11) 
13) Strong irreducibility is false. (By reductio, 1,4,12) 
As noted above, I intend to grant Alston the correctness of his account of metaphor and 
the appropriateness and typicality of the example he offers (assumptions 2 and 3). 1 will 
also accept that the argument as presented is valid, and that assumptions 10 and 11 are 
true. It is thus common ground between myself and Alston that the argument against SI 
is sound if 8 and 9 are true. For convenience, I will consider the question of their truth 
by examining two slightly more general principles, which I will assume provide the sole 
support for 8 and 9. 
Conceptual Access If a subject has cognitive access to a property, then the subject has 
a concept of that property. 
261 This step in the argument may seem less than obvious. Remember, however, that on Alston's account 
of metaphor, a speaker must'have in mind'the respects in which the model resembles the subject of the 
metaphor. 
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Mutual Access If it is possible for the speaker of a natural language to form a 
concept of the property P, then other members of the language 
community can form a concept of P. 
I suggest that the defender of Sl can best resist Alston's argument by rejecting either one 
or both of the above principles. The challenge, of course, is for the SI-theorist to 
provide principled grounds for doing so, and so avoid the charge of a mere ad hoc 
refusal to accept Alston's reductio. I will begin with outlining a possible strategy for 
rejecting mutual access. 
Thepriinafacie grounds for rejecting the Mutual Access principle appear bleak. After 
all, given plausible assumptions about the shared cognitive and conceptual capacities of 
natural language users - endorsed byý empirical evidence as well as common sense - it 
seems to follow that, in the vast majority of cases, a species of conceptual mastery 
attainable by an arbitrary member of a natural language community can be duplicated by 
his peers. Of course, this need not always be the case, at least in practice. The 
extemalist tradition in epistemology and semantics has stressed the widespread 
phenomenon of epistemic and linguistic div ision of labour. 262 Given finite capacities 
and ever more specific fields of human intellectual enquiry, it may well be practically 
impossible to acquire conceptual mastery of many theoretical concepts. Moreover, it is a 
familiar truth that experts can develop a higher degree of conceptual sensitivity than 
others possess with regard to the properties of wine, humans or song; and perhaps we 
can imagine certain of them making use of innate sensitivities simply not available to the 
rest of us. Your inborn capacity for colour discrimin ation, or gift for mathematical 
physics may, as a matter of fact, allow you to conceptualise elements of your experience 
which are literally unreachable by those of us whose sensitivities are naturally less apt 
for honing. Nevertheless, this can hardly be the kind of case that the SI-theorist would 
wish to rely on. Ineffable experience of and thought about God seems unlikely to be 
best represented as the unspeakable privilege of a genetically blessed few. 
262 See e. g. Putnam (1975); Burge (1979). 
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A better tactic is for the defender of irreducibility to look for a principled way to 
differentiate between certain speakers and others, in a way that lets them effectively 
undermine mutuality. Unusually, Alston identifies precisely such a route in a footnote 
towards the end of his paper. In a footnote to his discussion of I. M. Crombie's 
position 263 Alston writes 
Although I am reading Crombie as a parimetaphoricist, he is susceptible to an 
interestingly different reading according to which theological metaphors can be literally 
paraphrased, though not by mere mortals. That is, we might think of Christ, who, 
according to Crombie, guarantees that the models he provides for us are suitable models, 
as being able to spell out the crucial similarities in literal terms. This, then, would be an 
extension of the familiar situation in which a poet uses a metaphor with some definite 
intention in mind that he could express literally, but where none of his readers could do 
so, though some of them are "grasped" by the metaphor. 264 
Alston is correct to note that this is an "interestingly different" way of interpreting or 
developing Crombie's position, but seems not to fully recognise the direct relevance of 
this type of account for his argument against strong irreducibility. It seems to me to 
speak directly against the mutual access principle, in cases where the linguistic 
community includes members who are more than "Mere mortals". 
Let's avoid textual issues as to the correctness of this reading of Crombie, and simply 
take the defender of this type of account to be committed to the following claim: 
Asymmetrical Access In cases where a linguistic community has members who 
are more than mere mortals, it is possible for certain 
speakers to form concepts of certain properties which 
other speakers cannot. 
Asymmetrical Access entails that the mutual access principle doesn't hold in cases 
where the linguistic community includes those who are more than mere mortals, and 
thus, if good, would block Alston's argument against SI. Moreover, it has, I believe, a 
263 As outlined in Crombie (1955) and (1957) 
264 Alston (1989) 36 n. 23. 
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certain degree of independent plausibility, and thus provides a means for the SI-theorist 
to avoid the charge of ad hoc rejection of Alston's premises. After all, as noted above, 
we are familiar with the idea that possession of certain cognitive capacities can be 
essential for concept mastery, at least for basic possession of such concepts. Normally 
sighted people have psychologically and epistemically basic mastery of colour concepts, 
for example, since they have the ability to grasp colours under the mode of presentation 
afforded by visual perception. Other members of the linguistic community (for example, 
congenitally blind, or colqur-blind members), if they count as possessing the concepts at 
all, do so in virtue of the existence of those who exercise basic mastery. Perhaps a 
person who couldn't visually distinguish between red and green might know that redness 
was the property of looking red to normally sighted people under standard conditions in 
the actual world, and might even have some other, reliable way of telling red things. from 
green. (We can imagine that certain light wave detectors might be combined in such a 
way that she could discriminate objects on the basis of their colour). Nevertheless, if she 
counts as possessing colour concepts at all, it is partly in virtue of the existence of those 
who exercise basic mastery of such concepts, since it is the visually basic judgements of 
these members which determine e. g. what counts as being co-extensive with, or a 
reliable detector of, red things. 265 Moreover, we can imagine that trying to get across to 
such people what it was like to make such judgements on the basis of visual appearance 
alone would involve appeal to metaphor, analogy and image; scarlet being like the sound 
of trumpet, for example. Nor is this phenomenon restricted to sensational or perceptual 
qualities. We might offer an autistic person metaphors, models or exemplars to help 
them track the emotional and psychological states of others, for example. 
I claimed above that the existence of this type of asymmetry of biological capacity didn't 
by itsetfprovide a very promising model for directly undermining Mutual Access in the 
theological case. However, it does serve to provide an interesting set of structural 
analogies which can be drawn on in defending Asymmetrical Access. Since we can 
reasonably expect that more than mortal members of natural language communities have 
distinctive cognitive capacities which mere mortals lack, we can expect that they can 
form concepts of certain properties - have ivays of thinking about certain properties - 
which are simply not open to their cognitively limited peers. It is open to the Christian 
265 1 assume here, for purposes of illustration, a response-dependent account of colour. 
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defender of SI to hold that only Christ can form basic concepts of the properties 
expressed by irreducible metaphors, and that any mastery of them that we might come to 
possess is bound to be partial, derivative and reliant on his use of them in practice and 
judgement. A natural policy, then, as we have seen above, is for Christ to make appeal 
to the concepts and capacities that we do have basic mastery of in order to elucidate 
those which we do not. 
Such an employment of Asymmetrical Access in the theological case has the, advantage 
of blocking a potential reply that Alston might make against the claim that 
considerations concerning experts and basicality suffice for rejecting Mutual Access. 
Such a reply would hold that the modal claim which the latter claim makes - that other 
members of the language community can fonri a concept of P- has to be heard as 'can in 
principle form a concept of F. It isn't clear that such a reply works even against those 
considerations; Kripkean style necessities regarding the essentiality of species and origin 
might mean that it was metaphysically impossible for certain members of linguistic 
community to acquire certain capacities possessed by others, in cases where the 
linguistic community involved several distinct kinds of creatures, for example. But in 
any case, it seems that the theistic defender of SI has good grounds for saying that even 
given such a strengthened reading of Mutual Access, there might be good grounds for 
rejecting it when the linguistic community involves both cognitively finite and non-finite 
members. 
The final position of the SI-theorist who rejects the mutual access principle by endorsing 
Asymmetrical Access, then, is independently motivated to the extent that it appeals to 
other cases which make plausible the claim that concept possession should be 
asymmetrically and externally individuated. Christ, unlike other members of his 
linguistic community, can form basic concepts of certain properties of God; the best way 
for him to convey the nature of these properties to creatures who lack such basic 
capacities may involve metaphor, myth and symbol, given to us in the form of parable. 
Nevertheless, we can count as having knowledge of God's nature to the extent that we 
stand in certain communal relationships to Christ. Just as some epistemological 
externalists argue that we can count as possessing theoretical knowledge, or mastery of 
the meaning of the terms of our language, in virtue of standing in certain deferential 
relationships to scientific experts and to the linguistic community as a whole, so we can 
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count as having knowledge of God and the meaning of metaphors that describe him to 
the extent that we intend to be accommodating our practice to Christ's. 
It is perhaps worth noting that this defence of SI is not dependent on Alston's rather 
surprising and counter-intuitive claim that this account "would be an extension of the 
familiar situation in which a poet uses a metaphor with some definite intention in mind 
that he could express literally, but where none of his readers could do s o, though some of 
them are "grasped" by the metaphor". I find it difficult to see why Alston takes such a 
case to be familiar, given that the phenomenology of poetic composition seems to count 
fairly drastically against it, and also why, on his account, the readers fail to be able to 
identify the content of the relevant intention. If it is because the poem concerns some 
ineffable subjective experience, then it is difficult to see how it can comprise such a 
content, given Alstoifs views on the necessity and mutuality of concept possession. A 
natural alternative interpretation is that the readers are merely contingently ignorant; that 
had they been around to ask the poet the correct questions, he could have identified for 
them the proposition that he had decided to dress up in borrowed clothes. Such an 
account seems to me to distort the nature of artistic creation and interpretation, but more 
seriously, to drain much of the interest from his suggestion of how to read Crombie. For 
if it is only the fact that Christ chose to speak indirectly, or wasn't asked the right 
questions, which differentiates our knowledge of God from his, then, apart from the 
radical contingency of this account of God's ineffability, there seems to be no reason 
why we might not be able to stumble across the relevant concepts for ourselves, so that 
the moderate strengthening of Mutual Access mentioned above would suffice to rebut 
Crombie's suggestion. 
5.6 Metaphor and Religio. us Language 2 
Such a strategy seems to me to be philosophically defensible and logically consistent; it 
may even prove promising for some purposes. Nevertheless, I think there is some cause 
for concern about whether it alone can do the requisite explanatory work. In particular, 
the defensive strategy as outlined so far might be taken to rely overly much on Christ's 
knowledge of God as providing the epistemic link between us and God. Christian SI- 
theorists might want to hold that, for example, metaphor s employed by the pre-Christian 
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prophets and psalmists can express or serve as a model for thought about God, while 
non-Christian theists might not accept that natural linguistic communities have included 
members with qualitatively different cognitive powers and capacities. Alternatively, 
concern may be felt about whether a purely externalist model of our knowledge about 
God can do justice to the reflective component of much of our theological talk and 
practice. 
For these reasons, and for the independent interest of the question, it's worth examining 
whether an independent rejection of Conceptual Access (the claim, remember, that if a 
subject has cognitive access to a property, then the subject has a concept of that 
property) might be motivated. The best line here, I believe, is for the defender of SI to 
appeal to other cases where philosophers have wanted to appeal to non-conceptual 
contents of our propositional attitudes. For, again, drawing analogies with 
independently motivated philosophical position allows the SI-theorist to deflect the force 
of Alston's reductio, while avoiding the charge of mere ad hoe rejection of another 
premise. 
It seems too quick, though, just to saddle Alston with the general claim that cognitive 
access entails conceptual access - so that just any reason to posit non-conceptual content 
would serve to rebut his argument. Alston might justifiably claim that strictly he needn't 
defend the general claim, (although this is the claim that he would most naturally be read 
as making) but only the weaker thesis that, if a subject has access to a theological 
property, then she has a concept of that property. From now on, then, I will argue 
against this weaker claim. 
The defender of irreducibility will be on strongest ground if he can make the case that 
the contents of thought about God, according to him, cohere with a general theory of 
representation, and yet are available to creatures who lack any of the relevant kinds of 
concept. This latter condition seems to block certain of the arguments presented in the 
literature in support of the possibility of non-conceptual contents of thought - for 
example, the claim that our perceptual experience is morefinely-grained than our 
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conceptual capacities. 266 Such arguments generally presuppose ý certain level of 
conceptual mastery, (visual concepts, for example, along with grasp of an objective 
spatial material world) but argue that the subtle variations of, say, shade, tone and 
shadow that our visual experience presents us with outrun our genuinely conceptual 
discriminatory capacities. In the case of thought about God, however, certain types of Sl 
theorist may well want to hold that we can't form any concept of God's nature, (although 
of course this isn't the only conceivable view, and certainly isn't entailed by the basic 
position). For those who are motivated by the thought of the complete alterity and 
transcendence of God, though, the kind of conceptual capacities presupposed by the 
fine-grainedness argument simply won't be present, so that the needed analogy won't 
genuinely hold. 
A better approach for the SI-theorist, I believe, is to rely on Bermudez' model, that 
allows for ivholly non-conceptual contents. It has been a while since I introduced his 
account, so let me briefly summarize it here. 
Bermudez outlines a plausible set of necessary conditions which a psychological state 
must meet if we are to count it as genuinely representational. He then argues that this 
general account of what it is for thought to have a content, to cognitively map aspects of 
the objective world, does not require that the subject of the thought should possess the 
concepts necessary to specify that content. Rather, the conceptual / non-conceptual 
distinction comprises afurther division of representational states into those whose 
contents presuppose conceptual mastery on behalf of the relevant subject, and those 
which might be undergone by creatures who lacked those concepts completely. 
Bermudez four requirements on psychological states being genuinely representational 
are as follows 
1) They should serve to explain behaviour in situations where the connections between 
sensory input and behavioural output cannot be plotted in a law-like manner. 
266 Again, Peacocke (1992) and particularly his (1994), 419-429, provide a useful overview of such 
arguments. 
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2) They should admit of cognitive integration, being able to connect up with other 
representational and motivational states. 
3) They should be compositionally structured in such a way that their elements can be 
constituents of other representational states. 
4) They should permit the possibility of misrepresentation. 
Given such a conception of a representational state, then, Bennudez offers us the 
following definition of when its content is non-conceptual 
(NQ The content of a psychological state T of a subject S is non-conceptual if the 
state meets the criteria for being genuinely representational outlined above, and S 
could be in the state T even if S lacked the concepts requisite to specify the 
content of T. 
Does the content of our thoughts about God meet Bermudez' four criteria for being 
genuinely representational? I believe that any theist is going to be committed to 
defending the claim that it does. Our thought about God, is going to be relevant to what 
we believe and how we act; and the prospects of explaining such action as prayer, 
reflection and self-sacrifice in stimulus-response terms seems wholly impossible, as the 
first condition demands. The connection with belief and action is going to ensure that 
such thought must be integrated with other cognitive'states; and the possibility of 
speaking and thinking falsely about God, or recognising that his qualities are. not shared 
by human beings, is going to ensure that any such thought must admit of the 
recombination of its parts, and the possibility error and misrepresentation. So each of 
Bermudez' criteria will be met. 
Given that a theist will typically be committed to the claim that thought about God is 
representational in B ermudez' sense, how might she establish that we could be in such 
states even if we lacked the relevant concepts? Well, she might hold that God's 
otherness, transcendence and infinity - however these notions are fleshed out - give us 
priniafacie reason to believe that we couldn't conceptualise his properties, so that the 
burden of proof is rather on the proponent of the (modified) Conceptual Access claim. 
How does holding such a position point towards a positive account of the usefulness of 
strongly irreducible metaphor? Well, defensively, it blocks Alston's argument, so that 
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the SI-theorist is, for the moment at least, on stable ground. More positively, she might 
argue as follows. Attribution of non-conceptual content is standardly intended to help us 
explain apparently cognitive and purposive behaviour in creatures that arguably haven't 
mastered concepts - animals, newborn babies, etc. Attribution of such content'piggy 
backs', as it were, on the conceptual capacities of the attributing theorist: it is because 
ive have the concept of squirrels, and elm trees, and spatial locations, that we can specify 
the dog's mistaken thought as one that the squirrel is in the elm tree. In this way, we can 
get the explanatory benefits of appeal to intentional states, while avoiding having to 
attribute an implausibly sophisticated conceptual range to beasts and babes, or to play 
down the normative and holistic character of concept acquisition and mastery. 
It is open to the defender of SI to hold that a similar relationship holds between 
ourselves and God as holds between the dog andthe theorist. We entertain genuinely 
representational, non-conceptual thoughts about God, which we express via metaphors. 
Thoughts with which contents? Those specified by God - since only ýsomething as 
powerful and cognitively unlimited as God could properly conceptualise his properties. 
We, not the dog, can specify the content of his thoughts about the elm tree; God, not us, 
can specify the content of our thought about God. The propositions that our metaphors 
express are thus cognitively within our grasp, and yet non-reducible, even in part, to 
literal language. Moreover, this second strategy, if good, seems to avoid the 
disadvantage noted with the first approach, since it is consistent with the claim that 
subjects from many different traditions and historical periods can think about God, and 
express that thought, no doubt with widely varying efficacy, in metaphor, model and 
parable. 
This type of reply, as with the first account, draws strength from analogies with 
independently motivated positions. States which plausibly involve non-conceptual 
content in Bermudez' sense - including perceptual, proprioceptive, emotional and 
aesthetic states - are ones where we find metaphors centrally important in describing and 
understanding our thoughts. In these cases, metaphors, analogies and models may 
indeed play a central role in the process of conceptualization by which we eventually 
come to be able to specify the states of thought that we are in. The idea that this need 
always be the case needs arguing, though, and there doesn't seem to me to be any reason 
why the SI-theorist should feel obliged to hold that it happens in the theological case. 
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There are no doubt many difficulties which might be raised with both approaches, 
evident on even this brief outline. I want to briefly consider two points which might be 
raised with reference to the rejection of Conceptual Access, however. The first is that, 
since God can specify the literal content of our metaphors, they are paraphrasable after 
all, and Strong Irreducibility is false. The defender of SI should concede that, in this 
sense, irreducible metaphors can be paraphrased, but hold that they were only ever 
committed to the weaker modal claim that they could not be paraphrased, even in part, 
and even in principle, by creatures such as us. Since God knows everything that can be 
known, he knows what our metaphors say, if they say anything, but this rebuttal of SI 
seems rather too quick to address the most interesting versions of the claim of 
irreducibility, and is definitely not in the spirit of Alston's argument as presented. 
The second objection which might be raised is that I have appealed to many non- 
metaphorical qualities of God in setting up the above argument - for example, that he 
would assign particular contents to the irreducible metaphors we use to talk about him. 
Doesn't such appeal to our knowledge of God's nature undercut many of the motivations 
which might be given for endorsing SI in the first place? In particular, can such an 
account be squared with any theory which holds that God's nature is wholly ineffable? 
I would want to make two replies to such an objection. The first is the local point that, 
as presented in this paper, Alston's argument is presented as establishing the 
impossibility of strongly irreducible theological metaphors. Even if my argument 
doesn't show that such metaphors can play the role that the supporter of ineffability 
required of them, it would still show that such metaphors ivere possible in theological 
contexts, for all Alston's argument shows, given either certain beliefs about externalism 
and basicality, or, more interestingly for my purposes here, about non-conceptual 
content. 
Secondly, the ineffability theorist might make a certain reflexive move in response to the 
above challenge, and claim that the philosophical claims she makes about God in the 
course of defending SI are, ultimately speaking as it were, as metaphorical as talk about 
shepherds, kings and rock. Of course, since she is committed to such metaphors 
expressing non-conceptual contents, which can only be specified by God, she will hold 
that the philosophical remarks about God and metaphor she makes themselves are 
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metaphors whose content she can entertain, although only God can specify. But it isn't 
immediately obvious why this move should be taken to be viciously circular, or self- 
defeating, at least in a context where the burden of proof isn't assumed always to fall on 
the theist. If she occupies states which genuinely represent aspects of God, and which 
are cognitively integrated with her other psychological states, then why shouldn't she 
employ these in reasoning about God? 
Such a result, even if consistent, may be considerably less than many defenders of 
ineffability might want to endorse; perhaps the idea that we can occupy any states which 
can genuinely represent the nature of God, conceptual or otherwise, simply fails to meet 
a certain type of sense of God's alterity. Nevertheless, such an account would, if stable, 
at least provide one elucidation of God's ineffability. That alone, it seems to me, 
provides it with sufficient interest to warrant more general consideration. 
I have argued that the defender of strong irreducibility has room to counter Alston's 
attempted reductio, and sketched two possible lines of thought which might allow her to 
do so. Both have costs in terms of philosophical commitments, but I have argued that 
for the most part, they are not particularly steep, and have struck philosophers as 
possessing some independent plausibility. I conclude that, pending further investigation 
at least, and for all Alston has shown us, theists are free to appeal to irreducible 
metaphors in theology. 
5.7 Metaphor and Vagueness 
I want to briefly discuss one final disambiguation of limitlessness; one highlighted by 
Davidson's evocative remark that any attempted paraphrase of metaphor is bound to fail 
because there is 'the idea of finishing would have no clear application'. It is clear that 
Davidson's remark may be taken in a number of different ways, drawing attention to a 
number of salient features of the limitlessness of metaphor, including some discussed 
earlier. I want to draw attention to one way in which the realist might aim to explain 
why the idea of finishing had no clear application, namely, by claiming that 
'__jnetaphorically means that-' is a vague term. 
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Take a standard example of metaphor: Romeo's claim that Juliet is the sun, say. It 
seems clear that there are some things that this definitely doesn't mean; that Juliet is 
gassy, for example. Moreover, there may be some features that no satisfactory 
elucidation of the metaphor could omit; that Juliet is important to Romeo, for example. 
But between these to categories, it is clear that there is a large grey area, where we are 
unsure whether a given property is really part of the metaphorical content expressed. 
Thus Stem describes the metaphor as conveying that Juliet is "exemplary and peerless, 
worthy of worship and adoration, one without whose nourishing attention another cannot 
live, one who awakens those in her presence from their slumbering, who brings light to 
darkness". 267 It is simply not clear to me that the metaphor genuinely mandates the 
claim that Juliet e. g. 'awakens those in her presence from their slumbering'. So it seems 
that, in general terms, we can often identify three categories of metaphorical assignment; 
those properties that definitely seem part of the metaphorical meaning, those that 
definitely do not, and those for which it is neither definite that they do nor definite that 
they do not. 
Such a division clearly invites a treatment in terms of vagueness. Such an account 
would have a natural account of why there was no clear stopping place in paraphrasing 
metaphor - we simply stray onto a wide, multi-dimensional borderline, where it is often 
far from clearwhether a given property genuinely counts as part of the meaning of the 
metaphor. Since I am dealing with a broadly realist account of metaphorical meaning, I 
will examine how the most straightforwardly realist account of vague terms - 
epistemicism - might account for this phenomenon. . 
Epistemicists about vagueness explain the linguistic behaviour of vague terms, including 
their capacity to g ive rise to the famous sorites paradoxes, in terms of our being ignorant 
about certain facts about the world. For an epistemicist about redness, there is a 
unknowable fact of the matter regarding which precise shade on the colour spectrum 
marks the transition from redness to non-redness. For the episternicist about 
metaphorical meaning, similarly, there are complete and precise facts about whether a 
given paraphrase of a metaphor is correct or not, but we simply cannot know what they 
are. Since, as noted above, most contemporary philosophers of metaphor endorse an 
267 Stern (2000) p. 9 
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anti-realist answer to the Evidence Transcendence test, episternicism will no doubt 
seem to an extremely revisionary proposal. The epistemicist thus has some important 
explanatory debts to discharge. They ought to tell us: 
(1) why we should believe in 'sharp cut-offs' in paraphrases of metaphor. 
(2) why we are unable to know the positions of such cut-offs. 
(3) how the answers to the above two questions can be integrated with our pre- 
theoretic conception of epistemology and semantics. 
I do not have space here for a satisfactory treatment of these issues. I can however, 
sketch the beginnings of a line that such a theorist might take. Firstly, the epistemicist 
ought to motivate his position by noting (a) his ability to give a straightforward 
resolution of a number of versions of the sorites paradoxes which (b) accords well with a 
minimal statement of the phenomenon of vagueness while (c) maintaining classical 
logic, an intuitive and clearly understood system and (d) avoiding the counter-intuitive 
results that seem to plague its rivals. 268 That begins to address (1). Secondly, the 
epistemicist ought to tell something like Williamson's story regarding our ignorance of 
such CUt_offs . 
269 Arguably, knowledge demands something like modal safety: it is a 
priori that, if S knows that P, then it couldn't easily have been the case that S believed 
that P and P was false. The problem with gaining knowledge of exactly where a given 
colour cuts off, or paraphrase ends, is that it is just too easy to form false beliefs in the 
area. Even if one happens to stumble by chance on the correct shade, or statement of the 
metaphor's meaning, one does not count as knowing that one has done so, since we lack 
the relevant powers of discrimination to clearly distinguish such choices from their 
incorrect, closely overlapping neighbours. So one is typically necessarily ignorant of 
where redness cuts off, and what the uniquely correct paraphrase of a metaphor really is. 
The real puzzle for the episternicist about m-meaning is in addressing the latter half of 
explanatory debt (3). What aspect of our linguistic thought and practice could possibly 
serve to determine that metaphor meant one perfectly precise paraphrase rather than 
268 For a detailed defence of (a), (c) and (d), see Williamson (1994) and (1997), and Sainsbury and 
Williamson (1997). For a defence of the claim that epistemicism coheres best with a minim4l description 
of the phenomenon of vaguness, see Greenough (2003). 
269 See Williamson (1994) Ch 7 and (2000) Chs. 5 and 7 
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another, closely related one, in a way that transcended all possibility ofsuccessful 
human enquiry? Surely, one might feel, this is wholly to surrender the Wittgensteinian 
insight that meaning has an internal connection to the way words and sentences are 
used? If this is the cost of finessing limitlessness, many will no doubt feel that it is 
hardly worth the candle. 
Nevertheless, it may be too soon to hope that such an extreme realist about metaphorical 
meaning will be forced into capitulation. The following answer may be open to him. 
Call each potential paraphrase of a metaphor a candidate-meaning of the metaphor. 
Think of such meanings as conjunctions of claims MI-Mn relating to the metaphor, a 
little like Stem's paraphrase of 'Juliet is the sun', only spelled out in some language 
which is infinitely more complicated than our own, suitable for expressing literally the 
fine-grained non-conceptual contents that English can only gesture at figuratively. 
Acceptable candidate-meanings will include each claim Mk that definitely belongs to the 
paraphrase of a given metaphor, and none of the claims that definitely do not belong to 
such a paraphrase. The vagueness of metaphor consists, according to our epistemicist, in 
our being unable to tell which of the acceptable candidate-meanings of the metaphor is 
the correct one. Even if we could formulate such paraphrases in such a language, and 
happened to pick the right one out by chance, we could never count as knowing that we 
had done so, since we cannot, we are supposing, reliably discriminate the correct 
candidate meaning from its incorrect, partially overlapping neighbours. So we can never 
have sufficient warrant for thinking that we have correctly paraphrased a metaphor, and 
a form of limitlessness is accounted for. 
The proposed epistemicist will think of a given metaphor as being ambiguous between 
its acceptable candidate-meanings. 270 Our linguistic practice, together with the way the 
world is, fails to determine a unique satisfier for the definite description 'correct 
paraphrase of the metaphor'. Now, arguably, it does not make sense to ask after the 
unrelativized truth value of an ambiguous utterance. Take the claim that many bats can 
fly. Is that true? Well, it's true of vampire bats, but not of baseball bats. The question 
270 1 owe this thought to Sider and Braun (2004). Those authors conclude that no sentence containing a 
vague term has a truth value, and no argument involving one is valid. My epistemicist concedes that may 
be true of sentences, but denies it of utterances. 
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of the truth value of the sentence is only properly resoluble once the ambiguity in the 
string has been eliminated. A similar feature holds true of arguments. Is: something is 
aflying bat, so something is a bat valid? Yes, on some resolutions of the ambiguous 
terms; no on others. Since sentences involving vague terms are treated as if they were 
ambiguous in the more traditional sense, the same story goes for them. On this view, 
Frege was right to hold that vagueness in natural language must be eliminated before 
evaluation in terms of truth, validity, etc, can take place. 
Such a view is obviously radically revisionary. We normally think of claims like: 
(a) Post-boxes are red 
(b) Men with no hair are bald 
as being straightforwardly true. Since, on the mooted view, each such vague sentence is 
ambiguous between a number of equally acceptable precisifications, it is strictly 
speaking incorrect to think of any of them being apt for truth or falsity. Similarly, 
- intuitively valid arguments ("All red things are coloured, this thing is red, so this thing is 
coloured") are actually not apt for such appraisal after all. 271 
My epistemicist attempts to sweeten the pill with the following fable. Although such 
sentences are non-truth apt, since they do not express unambiguous propositional 
contents, utterances of such sentences in context do express such unique meanings. 
How can this miracle occur? Think of a linguistic context as a device for maximizing 
the intelligibility of conversational participants. 272 Now, conversational participants 
normally aim to speak truly, and reason validly, notjust approximate to each. Moreover, 
they expect the same of other interlocutors. We ought to predict that context will thus 
shift in a way that allows them to achieve their aims. After all, that's exactly what 
happens when I tell you to put all the beer in the fridge, or describe my desk as flat. 
Contextual standards shift appropriately in response to the aims of conversational 
participants. How exactly this happens is no doubt a puzzling matter, which we don't 
271 Sider and Braun accept this conclusion, but argue that 'approximate truth' is all we need and should 
care about. 
272 Compare Lewis (1979) p 420. "... conversational score does tend to evolve in such a way as is required 
in order to make whatever occurs count ascorrect play". 
213 
yet understand fully, although we can model some aspects of it. Nevertheless, poor 
grasp of a phenomenon is not a reason to reject it, especially when we rely on appeal to 
it to do important explanatory work. 
How might context shift to let us achieve our aims? Since, by hypothesis, there are a 
selection of equally good candidate meanings, it cannot shift so as to pick an 
independently favoured one. In a sense, context is in the position of Buridan's Ass. 
Both have a goal - to eat straw, to maximise intelligibility - which they will fail to 
achieve if they remain static in the face of equally good options. The obvious solution 
for the Ass in this case is not to think about things too hard; to pick an arbitrary bundle 
at random, rather than settling for hunger in the face of equally tempting alternatives. 
Similarly, the best result for context is to simply assign an arbitrary precisification to 
every vague term in the utterance. That way, intelligibility is maximized. If context 
refuses to assign a value in the case of a draw, then our utterances end up failing of truth 
and validity, contrary to our communicative intentions. And that's exactly what we 
think context-shifts tend to prevent. 
Now, since, by hypothesis, such a shift by context assigns an arbitrary precisification to 
vague terms, we cannot hope to know which semantic value it has assigned. Safety is 
violated, since it is just to easy for us to form false beliefs about which of the permissible 
sharpenings of e. g. 'red' or 'bald' has been assigned to a given utterance. So the basic 
epistemicist story about vagueness holds. Nevertheless, on the suggested account, the 
epistemicist can seem to circumvent their greatest problem; of identifying what it is 
about our pre-theoretic linguistic practice that could possibly determine sharp cut-offs. 
The answer turns out to be relatively simple: our shared expectation that the correct 
interpretation of one's thought and talk is the one that maximizes intelligibility. Our 
epistemicist simply puts a characteristic spin on this plausible thought, by denying that 
we can always in principle come to know what such a correct interpretation is. 
A similar story goes for metaphor. Metaphors, according to our hero, are ambiguous 
between their rival candidate-meanings. In cases where we want to get something fairly 
definite across, to speak the truth, in an extended sense, context shifts to assign an 
arbitrary such candidate-meaning to the metaphor. The search for paraphrase is clearly 
doomed, on this account, since we would never be able to know that we had lighted on 
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the correct restatement even if we had. So a form of limitlessness is established. We 
can identify some propositions that lie clearly on either side of a large, grey area, but 
beyond that point, we are out of our epistemic depth. 
5.8 Conclusion 
In the early part of this thesis, I outlined and offered some preliminary defence of a 
broadly Davidsonian error-theory about metaphorical meaning. In the last two chapters, 
I have aimed to examine some key issues relating to realism about metaphorical 
meaning in a broader, and more neutral manner. In Chapter 4,1 discussed such meaning 
in the light of Wright's cruces, and began to examine whether they might help highlight 
previously unconsidered resources for accounting for the distinctive marks of metaphor. 
In this chapter, I continued that project. I argued that thinking of metaphors as serving 
to express non-conceptual contents provided some resources for a realist account of 
limitlessness and non-propositionality. I then described two ways in which such a 
model could be independently insightful and significant, in the philosophy of emotion 
and the philosophy of religion. Finally, I sketched a novel, robustly realist treatment of 
non-paraphrasability, in terms of a certain kind of context-dependent resolution of 
vagueness. 
It seems, then, that Davidson has not marshalled conclusive arguments, based on the 
marks of metaphor, that would serve to establish that. a broadly pragmatic realist model 
is hopeless. Since, as I have already concluded, Davidson himself should agree that 
metaphors can be used to implicate propositions, this is not wholly bad news for the 
error-theorist. Nevertheless, if the defence of Davidson's (A6) depends maintaining on 
the vast majority of metaphors failing to convey such propositions, at the supposed cost 
of surrendering the marks of metaphor, then such a defence seems to fail. Of course, my 
discussion here has been provisional, sketchy and carried out at an intuitive level. 
Nevertheless, I hope to have established several strategies by which the realist about 
metaphorical meaning might hope to give an account of the limitlessness and non- 
propositionality of metaphor, without surrendering central doctrines. In the absence of 
compelling reason for thinking that such strategies must fail, the pragmatic realist 
account of metaphorical content seems to remain as an important and viable position. 
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Conclusion 
My aim in this thesis has been to examine whether the philosophy of realism can cast 
light upon the philosophy of metaphor. The issues involved are large ones, and my 
discussion has often been correspondingly limited, sketchy and provisional. 
Nevertheless, I hope that some minor progress has been made. I began by endorsing 
some key aspects of Wright's recommended methodology for prosecuting debates about 
realism - in particular his suggestion that we should aim to identify and apply a series of 
diagnostic 'tests for objectivity' - while rejecting his characterization of the relative 
dialectical positions of the participants in such investigations. I then clarified and 
defended a broadly Davidsonian position on metaphor, signalling its kinship with error 
theoretic positions in other areas. I addressed Wright's worry that the availability of 
minimalism undercut the motivation for such a such a position, and argued that the 
Davidsonian was best understood as arguing that talk of metaphorical meaning, at least 
in the semantic sense of that ambiguous term, failed to meet even the most basic hurdle 
for objectivity, that of coherence in the light of the constitutive standards of its parent 
discourse. 
Though there is still much more work to be done, and plenty of room for the opposition 
to manoeuvre, I provisionally endorsed this aspect of the anti-realist challenge. Key 
premises of Davidson's master argument against a semantic treatment of metaphorical 
meaning had proved defensible, and the overall ontological economy of the position had 
earned it, I claimed, a right to. default status in the field. In an effort not to foreclose too 
quickly on defensible theories, I broadened my avenue of enquiry. Wright's tests 
provided a useful structure in which to address key issues in the philosophy of metaphor, 
and I endeavoured to apply them in a way. that was maximally neutral between live 
theories in the field. That methodological decision turned out to be fruitful, when 
attempting to apply the test to metaphor tests helped bring to the fore several under- 
explored issues - relating, for example, to the realist standing of speaker-intention, to the 
autonomy of metaphorical interpretation, and the epistemic transparency of context - 
that might otherwise have remained unexamined. 
217 
In the closing chapter, I set out a more positive vision, identifying a distinctive cognitive 
and linguistic role that metaphor characteristically discharges. I related Bermudez' work 
on non-conceptual content to Davidsonian worries about realist neglect of the marks of 
metaphor, and tried to demonstrate how these concerns might be addressed by a 
pragmatic realist about metaphorical meaning. I briefly treated the role of metaphor in 
the communication and examination of our emotional states, and suggested some ways 
in which the position might serve to underwrite the possibility of irreducible religious 
metaphor, contra Alston. 
Throughout the thesis, I have tried to address key issues in contemporary philosophy of 
metaphor. My discussion has been uneven; painfully underdeveloped in some areas, and 
painfully detailed in others. My focus of attention has often circled round two or three 
central theories and concerns. My primary stalking horses have been the insightful and 
original approaches of Davidson, Stem and Denham, with which I have found much to 
disagree, but much also to applaud. I have often returned to the question of how to 
pursue profitable discussion about realism, to the proper understanding of the distinctive 
marks of metaphor, and the connection between figurative meaning and speaker 
intention. Each of these issues seems barely to have been broached, and yet I hope that I 
have identified some potentially rewarding routes for further enquiry. 
Philosophy of metaphor - like the philosophy of the emotions, like the philosophy of art 
- often seems beset with a single overriding tension. . On the one hand, there 
is a strong 
tendency to try to bring metaphor within the compass of some systematic theory, that 
assigns it a suitably cognitive role, a place at the foundations of our epistemic practice. 
On the other, there is the tendency to feel that this approach, no matter how sensitively 
its practitioners try to account for the distinctive nature of the phenomenon, seems to 
leave everything out that made us interested in the topic in the first place. It is difficult 
to tell whether this reveals anything important about the nature of such subject matter, 
paradigmatically close as it is to the expressive, lived life of human beings, or whether it 
is merely a predictable side-effect of the usual murdering to dissect. In any case, this 
thesis, like most other work in the area, has made at best limited progress in resolving or 
dissolving that ftindamental tension. Davidson famously described metaphor as the 
dreamwork of language, but I want to conclude instead with Wittgenstein's cautionary 
remarks about what real dreamwork actually achieves: 
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In Freudian analysis, the dream is as it were dismantled. It loses its original sense 
completely. You might think of it as performed on the stage, with a plot that is 
sometimes fairly incomprehensible but also in part quite comprehensible, or at least 
apparently so, & as though this plot were then tom into little pieces & each part given a 
completely different meaning. You could also think of it like this: a picture is drawn on 
a big sheet of paper & the sheet is then folded in such a way that pieces which do not 
belong together at all in the original picture collide in appearance &a new picture, 
which may make sense or may not, is formed ... Now I could imagine that someone 
might exclaim "Yes, that is the solution, that is what I dreamed, without gaps or 
distortions. " It would then be this acknowledgement that made this solution tile 
solution ... In this case it might really be said: only when you have found it, do you know 
what you were looking for. 273 
It seems to me that Wittgenstein's construal of dreamwork is a good metaphor for the 
interpretation of metaphor itself, and also, aptly enough, for the completion of a thesis. 
273 Wittgenstein (1998) p. 78. '( MS 136 137a: 22.1.1948. ) 
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